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CHAPTER	  I	  
	  INTRODUCTION	  
	  	   Medical	  confidentiality	  mandates	  that	  doctors	  work	  to	  protect	  their	  clients	  secrets.	  	  But	  what	  happens	  when	  physicians	  are	  called	  upon	  to	  testify	  in	  a	  court	  of	  law?	  Upon	  questioning	  in	  the	  courtroom,	  are	  physicians	  ethically—or	  legally—justified	  in	  revealing	  their	  patient’s	  secrets?	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  laws	  governing	  medical	  testimony	  in	  the	  courtroom	  are	  myriad	  and	  contradictory.	  In	  some	  courtrooms,	  doctors	  are	  forbidden	  from	  disclosing	  their	  patients’	  secrets.	  In	  others,	  doctors	  risk	  being	  held	  in	  contempt	  of	  court	  if	  they	  withhold	  any	  information.	  New	  York’s	  statutory	  code	  protects	  almost	  all	  communications	  between	  doctor	  and	  patient.	  Massachusetts,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  requires	  physicians	  to	  submit	  to	  any	  and	  all	  questions.	  In	  California,	  physicians	  must	  reveal	  their	  patients’	  secrets	  in	  criminal	  trials,	  but	  cannot	  in	  civil	  trials.	  At	  present,	  federal	  law	  is	  ambiguous	  on	  the	  subject.	  These	  contradictions	  are	  the	  product	  of	  the	  slow	  evolution	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  This	  study	  surveys	  the	  history	  of	  the	  privilege	  throughout	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  a	  period	  when	  the	  majority	  of	  U.S.	  states	  adopted	  the	  privilege.	  Between	  1828	  and	  1906,	  thirty	  states,	  along	  with	  the	  District	  of	  Columbia	  adopted	  some	  form	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  Compared	  to	  this	  period	  of	  intense	  legislative	  activity,	  relatively	  few	  states	  adopted	  the	  privilege	  in	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  With	  almost	  all	  of	  these	  nineteenth-­‐century	  laws	  still	  in	  effect,	  nineteenth	  century	  developments	  in	  medical	  confidentiality	  continue	  to	  shape	  American	  law	  and	  medical	  practice	  in	  the	  twenty-­‐first	  century.	  	  
	  	  2	  
Privileged	  communications,	  a	  legal	  doctrine	  allowing	  specific	  pieces	  of	  evidence	  to	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  courtroom	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  protecting	  professional	  secrets,	  has	  long	  been	  debated	  within	  legal	  scholarship.	  In	  common	  law	  jurisdictions,	  conversations	  between	  attorney	  and	  client	  were	  the	  first	  communications	  to	  be	  excluded	  from	  court	  testimony.	  Legal	  scholars	  have	  found	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  attorney-­‐client	  privilege	  was	  infrequently	  applied	  to	  judicial	  decisions	  in	  the	  early	  seventeenth	  century.	  John	  Henry	  Wigmore,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  scholars	  of	  evidence	  law	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  stated	  that	  “the	  history	  of	  this	  privilege	  goes	  back	  to	  the	  reign	  of	  Elizabeth,	  where	  the	  privilege	  already	  appears	  as	  unquestioned.”1	  While	  recent	  scholarship	  has	  questioned	  this	  facile	  history	  of	  attorney-­‐client	  privilege,	  arguing	  that	  the	  privilege	  did	  not	  take	  its	  modern	  form	  until	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century,2	  the	  first	  court	  judges	  to	  rule	  on	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege,	  each	  stressed	  that	  attorney-­‐client	  privilege	  had	  long	  been	  recognized	  as	  a	  sound	  legal	  doctrine.3	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  John	  Henry	  Wigmore,	  A	  Treatise	  on	  the	  System	  of	  Evidence	  in	  Trials	  at	  Common	  Law	  
Including	  the	  Statutes	  and	  Judicial	  Decisions	  of	  All	  Jurisdictions	  of	  the	  United	  States	  
vol.	  4	  (Boston:	  Parkhill	  and	  Co.,	  1904),	  quote	  at	  3193,	  for	  a	  history	  of	  attorney-­‐client	  privilege,	  see	  pages	  3193-­‐3225.	  	  2	  For	  an	  example	  of	  this	  argument,	  see:	  Geoffrey	  Hazard,	  “An	  Historical	  Perspective	  on	  Attorney-­‐Client	  Privilege,”	  California	  Law	  Review	  66	  (1978),	  pp.	  1061-­‐1091.	  	  3	  See	  Lord	  Mansfield’s	  treatment	  of	  the	  attorney,	  Berkley	  in	  the	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston’s	  Trial	  for	  Bigamy:	  The	  Trial	  of	  Elizabeth	  Duchess	  Dowager	  of	  Kingston	  for	  
Bigamy,	  before	  the	  Right	  Honourable	  the	  House	  of	  Peers,	  in	  Westminster-­‐Hall,	  in	  Full	  
Parliament,	  on	  Monday	  the	  15th,	  Tuesday	  the	  16th,	  Friday	  the	  19th,	  Saturday	  the	  20th,	  
and	  Monday	  the	  22d	  of	  April,	  1776;	  on	  the	  Last	  of	  Which	  Days	  the	  Said	  Elizabeth	  
Duchess	  Dowager	  of	  Kingston	  Was	  Found	  Guilty.	  Published	  by	  Order	  of	  the	  House	  of	  
Peers	  (London:	  printed	  for	  Charles	  Bathurst,	  in	  Fleet-­‐Street,	  1776),	  120.	  	  and	  Justice	  Buller’s	  remarks	  in	  Wilson	  v.	  Rastall:	  Term	  Reports	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  King’s	  Bench:	  from	  
	  	  3	  
In	  comparison	  to	  attorney-­‐client	  privilege,	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  has	  proven	  far	  more	  controversial.	  A	  legal	  guarantee	  that	  doctors	  cannot	  be	  compelled	  to	  reveal	  patients’	  secrets	  in	  courts	  of	  law,	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  is	  one	  of	  the	  strongest	  guarantees	  of	  medical	  confidentiality.	  The	  privilege	  implies	  that	  doctors’	  ability	  to	  serve	  their	  patients	  effectively	  and	  efficiently	  is	  more	  important	  than	  the	  basic	  functions	  of	  law.	  Accordingly,	  medical	  practitioners	  have	  often	  pursued	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  as	  a	  powerful	  indicator	  of	  the	  status	  and	  esteem	  of	  the	  profession.	  Legal	  scholars,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  have	  often	  opposed	  the	  privilege,	  suggesting	  it	  only	  serves	  as	  an	  impediment	  to	  the	  judicial	  process.	  	  Yet	  the	  medical	  and	  legal	  positions	  on	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  were	  never	  fixed.	  	  Distinct	  groups	  of	  medical	  and	  legal	  scholars	  have	  embraced	  and	  rejected	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  at	  different	  times	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  larger	  agendas.	  At	  times,	  doctors	  viewed	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  as	  a	  powerful	  indicator	  of	  professional	  status.	  At	  other	  points,	  however,	  many	  physicians	  came	  to	  view	  the	  privilege—and	  its	  restriction	  on	  their	  ability	  to	  exercise	  discretion	  in	  disclosing	  medical	  information—as	  challenge	  to	  their	  professional	  autonomy.	  Similarly,	  legal	  scholars	  have,	  at	  times,	  embraced	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  make	  the	  judicial	  process	  more	  legible,	  while,	  at	  others,	  as	  an	  unwanted	  impediment	  to	  the	  judicial	  process.	  	  Analyzing	  the	  medical	  and	  legal	  developments	  that	  led	  much	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  adopt	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege,	  this	  study	  places	  the	  evolution	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  within	  the	  larger	  histories	  of	  the	  professionalization	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Michaelmas	  Term	  31st	  George	  III.	  1790	  to	  Trinity	  Term,	  32nd	  George	  III.	  1792.	  Both	  
Inclusive	  (London:	  1799)	  Both	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  later	  chapters.	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medicine	  and	  the	  codification	  of	  American	  law.	  Over	  the	  past	  thirty	  years,	  historians	  have	  produced	  a	  vibrant	  scholarship	  on	  these	  issues.	  The	  social	  history	  of	  medicine	  has	  spawned	  multiple	  comprehensive	  studies	  of	  the	  professionalization	  of	  medicine	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  4	  as	  well	  as	  the	  interrelated	  histories	  of	  medical	  ethics5	  and	  the	  relationship	  between	  medicine	  and	  the	  law.	  6	  To	  date,	  however,	  no	  scholar	  has	  investigated	  the	  long	  and	  tangled	  relationship	  between	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  and	  the	  medical	  profession	  in	  the	  United	  States.7	  For	  scholars	  interested	  in	  this	  issue,	  legal	  treatises	  continue	  to	  offer	  the	  most	  thorough	  histories	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege,	  yet	  the	  historical	  context	  that	  shaped	  the	  long	  evolution	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  is	  largely	  absent	  from	  these	  studies.	  8	  This	  work	  seeks	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  professionalization	  of	  medicine,	  this	  study	  relies	  primarily	  upon	  the	  works	  of:	  Paul	  Starr,	  The	  Social	  Transformation	  of	  American	  Medicine:	  The	  
Rise	  of	  a	  Sovereign	  Profession	  and	  the	  Making	  of	  a	  Vast	  Industry	  	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  1982);	  John	  Harley	  Warner,	  The	  Therapeutic	  Perspective:	  Medical	  Practice,	  
Knowledge,	  and	  Identity	  in	  America,	  1820-­‐1885	  (Princeton:	  University	  Press,	  1986);	  and	  William	  Rothstein’s	  American	  Physicians	  in	  the	  Nineteenth	  Century:	  From	  Sects	  to	  
Science	  (Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1972).	  	  5	  For	  discussion	  of	  these	  topics,	  this	  study	  will	  build	  upon	  the	  work	  of	  Robert	  Baker’s	  Before	  Bioethics:	  A	  History	  of	  American	  Medical	  Ethics	  from	  the	  Colonial	  
Period	  to	  the	  Bioethics	  Revolution	  (Oxford:	  University	  Press,	  2013);	  and	  Donald	  E.	  Konold,	  A	  History	  of	  American	  Medical	  Ethics,	  1847-­‐1912	  (Madison:	  1962).	  	  6	  William	  Novak,	  The	  People’s	  Welfare:	  Law	  and	  Regulation	  in	  Nineteenth-­‐Century	  
America	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1996).	  Much	  of	  my	  analysis	  of	  medico-­‐legal	  developments	  is	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  James	  C.	  Mohr’s	  Doctors	  and	  
the	  Law:	  Medical	  Jurisprudence	  in	  Nineteenth-­‐Century	  America	  (Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  1996).	  	  7	  Angus	  Ferguson’s	  Should	  a	  Doctor	  Tell?	  The	  Evolution	  of	  Medical	  Confidentiality	  in	  
Britain	  	  (Farnham:	  Ashgate,	  2013)	  offers	  an	  overview	  of	  similar	  developments	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom.	  	  	  8	  Of	  these	  texts,	  Wigmore’s	  On	  Evidence,	  first	  published	  over	  a	  century	  ago,	  continues	  to	  be	  the	  most	  comprehensive.	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integrate	  the	  history	  of	  the	  evolution	  of	  these	  laws	  with	  contemporary	  scholarship	  on	  the	  history	  of	  medicine.	  	  Many	  scholars	  have	  asserted	  that	  the	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  was	  first	  invoked	  during	  the	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston’s	  trial	  for	  bigamy	  in	  1776.	  Chapter	  1	  examines	  this	  influential	  court	  case,	  focusing	  on	  the	  circumstances	  that	  led	  Caesar	  Hawkins,	  the	  Duchess’s	  surgeon,	  to	  ask	  permission	  to	  withhold	  his	  patients’	  secrets.	  By	  placing	  this	  trial	  in	  its	  historical	  context,	  it	  becomes	  apparent	  that	  Hawkins	  did	  not	  claim	  privileged	  communications	  on	  behalf	  of	  his	  profession,	  but	  rather	  appealed	  to	  his	  status	  as	  a	  wealthy,	  aristocratic	  gentleman.	  If	  Hawkins	  did	  not	  advocate	  for	  privileged	  communications	  on	  behalf	  of	  his	  profession,	  the	  origins	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  must	  be	  attributed	  to	  later	  medico-­‐legal	  developments.	  	  	   The	  first	  statute	  guaranteeing	  medical	  confidentiality	  was	  enacted	  in	  New	  York	  in	  1828.	  Over	  the	  next	  few	  decades,	  numerous	  states	  followed	  suit	  in	  adopting	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  Chapter	  2	  examines	  the	  wave	  of	  legislation	  that	  brought	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  to	  much	  of	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century.	  While	  scholars	  have	  rightly	  connected	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  to	  the	  professionalization	  of	  medicine,9	  the	  earliest	  statutes	  were	  initially	  unnoticed	  by	  nineteenth	  century	  physicians.	  Instead,	  these	  statutes	  can	  be	  best	  explained	  as	  part	  of	  a	  codification	  movement	  that	  reshaped	  American	  law	  in	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century.	  Codification	  enabled	  Americans	  to	  amend	  and	  reform	  the	  common	  law,	  producing	  new	  or	  revised	  statutory	  codes	  in	  numerous	  states.	  Each	  of	  the	  physician-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  the	  subject	  is	  discussed	  in	  histories	  of	  medical	  ethics,	  such	  as	  Konold’s	  A	  History	  of	  American	  Medical	  Ethics	  or	  Baker’s	  Before	  Bioethics,	  it	  is	  usually	  discussed	  in	  this	  context.	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patient	  privilege	  statutes	  enacted	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  were	  connected	  to	  larger	  codification	  movements.	  And	  yet	  medical	  developments	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  gradually	  brought	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  into	  medical	  discourse.	  	  A	  small	  cadre	  of	  physicians	  sought	  to	  monopolize	  the	  medical	  profession	  in	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century.	  In	  time,	  these	  doctors	  came	  to	  see	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  as	  a	  powerful	  tool	  to	  enhance	  the	  status	  and	  reputation	  of	  the	  medical	  profession.	  Chapter	  3	  examines	  the	  rise	  of	  codified	  medical	  ethics	  and	  medical	  police	  that	  led	  doctors	  to	  embrace,	  and	  increasingly	  advocate	  for,	  the	  spread	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  By	  formally	  acknowledging	  the	  privilege	  in	  the	  ethical	  codes	  of	  various	  local	  and,	  eventually,	  national	  medical	  societies,	  doctors	  signaled	  their	  desire	  to	  see	  the	  further	  spread	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  	  	   In	  the	  second	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  doctors	  would	  emerge	  as	  the	  foremost	  proponents	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  Beginning	  in	  the	  1880s,	  doctors	  openly	  campaigned	  to	  secure	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  in	  numerous	  states,	  using	  medical	  societies	  and	  professional	  journals	  as	  instruments	  to	  rally	  support	  for	  proposed	  legislation.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  the	  consensus	  that	  underpinned	  codified	  medical	  ethics	  gave	  way.	  Increasingly	  disillusioned	  with	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  medical	  policing	  was	  being	  conducted,	  many	  physicians	  rebelled	  against	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association’s	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  and	  the	  statutory	  protection	  of	  medical	  confidentiality.	  Chapter	  4	  examines	  the	  advocacy	  of	  doctors	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  this	  debate.	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  Chapter	  5	  examines	  legal	  and	  medical	  responses	  to	  the	  proliferation	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century.	  By	  1900,	  dissent	  within	  the	  medical	  profession	  had	  reached	  a	  boiling	  point.	  Doctors	  came	  to	  see	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  and	  codified	  medical	  ethics	  as	  an	  unwelcome	  limitation	  on	  their	  professional	  autonomy.	  The	  AMA	  revised	  its	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  twice	  over	  the	  first	  two	  decades	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  each	  time	  reducing	  its	  proscriptive	  powers.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  legal	  scholars	  also	  emerged	  as	  critics	  of	  the	  law.	  Foremost	  among	  these	  critics,	  John	  Henry	  Wigmore	  suggested	  that	  the	  privilege	  should	  be	  abolished	  altogether.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  criticism	  from	  both	  the	  medical	  and	  legal	  professions,	  the	  proliferation	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  abruptly	  came	  to	  an	  end.	  Since	  1900,	  few	  jurisdictions	  have	  adopted	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  Instead	  many	  jurisdictions	  reversed	  course,	  amending	  their	  laws	  to	  limit	  the	  applications	  of	  the	  privilege.	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CHAPTER	  II	  
	  CREATING	  A	  PRECEDENT:	  MEDICAL	  CONFIDENTIALITY	  AND	  THE	  DUCHESS	  OF	  
KINGSTON’S	  CASE	  	   Caesar	  Hawkins:	  I	  do	  not	  know	  how	  far	  any	  thing,	  that	  has	  come	  before	  me	  in	  a	  confidential	  trust	  in	  my	  profession	  should	  be	  disclosed,	  consistent	  with	  my	  professional	  honor.	  	  	  Lord	  Mansfield:	  …If	  a	  surgeon	  was	  voluntarily	  to	  reveal	  these	  secrets,	  to	  be	  sure	  he	  would	  be	  guilty	  of	  a	  breach	  of	  honour,	  and	  of	  great	  indiscretion;	  but	  to	  give	  that	  information	  in	  a	  court	  of	  justice,	  which	  by	  the	  law	  of	  the	  land	  he	  is	  bound	  to	  do,	  will	  never	  be	  imputed	  to	  him	  as	  an	  indiscretion	  whatever.	  	   Testimony	  from	  the	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston’s	  Trial	  for	  Bigamy,	  1776	  	  	  	   The	  most	  common	  history	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  holds	  that	  the	  privilege	  was	  first	  invoked	  in	  1776	  during	  the	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston’s	  trial	  for	  bigamy.	  Asked	  to	  reveal	  the	  intimate	  details	  of	  a	  longtime	  client,	  the	  Duchess’s	  surgeon,	  Caesar	  Hawkins,	  bravely	  took	  a	  stand	  for	  the	  “honour	  of	  [his]	  profession.”	  Hawkins	  argued	  that	  medical	  men	  were	  entrusted	  with	  great	  secrets;	  betraying	  these	  secrets	  under	  any	  circumstances	  would	  damage	  the	  welfare	  of	  their	  patients	  and	  the	  honor	  of	  their	  profession.	  But	  the	  judge	  was	  unsympathetic,	  stating,	  “If	  a	  surgeon	  was	  voluntarily	  to	  reveal	  these	  secrets,	  to	  be	  sure	  he	  would	  be	  guilty	  of	  a	  breach	  of	  honour,	  and	  of	  great	  indiscretion;	  but,	  to	  give	  that	  information	  in	  a	  court	  of	  justice,	  which	  by	  the	  law	  of	  the	  land	  he	  is	  bound	  to	  do,	  will	  never	  be	  imputed	  to	  him	  as	  any	  indiscretion	  whatsoever.”1	  Since	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  this	  brief	  aside	  by	  Lord	  Mansfield	  has	  been	  cited	  as	  a	  foundational	  legal	  precedent	  that	  denied	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  Trial	  of	  Elizabeth	  Duchess	  Dowager	  of	  Kingston,	  120.	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doctors	  any	  inherent	  claim	  to	  privileged	  communications.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  nineteenth	  century,	  as	  doctors	  lamented	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  formalized	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege,	  this	  assumption	  gradually	  became	  a	  staple	  of	  medico-­‐legal	  texts	  in	  both	  Britain	  and	  the	  United	  States.	  Legal	  scholars	  accepted	  the	  same	  account	  of	  the	  trial’s	  proceedings	  and	  celebrated	  the	  decision	  as	  a	  triumph	  of	  law	  over	  obstruction.2	  	  In	  their	  arguments,	  both	  advocates	  and	  critics	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  have	  overlooked	  the	  peculiar	  circumstances	  surrounding	  the	  Duchess’s	  trial.	  Hawkins’s	  attempt	  to	  invoke	  “professional	  honor”	  was	  not	  an	  appeal	  to	  widely	  practiced	  or	  universally	  recognized	  medical	  standards,	  but	  rather	  a	  suggestion	  that	  his	  standing	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  medical	  profession	  granted	  him	  privileges	  that	  would	  have	  been	  denied	  to	  other	  practitioners.	  Hawkins,	  a	  wealthy	  and	  successful	  surgeon,	  relied	  upon	  his	  relationships	  with	  aristocratic	  clients	  to	  gain	  social	  status,	  adopting	  the	  values	  and	  styles	  of	  the	  fashionable	  elite,	  including	  notions	  of	  gentlemanly	  honor.	  Thus	  his	  appeal	  to	  “professional	  honor”	  was	  an	  attempt	  to	  secure	  the	  privileges	  of	  elite	  social	  status	  and	  to	  protect	  his	  personal	  relationship	  with	  the	  Duchess.	  	  The	  unique	  circumstances	  and	  timing	  of	  the	  case,	  however,	  allowed	  this	  brief	  conversation	  to	  be	  transformed	  into	  a	  lasting	  legal	  precedent	  that	  seemingly	  addressed	  modern	  notions	  of	  medical	  confidentiality.	  The	  trial	  of	  a	  controversial	  figure	  in	  England’s	  highest	  court	  naturally	  drew	  attention	  from	  laypersons	  and	  legal	  scholars	  alike,	  and	  the	  Duchess’s	  case	  remains	  among	  the	  best	  recorded	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  For	  an	  example	  of	  a	  legal	  critique	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  see	  John	  Henry	  Wigmore,	  A	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  System	  of	  Evidence	  in	  Trials	  at	  Common	  
Law	  2nd	  ed.	  vol.	  5	  (Boston:	  Little,	  Brown,	  and	  Co.,	  1923),	  201-­‐227.	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preserved	  of	  the	  era.	  Occurring	  in	  1776,	  the	  trial	  took	  place	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  larger	  transformation	  of	  courtroom	  proceedings.	  The	  advent	  of	  adversarial	  criminal	  trials,	  with	  attorneys	  representing	  both	  prosecution	  and	  defense	  led	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  standardized	  rules	  of	  evidence.	  Lord	  Mansfield	  (whose	  ruling	  has	  been	  cited	  as	  a	  rejection	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege)	  was	  at	  the	  head	  of	  this	  movement;	  his	  decisions	  on	  numerous	  other	  legal	  issues	  formed	  crucial	  precedents	  that	  helped	  modernize	  English	  law.	  As	  the	  notions	  of	  gentlemanly	  honor	  subsided	  and	  the	  medical	  profession	  grew	  stronger	  in	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century,	  legal	  scholars	  increasingly	  looked	  to	  the	  Duchess’s	  trial	  as	  a	  legal	  precedent,	  ascribing	  the	  well-­‐remembered	  case	  with	  modern	  notions	  of	  medical	  confidentiality	  and	  medical	  ethics.	  At	  the	  time	  of	  the	  trial,	  however,	  few	  people	  were	  concerned	  about	  the	  conflicting	  duties	  of	  medical	  practitioners;	  the	  case	  invoked	  many	  more	  pressing	  issues.	  For	  some,	  the	  trial	  was	  an	  indictment	  of	  aristocratic	  vice	  and	  the	  notion	  that	  Peers	  could	  openly	  defy	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  realm.	  Others	  worried	  what	  ramifications	  the	  court’s	  ruling	  might	  have	  on	  marriage	  law.3	  Many	  more	  simply	  looked	  to	  the	  trial	  as	  a	  source	  of	  entertainment.	  For	  five	  days,	  all	  of	  London	  eagerly	  awaited	  news	  of	  the	  Duchess’s	  fate.	  Peers	  watched	  the	  proceedings	  from	  Westminster	  Hall,	  where,	  for	  a	  steep	  price,	  curious	  spectators	  could	  pay	  to	  witness	  the	  trial.	  Others	  followed	  the	  proceedings	  through	  daily	  recaps	  in	  the	  London	  papers.	  Each	  day,	  the	  spectacle	  began	  when	  lords	  and	  ladies,	  dressed	  in	  their	  finest	  clothes,	  made	  the	  procession	  to	  Westminster	  Hall.	  Once	  King	  George	  III	  had	  settled	  into	  his	  velvet	  chair,	  however,	  all	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  “To	  the	  Printer	  of	  the	  Gazetteer:	  Kingston	  Cause,”	  Gazetteer	  (London,	  England),	  March	  7,	  1776.	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eyes	  turned	  towards	  a	  stout	  fifty-­‐six	  year	  old	  woman	  elegantly	  dressed	  in	  black.	  The	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston	  arrived	  with	  a	  small	  party	  of	  attendants,	  physicians,	  and	  three	  women	  the	  papers	  christened,	  “Iphigenia’s	  Late	  Procession,”	  a	  nod	  to	  a	  famed	  incident	  in	  which	  the	  Duchess	  arrived	  at	  a	  masquerade	  en	  deshabille.	  Those	  expecting	  outrageous	  antics	  were	  largely	  disappointed,	  however.	  Apart	  from	  the	  dramatic	  entrance,	  the	  Duchess	  sat	  calmly	  through	  five	  days	  of	  accusations,	  restraining	  her	  sharp	  wit	  and	  theatrical	  tendencies.4	  The	  trial	  marked	  the	  climax	  of	  a	  decades-­‐long	  marital	  drama	  that	  had	  long	  transfixed	  the	  British	  public	  with	  illicit	  affairs,	  secret	  marriages,	  slander,	  and	  accusations	  of	  bribery.	  Born	  Elizabeth	  Chudleigh,	  the	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston	  inherited	  a	  minor	  title.	  Nevertheless,	  her	  father’s	  losses	  in	  the	  South	  Seas	  Bubble	  coupled	  with	  his	  early	  death	  left	  no	  fortune	  to	  inherit.	  Yet	  with	  no	  money	  and	  only	  a	  minor	  title,	  Chudleigh	  managed	  to	  secure	  fame	  and	  fortune	  through	  a	  series	  of	  controversial	  affairs	  and	  marriages.	  Her	  rise	  to	  the	  top	  of	  British	  society	  was	  complete	  when	  an	  elderly	  benefactor	  managed	  to	  have	  Chudleigh,	  at	  the	  age	  of	  twenty-­‐three,	  named	  maid	  of	  honor	  to	  Augusta,	  Princess	  of	  Wales.	  In	  court,	  Chudleigh’s	  charm	  and	  beauty	  won	  her	  numerous	  suitors,	  yet	  she	  settled	  on	  Augustus	  John	  Hervey,	  a	  man	  of	  modest	  wealth.	  In	  order	  to	  maintain	  Chudleigh’s	  appointment	  as	  maid	  of	  honor	  to	  the	  Princess	  of	  Wales,	  however,	  the	  ceremony	  was	  conducted	  in	  secret	  and,	  at	  the	  time,	  few	  people	  learned	  of	  the	  marriage.	  Shortly	  after	  their	  nuptials,	  Hervey,	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  “Duchess	  of	  Kingston’s	  Trial:	  Westminster	  Hall,”	  Craftsman	  or	  Say’s	  Weekly	  Journal	  (London,	  England),	  April	  20,	  1776;	  and	  Gillian	  Russell,	  Women	  Sociability	  and	  
Theatre	  in	  Georgian	  London	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  169-­‐173.	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lieutenant	  in	  the	  British	  Navy,	  shipped	  off	  to	  sea	  for	  two	  years,	  leaving	  the	  Duchess	  to	  resume	  her	  life	  at	  court.	  During	  their	  brief,	  unhappy	  marriage,	  the	  couple	  had	  little	  contact.	  Despite	  the	  birth	  of	  a	  child,	  Hervey	  severed	  ties	  with	  Chudleigh	  after	  five	  years	  of	  marriage.5	  	   Chudleigh	  soon	  became	  the	  mistress	  of	  Evelyn	  Pierrepont,	  the	  Duke	  of	  Kingston-­‐Upon-­‐Hull.	  Content	  in	  her	  new	  position,	  she	  dropped	  all	  claims	  of	  marriage	  to	  Augustus	  John	  Hervey.	  After	  a	  few	  years,	  however,	  it	  became	  apparent	  that	  the	  once-­‐impoverished	  Hervey	  would	  soon	  inherit	  a	  fortune	  and	  become	  the	  Duke	  of	  Bristol.	  Seeing	  an	  opportunity	  to	  further	  secure	  her	  place	  in	  British	  society,	  Chudleigh	  quickly	  had	  their	  brief,	  clandestine	  marriage	  recorded.	  Though	  now	  official,	  it	  remained	  a	  secret	  for	  another	  decade	  until	  Hervey,	  wishing	  to	  remarry,	  pressed	  for	  a	  divorce.	  With	  her	  private	  affairs	  thrust	  into	  the	  public	  eye,	  Chudleigh	  sued	  Hervey	  for	  falsely	  claiming	  marriage.	  The	  jactitation	  suit	  was	  settled	  in	  an	  ecclesiastical	  court	  in	  1769.	  Hervey,	  likely	  due	  to	  a	  £16,000	  bribe	  from	  his	  former	  spouse,	  mounted	  little	  defense	  and	  the	  court	  ruled	  that	  the	  marriage	  had	  never	  taken	  place.	  With	  the	  legal	  issues	  seemingly	  put	  to	  rest,	  Both	  Hervey	  and	  Chudleigh	  remarried.	  In	  1773,	  however,	  her	  new	  husband,	  the	  Duke	  of	  Kingston,	  passed	  away,	  leaving	  all	  his	  property	  to	  Chudleigh,	  the	  new	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston.	  Controversy	  over	  the	  Duchess’s	  marital	  status	  ensued	  when,	  in	  hopes	  of	  nullifying	  Chudleigh’s	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  T.A.B	  Corley,	  "Chudleigh,	  Elizabeth,"	  Oxford	  Dictionary	  of	  National	  Biography	  (Oxford;	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004);	  and	  Russell,	  154-­‐158.	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claims	  to	  the	  inheritance,	  the	  Duke’s	  nephew,	  Evelyn	  Medows,	  indicted	  the	  Duchess	  for	  bigamy.6	  	   The	  ensuing	  trial,	  set	  to	  take	  place	  in	  1775,	  quickly	  captivated	  the	  British	  press.	  In	  newspaper	  headlines,	  the	  latest	  news	  on	  the	  bigamous	  Duchess	  often	  displaced	  reports	  of	  mounting	  tensions	  in	  America.	  Seeking	  to	  capitalize	  on	  the	  trial’s	  publicity,	  Samuel	  Foote,	  a	  popular	  comedian	  and	  playwright,	  authored	  A	  Trip	  
to	  Calais,	  a	  satire	  that	  cast	  the	  Duchess	  as	  Kitty	  Crocodile,	  an	  allusion	  to	  Chudleigh’s	  “gift	  for	  tears,”	  or,	  alternately,	  Lady	  Betty	  Bigamy.	  7	  Though	  never	  published,	  the	  play	  caused	  a	  controversy	  when	  Foote	  and	  the	  Duchess	  each	  published	  letters	  in	  several	  London	  newspapers.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  several	  months	  they	  exchanged	  insults.	  While	  Foote	  often	  feigned	  ignorance	  at	  the	  source	  of	  the	  Duchess’s	  anger,	  Chudleigh	  offered	  scathing	  critiques	  of	  Foote’s	  honor	  and	  manhood,	  calling	  him	  a	  “subservient	  vassal”	  and	  stating	  that	  she	  would	  not	  “prostitute	  the	  term	  manhood	  by	  applying	  it	  to	  Mr.	  Foote.”8	  Printed	  throughout	  the	  summer	  of	  1775,	  the	  exchange	  heightened	  anticipation	  for	  the	  Duchess’s	  upcoming	  trial.	  Her	  antics	  outraged	  many	  who	  saw	  her	  insults	  as	  poor	  conduct	  for	  a	  woman	  of	  her	  status.	  Others,	  believing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  	  Ibid.,	  569.	  	  7	  Dircks, Phyllis T. “Foote, Samuel (bap. 1721, d. 1777),” Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Russell, 158. 	  8	  Elizabeth	  Chudleigh,	  “Note	  to	  the	  Public,”	  Public	  Ledger	  (London,	  England),	  August	  15,	  1775.	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Foote’s	  play	  to	  be	  an	  indecent	  attempt	  to	  sully	  the	  reputation	  of	  a	  peer,	  wrote	  to	  the	  London	  papers	  in	  support	  of	  the	  Duchess.9	  	  After	  several	  postponements	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Duchess’s	  failing	  health,	  the	  trial	  began	  in	  April	  1776.	  It	  quickly	  became	  the	  center	  of	  London	  social	  life.	  At	  her	  own	  request,	  the	  Duchess	  was	  tried	  as	  a	  Peer	  by	  the	  House	  of	  Lords.	  Throughout	  the	  trial’s	  first	  two	  days,	  attorneys	  for	  both	  sides	  argued	  whether	  the	  Duchess’s	  marital	  status—previously	  settled	  in	  an	  ecclesiastical	  trial—fell	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Lords.	  After	  deciding	  they	  would	  hear	  the	  case,	  the	  Lords	  began	  hearing	  testimony	  from	  witnesses.	  Over	  the	  next	  two	  days,	  the	  court	  learned	  that	  the	  Duchess	  had	  previously	  been	  married	  to	  John	  Hervey	  and	  that	  the	  earlier	  ruling	  of	  the	  ecclesiastical	  court	  had	  been	  found	  in	  error.	  On	  the	  fifth	  day	  of	  the	  trial,	  after	  arguments	  had	  concluded,	  the	  Lords	  arose	  one	  by	  one.	  Each	  placed	  his	  right	  hand	  upon	  his	  chest,	  delivering	  the	  verdict:	  “guilty,	  upon	  my	  honor.”	  Only	  the	  Duke	  of	  Newcastle,	  who	  had	  formerly	  enjoyed	  a	  brief	  affair	  with	  the	  Duchess,	  deviated,	  stating	  “guilty	  erroneously,	  but	  not	  intentionally.”10	  Though	  the	  court’s	  ruling	  stripped	  Chudleigh	  of	  her	  title	  as	  the	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston,	  recognition	  of	  her	  marriage	  to	  Hervey	  allowed	  her	  to	  plead	  the	  privilege	  of	  peerage	  and	  avoid	  the	  typical	  punishment	  for	  bigamy,	  burning	  of	  the	  hand.	  Following	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  trial,	  the	  Duchess	  fled	  England	  for	  Calais.	  Though	  she	  retained	  most	  of	  her	  fortune,	  the	  Duchess	  spent	  much	  of	  the	  remainder	  of	  her	  life	  in	  self-­‐imposed	  exile.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  “For	  the	  Morning	  Post:	  To	  the	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston,”	  Morning	  Post	  and	  Daily	  
Advertiser	  (London,	  England),	  August	  19,	  1775,	  and	  Russell,	  158-­‐163.	  	  
	  10	  The	  Trial	  of	  Elizabeth	  Duchess	  Dowager	  of	  Kingston,	  154–156.	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Lost	  amidst	  the	  spectacle	  and	  controversy	  of	  the	  trial,	  another	  battle	  over	  honor—one	  that	  would	  have	  profound	  effects	  on	  the	  history	  of	  medicine	  and	  the	  law—went	  largely	  unnoticed.	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  trial’s	  fourth	  day,	  Caesar	  Hawkins,	  a	  prominent	  surgeon	  and	  witness,	  was	  asked	  if	  he	  knew	  of	  any	  marriage	  between	  Chudleigh	  and	  Hervey.	  Not	  wanting	  to	  harm	  the	  Duchess’s	  defense,	  he	  responded,	  “I	  do	  not	  know	  how	  far	  any	  thing,	  that	  has	  come	  before	  me	  in	  a	  confidential	  trust	  in	  my	  profession	  should	  be	  disclosed,	  consistent	  with	  my	  professional	  honor.”11	  Hawkins’s	  query	  to	  the	  presiding	  lords	  has	  been	  interpreted	  as	  the	  first	  invocation	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  in	  the	  history	  of	  English	  common	  law.	  Accordingly,	  Lord	  Mansfield’s	  response—that	  Hawkins	  must	  answer	  all	  questions	  asked	  of	  him—has	  long	  been	  invoked	  by	  legal	  scholars	  as	  proof	  that	  medical	  practitioners	  cannot	  claim	  privileged	  communications.	  A	  close	  examination	  of	  Hawkins’s	  career	  and	  personal	  relationships,	  however,	  reveals	  that	  the	  surgeon	  never	  intended	  to	  claim	  medical	  confidentiality	  or	  argue	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  medical	  profession.	  	  Caesar	  Hawkins,	  the	  Duchess’s	  surgeon	  and	  confidant,	  was	  one	  of	  the	  most	  successful	  medical	  practitioners	  of	  his	  time.	  Born	  into	  a	  family	  of	  surgeons,	  he	  had	  learned	  the	  practice	  under	  the	  tutelage	  of	  his	  father.	  As	  a	  young	  surgeon,	  he	  managed	  to	  convert	  his	  personal	  relationships	  into	  prestigious	  and	  lucrative	  appointments,	  including	  surgeon	  to	  the	  Prince	  of	  Wales	  and	  sergeant-­‐surgeon	  to	  King	  George	  II.	  He	  also	  maintained	  a	  prominent	  and	  lucrative	  practice	  at	  St.	  George’s	  Hospital	  in	  London.	  These	  positions	  allowed	  Hawkins	  to	  amass	  considerable	  wealth	  and	  social	  standing;	  in	  1778,	  he	  was	  made	  a	  Baronet	  for	  his	  services	  to	  the	  crown.	  At	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Ibid.,	  119.	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the	  time	  of	  the	  trial,	  Hawkins	  had	  reached	  the	  apex	  of	  a	  long	  and	  distinguished	  career.	  For	  decades,	  he	  had	  cultivated	  a	  network	  of	  powerful	  clients,	  using	  their	  patronage	  to	  propel	  him	  to	  the	  top	  of	  his	  profession.12	  	  	   Hawkins’s	  successes	  came	  in	  spite	  of	  a	  gradual	  weakening	  of	  the	  status	  of	  the	  medical	  profession.	  In	  the	  sixteenth	  century,	  the	  Royal	  College	  of	  Physicians,	  an	  elite	  cadre	  of	  medical	  practitioners,	  dominated	  medicine	  in	  London	  while	  apothecaries	  and	  surgeon-­‐barbers	  formed	  the	  lower	  ranks	  of	  the	  medical	  profession.	  The	  hierarchical	  structure	  of	  the	  medical	  profession	  was	  thrown	  into	  disarray	  in	  1704,	  when	  William	  Rose,	  an	  apothecary,	  successfully	  challenged	  physicians’	  attempts	  to	  regulate	  and	  control	  the	  profession.	  The	  court’s	  ruling	  confirmed	  the	  status	  of	  apothecaries	  and	  surgeons,	  while	  also	  opening	  the	  medical	  marketplace	  to	  outside	  influence;	  clergy,	  folk	  healers,	  and	  domestic	  medicine	  all	  offered	  formidable	  challenges	  to	  traditional	  medicine.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  availability	  of	  medical	  texts	  and	  the	  relative	  simplicity	  of	  many	  treatments	  meant	  that	  little	  knowledge	  or	  expertise	  separated	  professionals	  from	  informed	  laypersons.13	  	  	   For	  many	  practitioners,	  greater	  competition	  weakened	  their	  professional	  status	  and	  undermined	  the	  potential	  for	  collective	  action.	  The	  Rose	  Trial	  crippled	  the	  Royal	  College,	  leaving	  individual	  practitioners	  to	  fend	  for	  themselves.	  At	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Susan	  C	  Lawrence,	  Charitable	  Knowledge	  Hospital	  Pupils	  and	  Practitioners	  in	  
Eighteenth-­‐Century	  London	  (Cambridge;	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  1996);	  J.F.	  Payne,	  "Hawkins,	  Sir	  Caesar,	  first	  baronet	  (1711-­‐1786),"	  Oxford	  
Dictionary	  of	  National	  Biography	  (Oxford	  and	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004).	  	  13	  Toby	  Gelfand,	  “The	  History	  of	  the	  Medical	  Profession,”	  in	  Companion	  Encyclopedia	  
of	  the	  History	  of	  Medicine	  vol.	  2	  (London:	  Routledge,	  1993)	  edited	  by	  W.F.	  Bynum	  and	  Ray	  Porter,	  1124-­‐1136;	  and	  Roy	  Porter,	  Bodies	  Politic:	  Disease,	  Death,	  and	  
Doctors	  in	  Britain,	  1650-­‐1900	  (Ithaca,	  N.Y.:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  139.	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same	  time,	  a	  growing	  market	  for	  medical	  services	  and	  increased	  competition	  made	  doctors	  desperate	  to	  enhance	  their	  own	  name.	  Some	  used	  advertisements,	  authoring	  catchy	  jingles	  and	  slogans.	  Others	  turned	  to	  more	  dubious	  methods,	  hiring	  actors	  to	  call	  for	  their	  services	  at	  opportune	  moments.	  Even	  more	  troubling,	  many	  practitioners	  garnered	  reputations	  for	  debauchery	  and	  sexual	  exploitation,	  further	  cementing	  the	  profession’s	  poor	  reputation.	  Contemporary	  pamphlets	  and	  cartoons	  mocked	  the	  inefficacy	  of	  physicians	  with	  quips	  like,	  “While	  the	  doctors	  consult,	  the	  patient	  dies.”14	  Widespread	  criticism	  of	  physicians’	  morality	  and	  competency	  meant	  that,	  in	  1776,	  arguments	  on	  behalf	  of	  honor	  of	  the	  medical	  profession	  would	  have	  garnered	  little	  sympathy.	  	   Nevertheless,	  a	  small	  group	  of	  practitioners	  flourished	  in	  the	  eighteenth	  century.	  William	  Hunter,	  a	  prominent	  physician,	  managed	  to	  pull	  in	  more	  than	  £10,000	  per	  year,	  a	  salary	  equal	  to	  the	  income	  of	  a	  Peer.	  Several	  other	  physicians	  made	  even	  more.	  In	  many	  cases,	  success	  depended	  upon	  practitioners’	  ability	  to	  successfully	  cultivate	  networks	  of	  aristocratic	  patrons,	  often	  garnering	  the	  respect	  of	  clients	  as	  social	  companions	  rather	  than	  patients.	  Richard	  Warren,	  the	  physician	  to	  the	  Prince	  of	  Wales,	  employed	  this	  strategy	  to	  great	  effect;	  a	  contemporary	  observer	  noted:	  	  he	  added	  various	  literary	  and	  scientific	  attainments,	  which	  were	  most	  advantageously	  displayed	  by	  a	  talent	  for	  conversation	  that	  was	  at	  once	  elegant,	  easy	  and	  natural.	  Of	  all	  men	  in	  the	  world,	  he	  had	  the	  greatest	  flexibility	  of	  temper,	  instantaneously	  accommodating	  himself	  to	  the	  tone	  of	  feeling	  of	  the	  young	  the	  old,	  the	  gay	  and	  the	  sorrowful…	  no	  one	  ever	  had	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Porter,	  Bodies	  Politic,	  142.	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recourse	  to	  his	  advice	  as	  a	  physician,	  who	  did	  not	  remain	  desirous	  of	  gaining	  his	  friendship	  and	  enjoying	  his	  society	  as	  a	  companion.15	  	  	  Dressed	  in	  powdered	  wigs,	  satin	  coats,	  buckled	  shoes,	  and	  tricorn	  hats,	  wealthy	  physicians	  adopted	  the	  styles	  and	  mannerisms	  of	  the	  aristocracy.	  They	  bought	  vast	  estates,	  medals,	  paintings,	  manuscripts,	  and	  other	  expensive	  signals	  of	  social	  status.	  Likewise,	  they	  filled	  their	  gold	  canes	  with	  perfume	  to	  mask	  the	  odors	  of	  their	  profession.	  	  In	  seeking	  to	  incorporate	  themselves	  into	  aristocratic	  society,	  these	  physicians	  sought	  to	  dissociate	  themselves	  from	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  medical	  profession.16	  	   Accordingly,	  Caesar	  Hawkins’s	  position	  atop	  the	  medical	  profession	  stemmed	  from	  his	  ability	  to	  adopt	  the	  manners	  and	  styles	  of	  aristocratic	  society.	  His	  interactions	  with	  the	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston	  demonstrate	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  doctor-­‐patient	  relationships	  could	  be	  recast	  as	  friendships	  that	  conferred	  status	  and	  privilege	  on	  the	  surgeon.	  Hawkins	  first	  met	  the	  Duchess	  around	  the	  time	  of	  her	  brief	  marriage	  to	  Augustus	  John	  Hervey.	  The	  surgeon	  attended	  to	  Chudleigh	  professionally	  and	  was	  present	  when	  she	  gave	  birth	  to	  her	  child.	  What	  was	  initially	  a	  professional	  relationship,	  however,	  quickly	  became	  a	  personal	  one	  in	  which	  the	  surgeon	  often	  served	  as	  confidant	  and	  messenger	  to	  both	  the	  Duchess	  and	  her	  former	  husband.	  Before	  the	  Duchess’s	  ecclesiastical	  trial,	  for	  example,	  Hervey	  entrusted	  Hawkins	  to	  pass	  messages	  between	  the	  two	  parties	  because	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  William	  Macmichael	  and	  M.D.	  Rare	  Book	  Collection	  of	  Rush	  University	  Medical	  Center	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Stanton	  A.	  Friedberg,	  The	  Gold-­‐Headed	  Cane,	  (New	  York:	  P.	  B.	  Hoeber,	  1915),	  106.	  Quoted	  in	  Roy	  Porter,	  Bodies	  Politic	  at	  p.	  148.	  	  
	  16	  Rosemary	  O’Day,	  The	  Professions	  in	  Early	  Modern	  England,	  1450-­‐1800:	  Servants	  of	  
the	  Commonwealth	  (Harlow,	  England;	  New	  York:	  Longman,	  2000),	  243–247.	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he	  “thought	  [news	  of	  his	  desire	  for	  a	  divorce]	  would	  be	  less	  shocking	  to	  be	  carried	  by	  and	  received	  from,	  a	  person	  she	  [the	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston]	  knew,	  than	  from	  any	  stranger.”17	  Likewise,	  the	  avenues	  of	  communication	  between	  the	  Duchess	  and	  Hawkins	  often	  fell	  outside	  the	  normal	  confines	  of	  a	  physician-­‐patient	  relationship.	  Chudleigh	  visited	  Hawkins’s	  home	  and	  passed	  messages	  to	  his	  wife.	  The	  breakdown	  of	  firm	  barriers	  between	  physician	  and	  patient	  was	  also	  evident	  in	  Hawkins’s	  testimony	  at	  the	  Duchess’s	  trial.	  Though	  Hawkins’s	  testimony	  confirmed	  some	  medical	  information,	  including	  the	  birth	  of	  a	  child,	  much	  of	  his	  testimony	  addressed	  the	  contents	  of	  private	  or	  ‘loose’	  conversations.18	  Similarly,	  Caesar	  Hawkins’s	  views	  toward	  medical	  confidentiality	  embodied	  contradictions	  within	  the	  developing	  medical	  profession.	  Today,	  medical	  confidentiality	  invokes	  notions	  of	  patients’	  rights.	  In	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  century,	  however,	  medical	  practitioners	  were	  much	  less	  committed	  to	  maintaining	  patients’	  secrets.	  In	  professional	  disputes	  between	  practitioners,	  physicians	  and	  surgeons	  frequently	  revealed	  patients’	  names	  and	  medical	  problems	  to	  the	  public.19	  Just	  four	  years	  before	  Caesar	  Hawkins	  invoked	  “professional	  honor”	  in	  the	  Duchess’s	  trial,	  he	  engaged	  in	  a	  public	  debate	  with	  Samuel	  Lee,	  a	  well-­‐known	  surgeon	  and	  former	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  The	  Trial	  of	  Elizabeth	  Duchess	  Dowager	  of	  Kingston,	  121.	  	  18	  Ibid.,	  122–125.	  	  19	  Baker,	  Before	  Bioethics,	  53-­‐56.	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colleague	  of	  Hawkins	  at	  St.	  George’s	  Hospital.20	  In	  a	  letter	  published	  in	  the	  Morning	  
Chronicle	  and	  London	  Advertiser,	  Hawkins,	  along	  with	  several	  other	  notable	  London	  surgeons,	  admonished	  Lee	  for	  improperly	  treating	  his	  patients’	  ruptures.	  In	  the	  process,	  they	  unashamedly	  reveled	  both	  patients’	  names	  and	  medical	  conditions.21	  Four	  years	  later,	  Hawkins	  testified	  that	  he	  had	  no	  written	  records	  of	  the	  Duchess’s	  brief	  marriage	  and	  the	  birth	  of	  her	  son.	  He	  stated	  that	  he	  had	  long	  been	  in	  the	  habit	  of	  destroying	  documents	  that	  could	  reveal	  personal	  details	  of	  patients.22	  The	  disparate	  treatment	  of	  patients	  in	  these	  two	  cases	  illustrates	  that	  Hawkins	  and	  other	  medical	  practitioners	  viewed	  confidentiality	  as	  a	  part	  of	  their	  personal	  relationships	  with	  specific	  clients.	  Certainly,	  not	  all	  patients’	  secrets	  were	  worthy	  of	  protection.	  The	  cultivation	  of	  a	  network	  of	  elite	  clients,	  such	  as	  the	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston,	  however,	  required	  discretion	  and	  propriety	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  practitioner.	  By	  asking	  to	  be	  absolved	  from	  testifying,	  Hawkins	  departed	  from	  the	  contemporary	  norms	  of	  his	  profession.	  In	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  physicians	  frequently	  testified	  in	  civil	  and	  criminal	  proceedings	  without	  objection.	  Before	  the	  trial,	  for	  example,	  several	  physicians	  were	  called	  in	  front	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  John	  Ranby	  and	  Caesar	  Hawkins,	  The	  True	  Account	  of	  All	  the	  Transactions	  before	  
the	  Right	  Honourable	  the	  Lords,	  and	  Others	  the	  Commissioners	  for	  the	  Affairs	  of	  
Chelsea	  Hospital;	  as	  Far	  as	  Relates	  to	  the	  Admission	  and	  Dismission	  of	  Samuel	  Lee,	  
Surgeon.	  To	  Which	  Is	  Prefixed,	  A	  Short	  Account	  of	  the	  Nature	  of	  a	  Rupture.	  By	  John	  
Ranby	  and	  Caesar	  Hawkins,	  Serjeant-­‐Surgeons	  to	  His	  Majesty	  (London:	  printed	  for	  J.	  and	  P.	  Knapton	  in	  Ludgate-­‐Street,	  1754).	  	  21	  Benjamin	  Hoadly,	  Messenger	  Monsey,	  Caesar	  Hawkins,	  T.	  Hawkins,	  and	  William	  Hunter,	  “To	  Mr.	  Lee,	  Surgeon,	  in	  Arundel-­‐Street	  and	  surgeon	  of	  that	  Thing	  called	  the	  Rupture	  Hospital,	  near	  the	  Asylum,	  Westminster-­‐Bridge,”	  Morning	  Chronicle	  and	  
London	  Advertiser	  (London,	  England),	  February	  16,	  1773.	  	  22	  The	  Trial	  of	  Elizabeth	  Duchess	  Dowager	  of	  Kingston,	  120.	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answer	  questions	  about	  the	  Duchess’s	  failing	  health.	  Their	  testimony	  relayed	  information	  acquired	  through	  the	  practice	  of	  their	  profession;	  “[The	  Duchess’s]	  mental	  facilities	  have	  been	  injured,”	  they	  stated,	  “She	  is	  at	  present	  afflicted	  with	  an	  alienation	  of	  mind.”23	  At	  the	  time,	  this	  revelation	  of	  the	  Duchess’s	  intimate	  medical	  details	  in	  front	  of	  the	  Duchess’s	  peers	  (and	  to	  the	  public	  by	  way	  of	  the	  London	  papers)	  was	  uncontroversial.	  Unlike	  Hawkins,	  none	  of	  the	  physicians	  apparently	  viewed	  their	  indiscretion	  as	  a	  slight	  upon	  their	  professional	  honor.	  	  Hawkins,	  a	  successful	  surgeon	  who	  had	  no	  reservations	  about	  revealing	  some	  patients’	  personal	  information,	  would	  have	  been	  acutely	  aware	  of	  the	  expectations	  of	  physicians	  in	  courtroom.	  Because	  the	  testimony	  of	  physicians	  and	  surgeons	  was	  frequent	  and	  uncontroversial,	  he	  likely	  knew	  that	  claims	  to	  privilege	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  profession	  would	  have	  been	  met	  with	  little	  sympathy.	  Thus,	  Hawkins’s	  attempts	  to	  secure	  privileged	  communications,	  a	  powerful	  indicator	  of	  status	  that	  had	  never	  been	  granted	  to	  a	  medical	  practitioner,	  suggest	  both	  the	  importance	  of	  his	  personal	  relationship	  to	  the	  Duchess	  and	  a	  strong	  belief	  in	  his	  own	  social	  standing.	  The	  patronage	  and	  friendship	  of	  important	  clients,	  such	  as	  the	  Duchess	  and	  King	  George	  III,	  placed	  Hawkins	  amongst	  England’s	  social	  elite,	  serving	  as	  the	  source	  of	  his	  professional	  honor.	  Called	  into	  the	  courtroom	  to	  reveal	  the	  intimate	  secrets	  of	  one	  of	  these	  invaluable	  clients,	  Hawkins	  likely	  felt	  as	  though	  his	  precarious	  standing	  amongst	  the	  aristocracy	  was	  under	  attack.	  While	  Hawkins	  could	  not	  claim	  privilege	  as	  a	  medical	  practitioner,	  he	  hoped	  that	  his	  status	  at	  the	  top	  of	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  “Debates	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Lords:	  The	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston’s	  Trial,”	  Middlesex	  
Journal	  and	  Evening	  Advertiser	  (London,	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the	  profession	  and	  close	  relationships	  with	  prominent	  members	  of	  aristocratic	  society	  might	  offer	  him	  the	  privileges	  of	  gentlemanly	  honor.	  Accordingly,	  Hawkins’s	  claims	  to	  professional	  honor	  were	  not	  based	  upon	  the	  notion	  that	  physicians	  were	  obligated	  to	  protect	  the	  intimate	  secrets	  of	  their	  patients.	  Instead,	  Hawkins	  argued	  that	  his	  status	  at	  the	  top	  of	  English	  medicine	  gave	  him	  specific	  privileges	  that	  would	  have	  been	  denied	  to	  many	  other	  practitioners.	  	  Hawkins’s	  appeal	  to	  “professional	  honor”	  mirrored	  other	  claims	  to	  confidentiality	  that	  arose	  during	  the	  trial.	  After	  Hawkins,	  the	  prosecution	  called	  Sophia	  Fettiplace,	  a	  former	  friend	  of	  the	  Duchess,	  to	  the	  bar.	  Fettiplace	  asked	  to	  be	  excused	  from	  answering	  questions	  that	  might	  tarnish	  her	  relationship	  with	  the	  Duchess,	  stating,	  “Unless	  your	  Lordships	  require	  it	  of	  me	  as	  a	  witness	  of	  justice,	  I	  should	  wish	  to	  be	  excused.”	  Like	  Hawkins,	  Fettiplace	  was	  of	  a	  lower	  social	  standing	  than	  the	  presiding	  lords.	  Accordingly,	  her	  claims	  to	  privileged	  communications	  were	  met	  with	  little	  sympathy;	  The	  Lord	  High	  Steward	  refused	  Fettiplace’s	  request,	  requiring	  her	  to	  answer	  all	  questions.24	  	  Next,	  the	  prosecution	  called	  Lord	  Barrington.	  Again,	  the	  witness	  was	  a	  close	  friend	  of	  the	  Duchess	  and	  wished	  to	  be	  excused	  from	  revealing	  information	  revealed	  to	  him	  though	  private,	  personal	  conversations.	  Barrington	  argued,	  “If	  anything	  has	  been	  confided	  to	  my	  honor,	  or	  confidentially	  told	  to	  me,	  I	  do	  hold…	  that	  as	  a	  Man	  of	  Honor,	  as	  a	  Man	  regardful	  of	  the	  Laws	  of	  Society,	  I	  cannot	  reveal	  it.”25	  Though	  this	  appeal,	  with	  its	  references	  to	  personal	  honor,	  mirrored	  those	  made	  by	  Hawkins	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  The	  Trial	  of	  Elizabeth	  Duchess	  Dowager	  of	  Kingston,	  126.	  	  25	  Ibid.,	  127.	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Fettiplace,	  it	  was	  met	  with	  greater	  sympathy	  from	  the	  presiding	  lords.	  “I	  think	  that	  it	  would	  be	  improper	  in	  the	  noble	  lord	  to	  betray	  any	  conversations,”	  the	  Duke	  of	  Richmond	  responded,	  “I	  submit	  to	  your	  Lordships,	  that	  every	  matter	  of	  fact,	  not	  of	  conversation,	  which	  can	  be	  requested,	  the	  noble	  Lord	  is	  bound	  to	  disclose.”26	  Against	  Lord	  Mansfield’s	  suggestion,	  the	  Lords	  decided	  to	  adjourn	  to	  discuss	  the	  matter.	  After	  a	  lengthy	  discussion	  of	  courtroom	  proprieties	  and	  evidentiary	  procedure,	  the	  Lords	  returned	  to	  the	  courtroom,	  again	  compelling	  another	  witness	  to	  answer	  all	  questions	  asked	  of	  him.27	  Though	  Barrington’s	  arguments	  did	  not	  convince	  the	  Lords	  to	  relieve	  him	  of	  his	  duties	  to	  testify	  in	  court,	  he	  seemingly	  managed	  to	  convince	  both	  sets	  of	  attorneys.	  Neither	  was	  willing	  to	  press	  Barrington	  to	  disclose	  information	  learned	  in	  confidence,	  and	  he	  was	  allowed	  to	  leave	  the	  courtroom	  after	  answering	  several	  harmless	  questions.28	  	  In	  each	  of	  these	  three	  cases—Hawkins,	  Fettiplace,	  and	  Barrington—the	  witness	  desired	  to	  withhold	  information	  from	  the	  court	  that	  might	  incriminate	  the	  Duchess,	  arguing	  that	  revealing	  the	  Duchess’s	  secrets	  would	  constitute	  a	  violation	  of	  their	  honor.	  In	  the	  eighteenth	  century,	  honor	  referred	  to	  the	  recognition	  of	  one’s	  social	  status.	  To	  Samuel	  Johnson,	  the	  word	  was	  synonymous	  with	  “dignity,	  high	  rank,”	  and	  “title.”29	  Men	  and	  women	  of	  honor	  were	  expected	  to	  abide	  by	  a	  set	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Ibid.	  	  27	  Ibid.,	  128–129.	  	  28	  Ibid.	  	  29	  Samuel	  Johnnson,	  A	  Dictionary	  of	  the	  English	  Language:	  In	  Which	  the	  Words	  Are	  
Deduced	  from	  Their	  Originals,	  and	  Illustrated	  in	  Their	  Different	  Significations	  by	  
Examples	  from	  the	  Best	  Writers.	  To	  Which	  Are	  Prefixed,	  A	  History	  of	  the	  Language,	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norms	  that	  comprised	  the	  ‘code	  of	  honor.’	  Dictating	  the	  rules	  by	  under	  which	  aristocratic	  society	  functioned,	  “the	  code	  of	  honour	  was	  the	  moral	  code	  of	  the	  often	  irreligious	  man	  of	  fashion.”30	  It	  was	  generally	  accepted	  that	  honor	  was	  a	  unique	  privilege	  of	  aristocratic	  society,	  conferring	  distinct	  responsibilities	  and	  expectations.	  William	  Paley,	  a	  prominent	  priest	  and	  philosopher	  described	  this	  code	  of	  honor	  as:	  	  a	  system	  of	  rules	  constructed	  by	  people	  of	  fashion	  and	  calculated	  to	  facilitate	  their	  intercourse	  with	  one	  another	  and	  for	  no	  other	  purpose.	  Consequently	  nothing	  is	  advertised	  to	  by	  the	  law	  of	  honor,	  but	  what	  tends	  to	  incommode	  this	  intercourse.31	  	  Though	  these	  rules	  were	  often	  confined	  to	  the	  fashionable	  elite,	  historian	  Donna	  Andrew	  has	  argued	  that	  codes	  of	  honor	  were	  widely	  accepted	  both	  within	  and	  outside	  gentile	  society.	  Even	  if	  the	  public	  did	  not	  abide	  by	  the	  same	  laws	  as	  the	  aristocracy,	  English	  society	  maintained	  that	  aristocrats	  needed	  to	  follow	  a	  set	  of	  norms	  that	  could	  and	  often	  did	  conflict	  with	  the	  rule	  of	  law.32	  In	  duels,	  for	  example,	  notions	  of	  honor	  led	  combatants	  to	  maim	  and	  sometimes	  kill	  one	  another	  in	  defiance	  of	  the	  law.	  Though	  illegal,	  these	  transgressions	  were	  rarely	  prosecuted.33	  Likewise,	  in	  the	  courtroom,	  the	  assertion	  that	  individuals	  were	  bound	  to	  the	  norms	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and	  An	  English	  Grammar..	  In	  Two	  Volumes.,	  The	  third	  edition.,	  vol.	  Volume	  1	  (London:	  1765),	  1011.	  	  30	  Donna	  T	  Andrew,	  “The	  Code	  of	  Honour	  and	  Its	  Critics:	  The	  Opposition	  to	  Duelling	  in	  England,	  1700-­‐1850,”	  Social	  History	  5:3	  (1980):	  415.	  	  31	  William	  Paley,	  The	  Principles	  of	  Moral	  and	  Political	  Economy,	  2	  vols.	  (1790),	  1,	  7.	  Quoted	  in	  Andrew,	  “The	  Code	  of	  Honor	  and	  its	  Critics,”	  413.	  	  32	  Andrew,	  “The	  Code	  of	  Honour	  and	  Its	  Critics,”	  413.	  	  33	  Donna	  T	  Andrew,	  Aristocratic	  Vice:	  The	  Attack	  on	  Duelling,	  Suicide,	  Adultery,	  and	  
Gambling	  in	  Eighteenth-­‐Century	  England	  (New	  Haven	  and	  London:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2013);	  V.	  G	  Kiernan,	  “The	  Duel	  in	  Early	  Modern	  England:	  Civility,	  Politeness	  and	  Honour.,”	  English	  Historical	  Review	  120:485	  (2005).	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and	  standards	  of	  honor	  marked	  a	  challenge	  to	  legal	  conventions.	  By	  invoking	  honor,	  Hawkins,	  Fettiplace,	  and	  Barrington	  all	  argued	  that	  their	  status	  within	  the	  English	  aristocracy	  precluded	  them	  from	  submitting	  to	  questioning	  that	  might	  prove	  harmful	  to	  the	  reputation	  of	  their	  peers.	  	  The	  strength	  of	  theses	  claims	  varied,	  however,	  and	  the	  court’s	  response	  to	  witnesses	  marked	  an	  evaluation	  of	  each	  witness’s	  respective	  social	  standing.	  	  While	  Lord	  Mansfield	  clearly	  believed	  that	  honor	  had	  no	  place	  in	  the	  courtroom—he	  pushed	  to	  deny	  all	  three	  witnesses’	  claims	  to	  privileged	  communications—his	  fellow	  Lords	  seemed	  to	  disagree,	  allowing	  Barrington	  to	  leave	  the	  courtroom	  without	  tarnishing	  his	  honor.	  Of	  a	  lower	  social	  standing,	  attorneys	  from	  both	  sides	  were	  especially	  reluctant	  to	  challenge	  Barrington’s	  honor,	  indicating	  that	  Barrington’s	  title	  commanded	  the	  deference	  of	  his	  inferiors.	  For	  Hawkins	  and	  Fettiplace,	  however,	  their	  place	  in	  aristocratic	  society	  was	  much	  more	  precarious.	  Neither	  held	  an	  aristocratic	  title.	  Surrounded	  by	  the	  most	  prestigious	  men	  and	  women	  in	  English	  society,	  both	  would	  have	  been	  perceived	  as	  outsiders.	  Within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  trial,	  it	  is	  hardly	  surprising	  that	  their	  claims	  to	  honor,	  a	  privilege	  of	  fashionable	  elites,	  would	  have	  been	  granted	  little	  sympathy.	  	  In	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  trial’s	  fifth	  and	  final	  day,	  a	  fourth	  witness	  also	  asked	  to	  be	  absolved	  from	  testifying.	  Unlike	  the	  witnesses	  before	  him,	  however,	  William	  Berkley,	  Augustus	  John	  Hervey’s	  attorney,	  framed	  his	  query	  around	  a	  well-­‐established	  legal	  precedent.	  Dating	  back	  to	  the	  late	  sixteenth	  century,	  attorney-­‐client	  privilege	  had	  been	  an	  accepted	  custom	  in	  English	  courtrooms.	  In	  contrast	  to	  earlier	  claims	  to	  privileged	  communications,	  Berkley	  drew	  upon	  centuries	  of	  legal	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practice	  maintaining	  that	  attorneys	  could	  not	  be	  required	  to	  testify	  against	  the	  interests	  of	  their	  clients.34	  Before	  judges	  or	  attorneys	  asked	  Berkley	  a	  single	  question,	  he	  immediately	  stated,	  My	  Lords,	  what	  knowledge	  I	  had	  of	  this	  business	  arose	  from	  my	  being	  attorney	  to	  Lord	  Bristol,	  and	  I	  must	  leave	  it	  to	  your	  Lordships,	  whether	  I	  ought	  to	  be	  examined	  as	  for	  Lord	  Bristol	  consistent	  with	  Honour	  to	  myself	  and	  the	  duty	  I	  owe	  to	  him.35	  	  While	  Berkley,	  like	  other	  witnesses,	  framed	  his	  request	  around	  notions	  of	  honor,	  his	  appeal	  differed	  from	  earlier	  requests	  by	  nodding	  to	  established	  legal	  precedents.	  Instead	  of	  suggesting	  that	  he	  should	  be	  relieved	  of	  his	  legal	  obligations	  based	  upon	  his	  adherence	  to	  a	  personal	  code	  of	  honor,	  Berkley	  merely	  asked	  if	  the	  law	  would	  allow	  him	  to	  testify.	  In	  response,	  Mr.	  Wallace,	  attorney	  for	  the	  defense,	  replied	  that	  he	  called	  Berkley	  to	  the	  bar	  only	  to	  testify	  to	  a	  brief	  conversation	  with	  another	  key	  witness,	  and	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  discuss	  his	  relationship	  with	  Hervey.	  36	  After	  hearing	  claims	  from	  both	  the	  witness	  and	  attorney,	  Mansfield	  responded,	  	  the	  protection	  of	  attorneys	  is	  as	  what	  is	  revealed	  to	  them	  by	  their	  client,	  in	  order	  to	  take	  their	  advice	  or	  instruction	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  defense…	  [yet]	  this	  is	  no	  secret	  of	  the	  client,	  but	  is	  a	  collateral	  fact…and	  it	  has	  been	  often	  determined,	  that	  as	  to	  fact,	  an	  attorney	  or	  counsel	  has	  no	  privilege	  to	  withhold	  evidence.37	  	  	  Here,	  Mansfield’s	  rhetoric	  differed	  markedly	  from	  his	  responses	  to	  earlier	  requests	  for	  privileged	  communications.	  Instead	  of	  immediately	  dismissing	  the	  claim,	  he	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  A	  history	  of	  attorney-­‐client	  privilege	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Wigmore,	  On	  Evidence	  1st	  ed.,	  3194-­‐3256.	  	  35	  The	  Trial	  of	  Elizabeth	  Duchess	  Dowager	  of	  Kingston,	  146.	  	  36	  Ibid.	  	  37	  Ibid.	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acknowledged	  the	  privilege,	  but	  maintained	  that	  it	  did	  not	  apply	  in	  this	  instance.	  Berkley	  was	  allowed	  only	  to	  answer	  questions	  regarding	  his	  conversations	  with	  Anne	  Craddock,	  another	  witness,	  and	  did	  not	  reveal	  confidential	  information	  entrusted	  in	  him	  by	  his	  client,	  Augustus	  John	  Hervey.38	  Modern	  legal	  scholars	  might	  suspect	  that	  the	  first	  mention	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  would	  resemble	  this	  exchange	  between	  Mansfield	  and	  Berkley—a	  careful	  and	  measured	  evaluation	  of	  legal	  principles,	  seeking	  to	  define	  the	  limits	  of	  established	  privileges.	  Yet	  the	  differences	  are	  telling.	  Hawkins’s	  appeal	  did	  not	  draw	  upon	  the	  established	  expectations	  of	  his	  profession.	  Instead,	  Hawkins	  based	  his	  claims	  on	  notions	  of	  gentlemanly	  honor	  and	  aristocratic	  privilege.	  A	  close	  examination	  of	  the	  trial	  transcripts	  reveals	  some	  of	  the	  reasons	  contemporary	  legal	  scholars	  began	  to	  see	  the	  case	  as	  a	  binding	  legal	  precedent.	  Though	  Hawkins	  sought	  to	  be	  absolved	  from	  revealing	  the	  Duchess’s	  marital	  status,	  a	  fact	  he	  learned	  through	  private	  conversation	  and	  that	  was	  already	  public	  record,	  his	  invocation	  of	  “professional	  honor”	  used	  language	  that	  could	  easily	  be	  adapted	  to	  cover	  modern	  notions	  of	  medical	  confidentiality.	  Likewise,	  Mansfield’s	  response—	  “if	  a	  surgeon	  was	  to	  voluntarily	  reveal	  these	  secrets,	  to	  be	  sure	  he	  would	  be	  guilty	  of	  a	  breach	  of	  honor,	  and	  of	  great	  indiscretion;	  but	  to	  give	  that	  information	  in	  a	  court	  of	  justice,	  which	  by	  the	  law	  of	  land	  he	  is	  bound	  to	  do,	  will	  never	  be	  imputed	  to	  him	  as	  any	  indiscretion	  whatsoever”39—emphasized	  a	  conflict	  between	  Hawkins’s	  legal	  and	  professional	  duties.	  	  Though	  neither	  Mansfield	  nor	  Hawkins	  would	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Ibid.,	  146–147.	  	  39	  The	  Trial	  of	  Elizabeth	  Duchess	  Dowager	  of	  Kingston,	  120.	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distinguished	  between	  Hawkins’s	  practice	  as	  a	  surgeon	  and	  his	  personal	  relationship	  to	  the	  Duchess	  (the	  two	  would	  likely	  have	  been	  seen	  as	  one	  and	  the	  same),	  Hawkins	  also	  testified	  to	  facts	  revealed	  through	  the	  course	  of	  his	  professional	  duties.	  At	  one	  point,	  he	  was	  asked	  by	  the	  prosecuting	  attorney,	  “did	  you	  ever	  attend	  to	  the	  [Duchess’s]	  child	  in	  the	  course	  of	  your	  profession?”	  Hawkins	  responded	  affirmatively,	  confirming	  the	  birth	  of	  a	  child	  through	  the	  Duchess’s	  marriage	  to	  John	  Hervey.40	  Removed	  from	  the	  historical	  context	  of	  the	  courtroom,	  the	  initial	  exchange	  between	  Hawkins	  and	  Mansfield,	  with	  references	  to	  “professional	  honor”	  and	  the	  conflicting	  obligations	  of	  surgeons,	  would	  seem	  to	  address	  medical	  practitioners’	  duties	  of	  confidentiality.	  	  Likewise,	  the	  admission	  of	  evidence	  learned	  through	  the	  service	  of	  a	  surgeon’s	  profession	  without	  objection	  would	  have	  supported	  this	  reading	  of	  the	  exchange.	  Over	  the	  next	  several	  decades,	  this	  interpretation	  of	  Lord	  Mansfield’s	  ruling	  gradually	  became	  the	  accepted	  legal	  precedent	  on	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  The	  unique	  nature	  of	  the	  Duchess’s	  trial	  and	  Lord	  Mansfield’s	  commanding	  figure	  provide	  clues	  as	  to	  why	  this	  ruling	  has	  been	  readily	  accepted	  into	  the	  legal	  canon.	  By	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  century,	  precedent	  had	  become	  the	  predominant	  source	  of	  law	  for	  Mansfield	  and	  other	  royal	  court	  judges.41	  Administering	  law	  based	  upon	  precedent	  required	  finding	  relevant	  cases	  and	  evaluating	  the	  accuracy	  of	  documentation.	  Well-­‐versed	  in	  legal	  history	  and	  aware	  of	  some	  of	  the	  major	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Ibid.,	  121.	  	  41	  James	  Oldham	  and	  William	  Murray	  Mansfield,	  The	  Mansfield	  Manuscripts	  and	  the	  
Growth	  of	  English	  Law	  in	  the	  Eighteenth	  Century,	  vol.	  1	  (Chapel	  Hill:	  University	  of	  North	  Carolina	  Press,	  1992),	  201.	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transformations	  taking	  place	  in	  contemporary	  law,	  Mansfield	  often	  used	  his	  position	  on	  the	  King’s	  Bench	  to	  render	  high	  profile	  verdicts	  and	  rulings	  on	  procedural	  issues,	  knowing	  that	  these	  rulings	  would	  often	  become	  the	  standard	  procedure	  in	  future	  trials.	  As	  a	  legal	  scholar,	  Mansfield	  was	  deeply	  committed	  to	  modernizing	  the	  common	  law;	  to	  establishing	  rules	  that	  would	  increase	  its	  predictability;	  and	  to	  ensuring	  that	  these	  rules	  and	  precedents	  were	  applied	  evenly	  across	  myriad	  jurisdictions.42	  	  Mansfield’s	  remarks	  in	  pre-­‐trial	  proceedings	  reveal	  that	  he	  viewed	  the	  Duchess’s	  trial	  as	  a	  means	  of	  setting	  legal	  precedent	  that	  would	  have	  lasting	  impact.	  While	  pre-­‐trial	  discussions	  focused	  primarily	  upon	  the	  location	  of	  the	  trial	  and	  whether	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  had	  the	  appropriate	  authority	  to	  try	  the	  Duchess,	  Mansfield	  and	  the	  other	  presiding	  Lords	  were	  acutely	  aware	  of	  the	  unique	  circumstances	  surrounding	  the	  trial.	  	  The	  rarity	  of	  trying	  Peers	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  along	  with	  the	  spectacle	  surrounding	  the	  affair	  meant	  that	  every	  ruling	  in	  the	  trial—whether	  the	  appropriate	  jurisdiction	  of	  ecclesiastical	  courts,	  the	  location	  of	  the	  trial,	  or	  the	  admissibility	  of	  evidence—would	  be	  subject	  to	  public	  scrutiny	  and	  could	  potentially	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  precedent.43	  The	  Lords	  were	  not	  the	  only	  people	  interested	  in	  the	  trial	  for	  its	  potential	  to	  set	  legal	  precedent.	  In	  the	  months	  before	  the	  trial,	  a	  number	  of	  legal	  scholars	  published	  letters	  in	  the	  London	  papers	  arguing	  that	  the	  prosecution	  of	  the	  Duchess	  was	  illegal	  and	  represented	  a	  dangerous	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Ibid.,	  1:197.	  	  43	  “Debates	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Lords:	  The	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston’s	  Trial”	  Middlesex	  Journal	  
and	  Evening	  Advertiser	  December	  12,	  1775	  -­‐	  December	  14,	  1775;	  and	  “Debates	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Lords:	  The	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston’s	  Trial,”	  Middlesex	  Journal	  and	  Evening	  
Advertiser,	  December	  14,	  1775	  -­‐	  December	  16,	  1775.	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challenge	  to	  the	  authority	  and	  autonomy	  of	  Britain’s	  ecclesiastical	  courts.44	  Others	  worried	  that	  the	  trial	  might	  challenge	  the	  legality	  of	  divorces	  in	  England.45	  	  Well-­‐preserved	  cases,	  such	  as	  the	  Duchess’s	  trial,	  have	  often	  served	  as	  important	  sources	  of	  legal	  precedent.	  Because	  of	  the	  unique	  nature	  of	  the	  trial,	  few	  cases	  from	  the	  eighteenth	  century	  remain	  as	  well	  preserved	  in	  historical	  records.	  As	  a	  prominent	  and	  controversial	  figure	  in	  English	  society,	  the	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston’s	  trial	  prompted	  numerous	  publications	  such	  as	  Gentleman’s	  Magazine	  and	  The	  Lady’s	  
Magazine	  to	  publish	  abridged	  versions	  of	  the	  trial	  transcript.	  Often,	  these	  periodicals	  emphasized	  the	  drama	  and	  spectacle	  of	  the	  trial,	  making	  note	  of	  the	  fashion	  of	  the	  Duchess	  and	  other	  British	  aristocrats.46	  Popular	  periodicals,	  however,	  were	  not	  the	  only	  publications	  that	  published	  trial	  transcripts.	  	  The	  House	  of	  Lords	  also	  published	  a	  178-­‐page	  account	  of	  the	  proceedings	  in	  1776.	  Unlike	  the	  abridged	  versions	  in	  popular	  periodicals,	  this	  transcript	  was	  likely	  intended	  for	  an	  audience	  of	  legal	  scholars	  and	  contained	  detailed	  accounts	  of	  the	  court’s	  proceedings.47	  Francis	  Hargrave	  incorporated	  the	  House	  of	  Lords’	  transcript	  into	  his	  five-­‐volume	  collection	  of	  state	  trials.	  In	  addition	  to	  a	  collection	  of	  notable	  trials,	  Hargrave	  included	  a	  lengthy	  appendix	  that	  linked	  established	  evidentiary	  procedures	  to	  specific	  cases.	  In	  the	  appendix,	  Hargrave	  quoted	  Mansfield’s	  comments	  to	  Hawkins	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  “For	  the	  Morning	  Post:	  Kingston	  Cause,”	  Morning	  Post	  and	  Daily	  Advertiser	  (London,	  England),	  January	  2,	  1776.	  	  45	  “To	  the	  Printer	  of	  the	  Gazetteer:	  Kingston	  Cause,”	  Gazetteer	  (London,	  England),	  	  March	  7,	  1776.	  	  46	  “Classified	  Ads,”	  General	  Evening	  Post	  (London,	  England),	  April	  30,	  1776	  –	  May	  2,	  1776;	  and	  Russell,	  168-­‐174.	  	  47	  The	  Trial	  of	  Elizabeth	  Duchess	  Dowager	  of	  Kingston.	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as	  precedent	  to	  show	  that	  surgeons	  had	  no	  legal	  claim	  to	  confidentiality	  and	  could	  be	  compelled	  to	  testify	  in	  court.48	  Reprinted	  several	  times	  throughout	  the	  late-­‐eighteenth	  century,	  Hargrave’s	  collection	  demonstrates	  that	  legal	  scholars	  almost	  immediately	  began	  using	  the	  Duchess’s	  trial	  as	  a	  source	  for	  legal	  precedent.	  This	  process	  fits	  neatly	  into	  the	  larger	  history	  of	  the	  radical	  transformation	  of	  legal	  procedure	  that	  took	  place	  during	  the	  eighteenth	  century.	  The	  advent	  of	  adversarial	  criminal	  trials	  with	  attorneys	  representing	  both	  prosecution	  and	  defense	  led	  to	  the	  formalization	  of	  rules	  for	  the	  admissibility	  of	  evidence.49	  Legal	  treatises	  on	  evidence	  provided	  legal	  scholars	  with	  a	  formalized	  set	  of	  rules	  for	  courtroom	  proceedings.	  By	  1800,	  early	  evidence	  manuals	  like	  Leonard	  MacNally’s	  
The	  Rules	  of	  Evidence	  on	  Pleas	  of	  the	  Crown	  routinely	  cited	  Mansfield’s	  ruling	  in	  the	  Duchess’s	  trial	  as	  evidence	  that	  medical	  practitioners	  had	  no	  claims	  to	  confidentiality	  in	  the	  courtroom.50	  Frequently	  mentioned	  in	  legal	  treatises,	  the	  legal	  implications	  of	  this	  brief	  conversation	  were	  greatly	  amplified	  over	  the	  next	  few	  decades.	  In	  his	  1793	  treatise,	  A	  Digest	  of	  the	  Law	  of	  Actions	  and	  Trials	  at	  Nisi	  Prius	  Isaac	  Espinasse	  stated,	  	  And	  this	  privilege	  of	  not	  being	  compellable	  to	  divulge	  secrets	  professionally	  disclosed	  to	  them,	  is	  confined	  to	  attorneys	  and	  counsel	  only,	  and	  does	  not	  extend	  to	  persons	  of	  other	  professions:	  For	  where	  on	  the	  trial	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Francis	  Hargrave,	  A	  Complete	  Collection	  of	  State-­‐Trial	  and	  Proceedings	  for	  High-­‐
Treason	  and	  Other	  Crimes	  and	  Misdemeanors	  Vol.	  11	  (London:	  T.	  Wright,	  1776),	  504.	  	  	  49	  J.	  M	  Beattie,	  “Scales	  of	  Justice:	  Defense	  Counsel	  and	  the	  English	  Criminal	  Trial	  in	  the	  Eighteenth	  and	  Nineteenth	  Centuries,”	  Law	  and	  History	  Review	  9:2	  (1991):	  221–67;	  J.	  H	  Langbein,	  “Historical	  Foundations	  of	  the	  Law	  of	  Evidence:	  A	  View	  from	  the	  Ryder	  Sources,”	  Columbia	  Law	  Review	  96:5	  (1996):	  1168–1202.	  	  50	  Leonard	  MacNally,	  The	  Rules	  of	  Evidence	  on	  Pleas	  of	  the	  Crown	  (London:	  J	  Butterworth,	  1802),	  247-­‐248.	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Duchess	  of	  Kingston,	  Sir	  Caesar	  Hawkins	  the	  surgeon	  was	  called	  to	  speak	  to	  some	  matters	  wherein	  he	  had	  been	  employed	  by	  the	  Duchess,	  and	  objected	  to	  speak	  to	  them,	  he	  was	  ordered	  by	  the	  court,	  they	  holding	  that	  he	  had	  no	  such	  privilege.51	  	  	  Here,	  Espinasse	  espoused	  the	  broadest	  possible	  interpretation	  of	  the	  precedent—the	  unsuccessful	  attempt	  of	  a	  surgeon	  to	  secure	  privileged	  communications	  meant	  that,	  apart	  from	  lawyers,	  no	  professionals	  could	  claim	  privilege.	  These	  examples	  indicate	  that	  by	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  Mansfield’s	  brief	  response	  to	  Caesar	  Hawkins	  had	  been	  transformed	  from	  a	  referendum	  on	  a	  specific	  practitioner’s	  social	  standing	  into	  a	  binding	  precedent	  that	  limited	  privileged	  communications	  to	  lawyers	  alone.	  	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  many	  of	  the	  issues	  that	  had	  been	  central	  to	  the	  original	  conversation	  gradually	  disappeared	  from	  view.	  By	  referring	  to	  Hawkins	  with	  the	  honorable	  title,	  “Sir,”	  these	  legal	  scholars	  downplayed	  the	  notions	  of	  honor	  that	  had	  been	  central	  to	  the	  brief	  exchange	  between	  Mansfield	  and	  Hawkins.	  In	  the	  courtroom,	  Caesar	  Hawkins—not	  yet	  a	  Baronet—was	  viewed	  as	  a	  surgeon,	  a	  much	  less	  honorable	  position	  than	  the	  Lords	  who	  filled	  the	  courtroom.	  In	  the	  historical	  records	  of	  the	  trial,	  however,	  Hawkins’s	  knighthood	  would	  likely	  have	  placed	  his	  honor	  beyond	  reproach.	  This	  subtle	  change	  in	  the	  historical	  record	  of	  the	  trial	  allowed	  the	  conversation	  to	  be	  given	  new	  meanings.	  Without	  codes	  of	  honor	  as	  a	  powerful	  subtext,	  the	  conversation	  could	  easily	  be	  recast	  as	  an	  attempt	  by	  Hawkins	  to	  gain	  the	  privileges	  for	  an	  entire	  profession.	  Under	  this	  interpretation,	  Hawkins	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Isaac	  Espinasse,	  A	  Digest	  of	  the	  Law	  of	  Actions	  and	  Trials	  at	  Nisi	  Prius.	  The	  Second	  
Edition,	  Corrected,	  with	  Considerable	  Additions	  from	  Printed	  and	  Manuscript	  Cases,	  
and	  Three	  New	  Chapters	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Corporations	  and	  Evidence.	  By	  Isaac	  
“Espinasse,	  of	  Gray”s	  Inn,	  Esq.	  Barrister	  at	  Law,	  vol.	  2	  (London:	  printed	  for	  T.	  Cadell,	  Strand;	  and	  Whieldon	  and	  Butterw3orth,	  Fleet-­‐Street,	  1793),	  719.	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was	  not	  denied	  privilege	  because	  of	  his	  social	  standing,	  but	  because	  the	  medical	  profession	  could	  not	  successfully	  articulate	  its	  need	  for	  privileged	  communications.	  In	  1776,	  neither	  Mansfield	  nor	  Hawkins	  could	  have	  predicted	  that	  their	  brief	  conversation	  would	  have	  such	  a	  lasting	  impact.	  Over	  time,	  their	  words	  have	  been	  removed	  from	  their	  historical	  context	  and	  ascribed	  with	  new	  meanings;	  the	  notions	  of	  gentlemanly	  honor	  that	  were	  central	  to	  the	  case	  of	  have	  been	  replaced	  with	  more	  modern	  notions	  of	  medical	  ethics.	  This	  ability	  to	  be	  recast	  around	  contemporary	  debates	  has	  helped	  ensure	  the	  trial’s	  historical	  legacy.	  Some	  legal	  scholars	  have	  recently	  begun	  to	  reexamine	  the	  use	  of	  the	  Duchess’s	  trial	  as	  legal	  precedent,	  arguing	  that	  its	  use	  in	  modern	  law	  is	  based	  upon	  a	  misinterpretation	  of	  Hawkins	  and	  Mansfield’s	  arguments	  during	  the	  trial.52	  While	  these	  scholars’	  assertion	  that	  neither	  was	  speaking	  to	  medical	  confidentiality	  in	  the	  modern	  sense	  is	  correct,	  the	  common	  law	  precedent	  established	  by	  this	  brief	  aside	  was	  a	  product	  of	  the	  unique	  historical	  circumstances	  surrounding	  the	  Duchess’s	  trial.	  In	  Britain,	  this	  legal	  precedent	  has	  long	  proven	  a	  difficult	  obstacle	  to	  overcome,	  and	  there	  remains	  no	  formalized	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.53	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  legal	  interpretations	  of	  the	  Duchess’s	  trial	  have	  relegated	  battles	  over	  medical	  confidentiality	  to	  the	  state	  level,	  where	  many	  states	  have	  enacted	  statutes	  to	  codify	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  Even	  today,	  the	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston’s	  case	  continues	  to	  shape	  the	  contested	  boundaries	  between	  medicine	  and	  the	  law.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  For	  an	  example	  of	  this	  argument,	  see	  Danuta	  Mendelson,	  “The	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston’s	  Case,	  the	  ruling	  of	  Lord	  Mansfield	  and	  duty	  of	  medical	  confidentiality	  in	  court,”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Psychiatry	  35	  (2012),	  480-­‐489.	  	  53	  Ferguson,	  Should	  A	  Doctor	  Tell?.	  




	  CODIFICATION	  AND	  THE	  ORIGINS	  OF	  PHYSICIAN-­‐PATIENT	  PRIVILEGE	  	  “No	  person	  duly	  authorized	  to	  practice	  physic	  or	  surgery,	  shall	  be	  allowed	  to	  disclose	  any	  information	  which	  he	  may	  have	  acquired	  in	  attending	  to	  any	  patient,	  in	  a	  professional	  character,	  and	  which	  information	  was	  necessary	  to	  enable	  him	  to	  prescribe	  as	  a	  physician,	  or	  do	  any	  act	  for	  him,	  as	  a	  surgeon.” ⁠	  —Revised	  Statutes	  of	  New	  York	  (1828)	  	  	   In	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  origins	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century.	  In	  1800,	  no	  common	  law	  jurisdiction	  in	  Britain	  or	  the	  United	  States	  recognized	  physician-­‐patient-­‐privilege.	  The	  precedent	  established	  in	  the	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston’s	  trial	  remained	  unchallenged	  until	  1828,	  when	  New	  York	  became	  the	  first	  state	  to	  recognize	  medical	  confidentiality	  in	  the	  courtroom.	  By	  the	  1850s,	  numerous	  states	  had	  followed	  New	  York’s	  example,	  incorporating	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  into	  their	  newly	  revised	  legal	  codes.	  	  	   The	  proliferation	  of	  these	  statutes	  can	  be	  attributed	  primarily	  to	  developments	  within	  the	  legal	  profession	  rather	  than	  the	  medical	  profession.	  The	  early	  nineteenth	  century	  brought	  increasing	  demand	  for	  codification,	  the	  process	  of	  collecting	  and	  restructuring	  the	  law	  into	  an	  easily	  accessible	  legal	  code.	  The	  effects	  of	  this	  legal	  movement	  were	  myriad	  and	  diverse—most	  fall	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study.1	  Yet	  one	  product	  of	  codification	  was	  the	  advent	  and	  rapid	  spread	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  General	  studies	  of	  the	  codification	  movement	  can	  be	  found	  in	  numerous	  legal	  surveys,	  including	  Kermit	  Hall’s	  The	  Magic	  Mirror:	  Law	  in	  American	  History	  2nd	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2009)	  or	  Lawrence	  Friedman’s	  A	  History	  of	  
American	  Law	  3rd	  ed.	  (New	  York:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  2005).	  Charles	  Cook,	  The	  
American	  Codification	  Movement:	  A	  Study	  of	  Antebellum	  Legal	  Reform	  (Westport:	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physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  By	  challenging	  the	  basic	  assumptions	  of	  the	  old	  common	  law	  system,	  codification	  provided	  the	  impetus	  to	  reexamine	  established	  legal	  doctrines,	  including	  well-­‐established	  legal	  precedents	  such	  as	  Lord	  Mansfield’s	  ruling	  on	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  many	  of	  the	  greatest	  proponents	  of	  codification	  actively	  sought	  to	  revise	  and	  reshape	  American	  law.	  New	  York’s	  influential	  statute	  on	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  was	  enacted	  as	  part	  of	  a	  sweeping	  revision	  of	  that	  state’s	  judicial	  code.	  Likewise,	  all	  of	  the	  ensuing	  statutory	  guarantees	  of	  medical	  confidentiality	  were	  incorporated	  into	  the	  statute	  books	  through	  codification.	  	  This	  chapter	  charts	  the	  evolution	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  during	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century,	  focusing	  on	  the	  legal	  developments	  that	  facilitated	  the	  rapid	  spread	  of	  the	  privilege.	  For	  historians	  of	  medicine	  and	  the	  law,	  this	  period	  poses	  several	  dilemmas.	  On	  its	  face,	  the	  rapid	  spread	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  would	  seem	  to	  suggest	  that	  privileged	  communications	  must	  have	  been	  an	  important,	  and	  oft-­‐discussed	  topic	  throughout	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  century.	  Yet	  it	  was	  not.	  Instead,	  the	  privilege	  remained	  an	  arcane	  and	  seemingly	  inconsequential	  legal	  doctrine,	  certainly	  not	  a	  high	  profile	  issue.	  In	  fact,	  the	  issue	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  nearly	  vanished	  from	  both	  legal	  and	  medical	  discourse.	  Many	  of	  the	  earliest	  statutes	  were	  enacted	  without	  fanfare	  and	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  was	  seldom	  exercised	  in	  the	  courtroom.	  	   Despite	  the	  lack	  of	  interest	  from	  nineteenth-­‐century	  scholars,	  however,	  the	  legislation	  enacted	  during	  first	  half	  of	  the	  century	  would	  prove	  extremely	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Greenwood	  Press,	  1981)	  offers	  a	  thorough	  discussion	  of	  the	  codification	  movement	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  American	  law.	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influential.	  The	  laws	  themselves	  offered	  a	  powerful	  challenge	  to	  established	  legal	  precedent,	  providing	  the	  groundwork	  for	  future	  legislation.	  Many	  later	  laws	  merely	  parroted	  the	  language	  of	  these	  early	  statues.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  legal	  interpretations	  of	  Lord	  Mansfield’s	  ruling	  further	  hardened	  into	  an	  unbending	  legal	  precedent	  that	  applied	  to	  all	  jurisdictions	  without	  a	  statute.	  By	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  the	  fault	  lines	  between	  privileged	  and	  non-­‐privileged	  communications	  had	  been	  well	  established.	  Until	  1828,	  medical	  witnesses	  throughout	  the	  United	  States	  were,	  in	  theory,	  governed	  by	  the	  precedent	  established	  in	  the	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston’s	  trial	  for	  bigamy.	  While	  American	  legal	  records	  from	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century	  are	  fleeting	  and	  often	  incomplete,	  later	  legal	  scholarship	  suggests	  that	  the	  matter	  was	  seldom	  considered	  in	  American	  courtrooms.	  The	  few	  instances	  in	  which	  medical	  confidentiality	  was	  invoked	  in	  the	  courtroom	  demonstrate	  that	  American	  courts	  were	  often	  unable	  to	  reach	  a	  consensus	  on	  the	  issue.	  Sherman	  v.	  Sherman,	  a	  1793	  divorce	  case,	  upheld	  the	  precedent	  established	  in	  the	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston’s	  trial	  when	  a	  doctor’s	  testimony	  was	  allowed	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  “all	  he	  could	  testify	  came	  to	  his	  knowledge	  in	  confidence.”	  Later	  legal	  scholars	  have	  cited	  this	  case	  as	  proof	  that	  the	  precedent	  “would	  probably	  have	  been	  acknowledged	  as	  a	  common-­‐law	  principle	  in	  every	  American	  court.”2	  Other	  sources	  suggest,	  however,	  that	  some	  courts	  were	  willing	  to	  grant	  physicians	  privileged	  communications.	  The	  Medical	  Society	  of	  the	  State	  of	  New	  York’s	  1823	  System	  of	  Ethics	  claimed	  that,	  in	  1800,	  the	  Pennsylvania	  legislature	  barred	  the	  disclosure	  of	  medical	  secrets	  in	  the	  courtroom	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Wigmore,	  On	  Evidence	  1st	  ed.,	  3348.	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on	  the	  grounds	  that	  these	  communications	  were	  analogous	  to	  privileged	  communications	  between	  priest	  and	  penitent.3	  Neither	  of	  these	  cases	  ever	  came	  to	  be	  considered	  a	  source	  of	  precedent.	  	  Instead,	  American	  legal	  scholars	  continued	  to	  look	  to	  England,	  where	  only	  a	  few	  judicial	  decisions	  addressed	  the	  topic	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  Wilson	  v.	  
Rastall,	  the	  first	  and	  most	  frequently	  cited	  of	  these	  British	  decisions,	  had	  been	  adjudicated	  in	  1792.	  A	  bribery	  suit	  brought	  before	  the	  King’s	  Bench,	  the	  case	  featured	  no	  medical	  testimony.	  Yet	  in	  the	  court’s	  decision,	  Justice	  Buller,	  a	  protégé	  of	  Lord	  Mansfield,	  delivered	  a	  brief	  aside	  that	  reiterated	  the	  precedent	  established	  by	  his	  late	  mentor:	  There	  are	  cases	  to	  which	  it	  is	  much	  to	  be	  lamented	  that	  the	  law	  of	  privilege	  is	  not	  extended;	  those	  in	  which	  medical	  persons	  are	  obliged	  to	  disclose	  the	  information	  which	  they	  acquire	  by	  attending	  in	  their	  professional	  characters.	  This	  point	  was	  very	  much	  considered	  in	  the	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston’s	  case,	  where	  Sir	  C.	  Hawkins,	  who	  had	  attended	  the	  Duchess	  as	  a	  medical	  person	  made	  the	  objection	  himself,	  but	  was	  overruled,	  and	  compelled	  to	  give	  evidence	  against	  the	  prisoner.4	  	  	  Part	  of	  a	  lengthy	  monologue	  on	  attorney-­‐client	  privilege,	  these	  few	  lines	  were	  the	  first	  to	  invoke	  Mansfield’s	  ruling	  in	  a	  court	  of	  law.	  Within	  a	  few	  decades	  of	  the	  Duchess’s	  trial,	  the	  historical	  meaning	  of	  the	  brief	  exchange	  between	  Mansfield	  and	  Hawkins	  had	  changed	  drastically.	  	  	   Buller’s	  speech	  articulated	  what	  has	  become	  the	  modern	  reading	  of	  the	  trial—that	  Mansfield	  denied	  Hawkins	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege,	  establishing	  a	  precedent	  for	  all	  common	  law	  jurisdictions.	  In	  doing	  so,	  this	  conversation	  between	  judge	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Medical	  Society	  of	  the	  State	  of	  New	  York,	  System	  of	  Ethics,	  17-­‐18.	  	  4	  Term	  Reports	  in	  the	  Court	  of	  King’s	  Bench:	  from	  Michaelmas	  Term	  31st	  George	  III.	  
1790	  to	  Trinity	  Term,	  32nd	  George	  III.	  1792.,	  760.	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witness	  was	  stripped	  of	  its	  historical	  context	  and	  imbued	  with	  new	  values.	  What	  was	  originally	  a	  minor	  aside	  in	  a	  very	  controversial	  case	  suddenly	  became	  “much	  considered”	  and	  was	  preserved	  one	  of	  the	  trial’s	  lasting	  legacies.	  Ironically,	  Buller’s	  lament	  that	  privileged	  communications	  ought	  to	  be	  extended	  to	  medical	  practitioners	  helped	  secure	  this	  new	  reading	  of	  the	  Duchess’s	  trial,	  reaffirming	  the	  notion	  that	  issues	  of	  privileged	  communications	  had	  been	  central	  to	  the	  Duchess’s	  case.	  Buller’s	  remarks	  were	  then	  cited,	  along	  with	  Mansfield’s	  ruling,	  in	  Rex	  v.	  
Gibbons	  and	  Broad	  v.	  Pitt.5	  	  	   Nineteenth-­‐century	  legal	  scholars	  typically	  cited	  these	  cases	  as	  a	  source	  of	  binding	  legal	  precedent	  that	  precluded	  everyone	  but	  legal	  professionals	  from	  privileged	  communications.	  In	  1804,	  Thomas	  Peake’s	  A	  Compendium	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  
Evidence	  cited	  Mansfield	  to	  argue,	  “[the]	  rule	  of	  professional	  secrecy	  extends	  only	  to	  the	  case	  of	  facts	  stated	  to	  a	  legal	  practitioner,	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  enabling	  him	  to	  conduct	  a	  cause;	  and	  therefore…	  the	  statement…	  of	  a	  patient	  to	  his	  physician	  [is]	  not	  within	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  law.”	  6 ⁠	  	  Similarly,	  Samuel	  March	  Phillips’	  popular	  evidence	  manual	  cited	  both	  Mansfield	  and	  Buller.7	  In	  this	  way,	  evidence	  manuals	  lifted	  brief	  asides	  from	  justices	  Mansfield	  and	  Buller,	  transforming	  them	  into	  de	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Charles	  A.	  Boston,	  “The	  Law	  of	  Evidence	  Concerning	  Communications	  Between	  Patient	  and	  Physician,”	  in	  Medical	  Jurisprudence,	  Forensic	  Medicine	  and	  Toxicology	  2nd	  ed.,	  v.	  1,	  eidited	  by	  Rudolph	  A.	  Withaus	  (New	  York:	  1906),	  92.	  	  6	  Thomas	  Peake,	  A	  Compendium	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Evidence.	  With	  an	  Appendix	  of	  Cases	  (London:	  1804),	  175.	  	  7	  S.	  M.	  Phillips,	  A	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Evidence:	  First	  American	  Ed.,	  from	  the	  Second	  
London	  Ed.	  With	  Notes	  and	  References	  to	  American	  Authorities,	  to	  Which	  is	  Added	  the	  
Theory	  of	  Presumptive	  Proof	  (New	  York,:1816),	  104.	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facto	  laws.	  	   At	  the	  same	  time,	  these	  texts	  preserved	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  introduced	  much	  of	  the	  language	  and	  rhetoric	  associated	  with	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  Mansfield	  and	  Hawkins’	  discussion	  of	  “professional	  honor,”	  for	  example,	  was	  echoed	  in	  later	  legal	  discussion	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  In	  his	  1804	  treatise,	  Peake	  paraphrased	  Mansfield,	  “We	  should	  certainly	  think	  the	  friend,	  or	  the	  physician,	  who	  voluntarily	  violated	  the	  confidence	  reposed	  in	  him,	  acted	  dishonorably;	  but	  he	  cannot	  withhold	  the	  fact,	  if	  called	  upon	  by	  a	  court	  of	  justice.”8⁠	  In	  doing	  so,	  Peake	  emphasized	  physicians’	  conflicting	  duties—to	  their	  patients	  and	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  justice	  in	  the	  courtroom—that	  would	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  future	  discussion	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  Likewise,	  by	  including	  Buller’s	  lamentation	  against	  the	  lack	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  in	  his	  treatise,	  legal	  scholar	  Samuel	  March	  Phillips	  suggested	  that	  there	  was	  growing	  support	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.9	  Today,	  with	  an	  abundance	  of	  legal	  and	  medico-­‐legal	  literature	  readily	  available,	  these	  minor	  developments	  may	  seem	  trivial.	  Yet	  in	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century,	  legal	  treatises	  were	  often	  the	  only	  available	  writings	  on	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  Accordingly,	  the	  language	  and	  examples	  these	  texts	  used	  could,	  and	  did,	  have	  powerful	  effects	  on	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  later	  scholars	  and	  legislators	  viewed	  the	  privilege.	  	  	   New	  York’s	  adoption	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  provided	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  The	  New	  York	  statute,	  the	  first	  of	  its	  kind	  was	  heavily	  influenced	  by	  the	  language	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Peake,	  175.	  	  9	  Phillips,	  104.	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and	  rhetoric	  of	  these	  early	  cases	  and	  evidence	  manuals.	  By	  enacting	  the	  first	  statutory	  guarantee	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege,	  the	  proponents	  of	  the	  New	  York	  law	  were	  directly	  responding	  to	  the	  arguments	  of	  Buller	  and	  other	  legal	  scholars.	  The	  statute	  was	  enacted	  as	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  movement	  to	  codify	  and	  simplify	  the	  New	  York’s	  legal	  system.	  By	  the	  1820s,	  centuries	  of	  legislation	  and	  court	  rulings,	  coupled	  with	  poor	  record	  keeping,	  had	  created	  a	  myriad,	  sometimes-­‐contradictory	  body	  of	  laws.	  For	  lawyers	  and	  legislators,	  it	  was	  often	  difficult	  to	  determine	  which	  statutes	  and	  which	  rulings	  applied	  to	  specific	  cases.	  Many	  legal	  scholars	  believed	  that	  codification,	  a	  process	  that	  would	  replace	  the	  judicial	  interpretation	  of	  the	  common	  law	  system	  with	  a	  more	  precise	  and	  proscriptive	  legal	  code,	  offered	  an	  ideal	  solution.	  Accordingly,	  in	  1821,	  the	  New	  York	  legislature	  sought	  to	  rewrite	  the	  state	  constitution.	  Gathering	  in	  Albany,	  delegates	  to	  the	  New	  York	  state	  constitutional	  convention	  “abrogated”	  the	  sections	  of	  the	  states’	  common	  law	  and	  statutory	  codes	  that	  were	  “repugnant”	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  American	  governance.10	  	   Still,	  the	  vague	  language	  of	  New	  York’s	  new	  constitution	  only	  added	  to	  the	  complications	  surrounding	  the	  state’s	  law.	  Advocates	  of	  codification	  believed	  that	  the	  state	  legislature,	  representing	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  public,	  should	  be	  entrusted	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  consolidate	  and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  rewrite	  the	  offending	  laws.	  In	  1824,	  the	  state	  legislature	  commissioned	  a	  three-­‐man	  committee	  to	  “alter	  the	  phraseology”	  of	  the	  states	  codes	  and	  increase	  the	  legibility	  off	  the	  state’s	  statutory	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Cook,	  155.	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law.11	  	  The	  legislature	  asked	  attorneys	  Benjamin	  Butler	  and	  Erasmus	  Root,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  prominent	  legal	  scholar	  James	  Kent	  to	  examine	  the	  state’s	  laws.	  Root	  and	  Butler	  accepted,	  but	  Kent	  declined.	  In	  his	  place,	  the	  legislature	  appointed	  John	  Duer,	  another	  prominent	  New	  York	  Attorney.12	  	  	   New	  York	  governor	  DeWitt	  Clinton	  quickly	  emerged	  as	  a	  powerful	  and	  outspoken	  advocate	  of	  codification.	  In	  1825,	  he	  successfully	  lobbied	  to	  expand	  the	  committee’s	  task,	  empowering	  the	  revisers	  to	  consolidate	  laws	  relating	  to	  the	  same	  subject,	  to	  expunge	  expired	  or	  outdated	  legislation	  from	  the	  state	  code,	  and	  to	  suggest	  new	  laws	  to	  the	  state	  legislature.	  	  Entrusting	  the	  committee	  with	  these	  unprecedented	  powers,	  Governor	  Clinton	  sought	  nothing	  short	  of	  a	  complete	  overhaul	  of	  New	  York’s	  legal	  system.	  Before	  the	  state	  legislature,	  Clinton	  boldly	  asserted	  that	  he	  hoped	  to	  create	  “[a	  new]	  complete	  code	  founded	  on	  the	  salutary	  principles	  of	  the	  common	  law,	  adopted	  to	  the	  interests	  of	  commerce	  and	  the	  useful	  arts,	  the	  state	  of	  society	  and	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  government,	  and	  embracing	  those	  improvements	  which	  are	  enjoined	  by	  enlightened	  experience.”	  Clearing	  the	  revisers	  to	  extend	  their	  powers	  far	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  previous	  committees,	  Governor	  Clinton	  hoped	  codification	  would	  “free	  [state]	  laws	  from	  uncertainty,	  elevate	  a	  liberal	  and	  honorable	  [legal]	  profession,	  and	  utterly	  destroy	  judicial	  legislation,	  which	  is	  fundamentally	  at	  war	  with	  the	  genius	  of	  republican	  government.”13	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  New	  York	  State	  Constitution	  of	  1821,	  Article	  6,	  Section	  XIII;	  Mohr,	  Doctors	  and	  the	  
Law,	  78.	  12	  Mohr,	  Doctors	  and	  the	  Law,	  79.	  	  13	  Charles	  Z.,	  Lincoln,	  ed.	  Message	  from	  the	  Governors,	  Comprising	  Executive	  
Communications	  to	  the	  Legislature…	  11	  vols.	  (Albany,	  1909),	  II:90,	  quoted	  in	  Cook,	  138.	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   Not	  everyone	  on	  the	  committee	  shared	  Governor	  Clinton’s	  lofty	  ambitions,	  however.	  Uncomfortable	  with	  the	  new	  powers	  entrusted	  to	  the	  committee,	  Erasmus	  Root	  resigned.	  His	  replacement,	  Supreme	  Court	  reporter	  Henry	  Wheaton	  served	  for	  a	  year	  before	  he	  too	  resigned.	  By	  1827,	  John	  C.	  Spencer,	  a	  promising	  young	  New	  York	  lawyer,	  had	  replaced	  Wheaton.	  	  Compared	  to	  his	  predecessors,	  Spencer	  was	  wholeheartedly	  dedicated	  to	  the	  codification	  process.	  Spencer	  shared	  the	  governor’s	  belief	  that	  codification	  would	  solve	  the	  state’s	  legal	  problems.	  Both	  had	  no	  qualms	  about	  upending	  established	  English	  precedents	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  Americanize	  the	  common	  law.	  With	  Clinton’s	  blessing,	  Spencer	  quickly	  took	  control	  of	  the	  committee,	  authoring	  numerous	  laws	  and	  working	  tirelessly	  to	  secure	  their	  passage	  through	  the	  state	  legislature.14	  	   Thus,	  by	  1827,	  all	  three	  positions	  had	  been	  filled	  by	  young	  attorneys	  who	  favored	  codification	  and	  the	  committee	  had	  been	  entrusted	  with	  unprecedented	  legislative	  power.	  Seizing	  this	  unique	  opportunity,	  the	  revisers	  used	  the	  “liberal	  application”	  of	  their	  powers	  to	  completely	  rewrite	  the	  New	  York	  Statutory	  Code.	  The	  committee	  compiled	  all	  of	  the	  states’	  disparate	  statutes	  into	  a	  single	  volume.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  made	  numerous	  substantive	  changes	  to	  New	  York’s	  laws.	  For	  example,	  New	  York’s	  Revised	  Statutes	  made	  abortion	  after	  quickening	  a	  crime	  and	  radically	  reformed	  the	  state’s	  property	  and	  inheritance	  laws.	  In	  general,	  New	  York’s	  legal	  profession	  greeted	  this	  project	  with	  enthusiasm.	  While	  the	  legislature	  balked	  at	  a	  few	  specific	  provisions,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Revised	  Statutes	  were	  accepted	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Mohr,	  Doctors	  and	  the	  Law,	  79;	  Cook,	  140-­‐150.	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without	  controversy.15	  	  	   In	  this	  manner,	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  was	  quietly	  and	  unceremoniously	  added	  to	  the	  statute	  books.	  The	  revisers	  split	  New	  York’s	  statutes	  into	  five	  categories,	  presenting	  each	  separately	  to	  the	  state	  legislature.	  	  In	  1828,	  alongside	  numerous	  other	  provisions	  pertaining	  to	  criminal	  law,	  the	  revisers	  presented	  the	  state	  legislature	  with	  the	  first	  statute	  guaranteeing	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  The	  law	  read:	  	   	  No	  person	  duly	  authorized	  to	  practice	  physic	  or	  surgery,	  shall	  be	  allowed	  to	  disclose	  any	  information	  which	  he	  may	  have	  acquired	  in	  attending	  to	  any	  patient,	  in	  a	  professional	  character,	  and	  which	  information	  was	  necessary	  to	  enable	  him	  to	  prescribe	  as	  a	  physician,	  or	  do	  any	  act	  for	  him,	  as	  a	  surgeon.16	  	  The	  law	  was	  met	  with	  little	  objection	  from	  the	  state	  legislature,	  which	  quickly	  enacted	  the	  statute.	  Without	  a	  transcript	  of	  the	  debate	  on	  the	  legislature	  floor,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  ascertain	  whether	  the	  lawmakers	  understood	  the	  historical	  significance	  of	  this	  specific	  statute.	  17	  	   The	  revisers,	  however,	  were	  keenly	  aware	  that	  the	  new	  law	  challenged	  accepted	  legal	  precedents.	  As	  with	  all	  of	  their	  potentially	  controversial	  provisions,	  the	  committee	  kept	  careful	  notes,	  justifying	  their	  actions	  in	  case	  of	  potential	  opposition	  within	  the	  legislature.	  In	  their	  notes,	  the	  revisers	  provided	  the	  legislature	  with	  a	  lengthy	  argument	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  new	  statute.	  They	  began	  by	  citing	  Wilson	  v.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Ibid.	  16	  New	  York	  (State),	  Benjamin	  Franklin	  Butler,	  John	  Duer,	  and	  John	  Canfield	  Spencer,	  Revised	  Statutes	  of	  the	  State	  of	  New	  York,	  Passed	  During	  the	  Year	  One	  
Thousand	  Eight	  Hundred	  and	  Twenty	  Eight…	  Printed	  and	  Published	  Under	  the	  
Direction	  of	  the	  Revisers,	  Appointed	  for	  that	  Purpose	  (Albany,	  Packard	  &	  Van	  Bentuysen,	  1829),	  409.	  	  17	  Mohr,	  Doctors	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  the	  Law,	  79;	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Rastall,	  stating,	  “[Justice]	  Buller	  (to	  whom	  no	  one	  will	  attribute	  a	  disposition	  to	  relax	  the	  rules	  of	  evidence)	  said	  it	  was	  ‘much	  to	  be	  lamented’	  that	  [medical	  communications	  were]	  not	  privileged.”	  Likewise,	  the	  revisers	  offered	  British	  legal	  scholar	  Samuel	  March	  Phillips	  as	  another	  advocate	  of	  favor	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  The	  statute	  was	  modeled	  upon	  attorney-­‐client	  privilege	  and	  passed	  alongside	  a	  companion	  statute	  that	  extended	  the	  privilege	  to	  communications	  between	  priest	  and	  penitent.	  Yet	  the	  revisers	  saw	  the	  need	  to	  privilege	  medical	  communications	  as	  more	  pressing	  than	  the	  need	  to	  privilege	  attorney-­‐client	  relations:	  	  	  The	  ground	  on	  which	  communications	  to	  counsel	  are	  privileged,	  is	  the	  supposed	  necessity	  of	  the	  full	  knowledge	  of	  the	  facts,	  to	  advise	  correctly,	  and	  to	  prepare	  for	  the	  proper	  defense	  or	  prosecution	  of	  a	  suit.	  But	  surely	  the	  necessity	  of	  consulting	  a	  medical	  adviser,	  when	  life	  itself	  may	  be	  in	  jeopardy,	  is	  still	  stronger.	  And	  unless	  such	  consultations	  are	  privileged,	  men	  will	  be	  incidentally	  punished	  by	  being	  obliged	  to	  suffer	  the	  consequences	  of	  injuries	  without	  relief	  from	  the	  medical	  art,	  and	  without	  conviction	  of	  any	  offence.	  	  	  Moreover,	  the	  revisers	  adopted	  up	  the	  rhetoric	  that	  had	  developed	  in	  courtrooms	  and	  legal	  texts,	  stressing	  physicians’	  conflicting	  duties	  to	  their	  patients	  and	  the	  law.	  They	  feared	  that	  physicians,	  if	  torn	  between	  the	  two,	  would	  choose	  to	  honor	  their	  obligations	  to	  their	  patients,	  disobeying	  the	  courts	  in	  the	  process:	  Besides,	  in	  such	  cases,	  during	  the	  struggle	  between	  legal	  duty	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  professional	  honor	  on	  the	  other,	  the	  latter,	  aided	  by	  a	  strong	  sense	  of	  the	  injustice	  and	  inhumanity	  of	  the	  rule,	  will,	  in	  most	  cases,	  furnish	  a	  temptation	  to	  the	  perversion	  or	  concealment	  of	  truth,	  too	  strong	  for	  human	  resistance.	  	  Given	  physicians’	  desire	  to	  protect	  their	  patients	  and	  the	  support	  of	  prominent	  legal	  scholars,	  the	  revisers	  urged	  the	  state	  legislature	  to	  adopt	  the	  privilege	  immediately.	  The	  revisers	  concluded,	  “In	  every	  view	  that	  can	  be	  taken	  of	  the	  policy,	  justice	  or	  humanity	  of	  the	  rule,	  as	  it	  exists,	  its	  relaxation	  seems	  highly	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expedient.”	  They	  also	  suggested	  that	  the	  proposed	  law	  was	  “so	  guarded	  that	  it	  can	  not	  be	  abused	  by	  applying	  it	  to	  cases	  not	  intended	  to	  be	  privileged.”18	  To	  lawmakers,	  this	  reasoning	  must	  have	  been	  convincing.	  	  The	  statute	  itself	  drew	  little	  criticism,	  and	  the	  state	  legislature	  enacted	  the	  law	  alongside	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  revisers’	  amendments	  to	  the	  criminal	  code.	  Still,	  the	  Reviser’s	  Notes	  do	  not	  completely	  illuminate	  the	  reasons	  a	  few	  New	  York	  lawyers	  suddenly	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  entrust	  doctors	  with	  unprecedented	  legal	  privileges.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  revisers	  were	  pushed	  to	  enact	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  by	  one	  or	  several	  influential	  physicians.	  Recent	  scholarship	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  revisers	  sought	  the	  council	  of	  Theodoric	  Romeyn	  Beck,	  for	  guidance	  on	  revised	  code’s	  application	  to	  medical	  policy.	  Beck,	  an	  Albany	  physician,	  was	  perhaps	  the	  foremost	  scholar	  of	  medical	  jurisprudence	  in	  first	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  As	  one	  of	  Albany’s	  most	  prominent	  citizens,	  he	  was	  also	  well	  acquainted	  with	  the	  members	  of	  the	  revising	  committee,	  especially	  John	  C.	  Spencer.	  Beck	  and	  Spencer	  had	  both	  attended	  Union	  College,	  graduating	  one	  year	  apart.	  Each	  was	  a	  close	  friend	  of	  Governor	  Clinton.	  Historian	  James	  Mohr	  has	  demonstrated	  that	  Beck	  worked	  closely	  with	  the	  revisers—none	  of	  whom	  were	  experts	  on	  medical	  issues—to	  revise	  New	  York’s	  medical	  laws.	  Though	  much	  of	  the	  communications	  between	  Beck	  and	  the	  revisers	  was	  likely	  conducted	  in	  private,	  excerpts	  from	  Beck’s	  personal	  correspondence	  reveal	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Beck	  was	  involved	  in	  the	  process	  of	  revision:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Commissioners	  on	  Revision	  of	  the	  Statutes	  of	  New	  York	  (Albany:	  1836),	  III,	  737.	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Albany,	  Sept.	  11,	  1828	  	  I	  have	  prepared	  various	  Sections	  against	  medical	  malpractice	  according	  to	  your	  Suggestions,	  particularly	  the	  improper	  use	  of	  instruments,	  capital	  operations	  in	  surgery,	  selling	  poisons	  &c.	  which	  when	  examined	  by	  Mr.	  Butler	  I	  will	  have	  edited	  and	  sent	  to	  you.	  In	  the	  mean	  while	  I	  want	  you	  to	  prepare	  the	  public	  and	  particularly	  the	  Legislature,	  by	  communications	  in	  the	  different	  newspapers,	  by	  extracts	  from	  approved	  writers	  on	  such	  subjects,	  and	  by	  such	  other	  means	  as	  occur	  to	  you,	  for	  a	  favorable	  examination	  and	  discussion	  upon	  our	  provisions.	  I	  have	  neither	  the	  time	  nor	  ability	  to	  do	  it.	  	   Yours	  very	  respectfully,	  J.	  C.	  Spencer	  	  To	  Mohr,	  this	  “letter	  makes	  clear	  the	  fact	  that	  Beck	  was	  given	  a	  reasonably	  free	  hand	  to	  try	  to	  insinuate	  into	  the	  proposed	  legal	  code	  any	  medically	  related	  provisions	  he	  wanted.”19	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  Spencer	  entrusted	  his	  friend	  and	  colleague	  to	  curry	  the	  favor	  of	  state	  legislators,	  suggesting	  that	  Beck	  was	  actively	  involved	  in	  nearly	  every	  phase	  of	  the	  process.	  Furthermore,	  the	  law	  itself	  as	  well	  as	  the	  justification	  presented	  in	  the	  Revisers’	  Notes	  expounded	  upon	  many	  of	  the	  themes	  present	  throughout	  Beck’s	  work.	  All	  of	  this	  information	  would	  seem	  to	  suggest	  that	  Beck’s	  guidance	  prompted	  the	  revisers	  to	  insert	  a	  statute	  guaranteeing	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  into	  the	  revised	  code.	  	  Yet	  a	  closer	  examination	  of	  Beck’s	  publications	  provides	  no	  evidence	  that	  he	  directly	  pushed	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  The	  initial	  1823	  edition	  of	  Elements	  of	  Medical	  Jurisprudence,	  Beck’s	  seminal	  work,	  featured	  little	  discussion	  of	  the	  duties	  facing	  medical	  witnesses.	  In	  1828,	  Beck	  addressed	  the	  Medical	  Society	  of	  the	  State	  of	  New	  York	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  medical	  testimony	  in	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Mohr,	  Doctors	  and	  the	  Law,	  81.	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courtroom,	  but	  again	  did	  not	  mention	  privileged	  communications.20	  Thus,	  while	  Beck	  might	  have	  been	  involved,	  he	  never	  publicly	  advocated	  in	  favor	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  before	  the	  law	  was	  passed.	  Moreover,	  in	  later	  editions	  of	  Principles	  
of	  Medical	  Ethics	  Beck	  did	  mention	  the	  precedent	  established	  in	  the	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston’s	  trial,	  but	  failed	  to	  mention	  New	  York’s	  medical	  confidentiality	  law.21	  	  Another	  possibility	  is	  that	  a	  small	  group	  of	  New	  York	  physicians	  managed	  to	  convince	  the	  revisers	  to	  enact	  a	  statutory	  guarantee	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  Five	  years	  before	  the	  New	  York	  State	  Legislature	  enacted	  the	  United	  States’	  first	  medical	  confidentiality	  law,	  the	  Medical	  Society	  of	  the	  State	  of	  New	  York	  (MSSNY)	  had	  openly	  called	  for	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  in	  its	  System	  of	  Ethics	  (This	  document	  would	  prove	  influential	  in	  the	  history	  of	  American	  medical	  ethics,	  and	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  Chapter	  3).	  Comparing	  physicians	  to	  Catholic	  priests,	  System	  of	  
Ethics	  suggested	  that	  physicians’	  were	  obliged	  to	  maintain	  patients’	  confidences	  even	  in	  a	  court	  of	  law.	  Written	  by	  several	  prominent	  physicians,	  this	  document	  may	  very	  well	  have	  informed	  the	  committee’s	  decision	  to	  enact	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.22	  	  Yet	  if	  the	  revisers	  solicited	  the	  advice	  of	  either	  Beck	  or	  the	  MSSNY,	  they	  chose	  not	  to	  present	  this	  information	  to	  the	  state	  legislature.	  Instead,	  the	  Revisers’	  Notes	  suggest	  that	  the	  New	  York	  statue	  was	  prompted	  by	  nineteenth-­‐century	  legal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Beck,	  Elements	  of	  Medical	  Jurisprudence	  1st	  Ed.	  (Albany:	  1823);	  Beck,	  “On	  Medical	  Evidence,”	  New	  York	  Medical	  and	  Physical	  Journal	  	  7	  (1828),	  9-­‐34.	  21	  Theodric	  Romeyn	  Beck	  and	  John	  B.	  Beck,	  Elements	  of	  Medical	  Jurisprudence	  5th	  ed.	  v.	  2	  (Albany:	  1835),	  661.	  	  22	  Medical	  Society	  of	  the	  State	  of	  New	  York,	  System	  of	  Ethics	  (New	  York:	  1823);	  Baker,	  Before	  Bioethics,	  112-­‐123.	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scholarship.	  The	  language	  in	  the	  revisers’	  notes	  echoed	  the	  language	  of	  earlier	  court	  cases	  and	  legal	  manuals.	  The	  revisers	  specifically	  referred	  to	  physicians’	  “professional	  honor”	  and	  cited	  Buller	  and	  Phillips,	  both	  prominent	  legal	  scholars.	  They	  did	  not	  cite	  any	  physicians	  or	  medical	  experts.	  	  Likewise,	  the	  revisers	  justified	  their	  changes	  to	  the	  New	  York	  code,	  by	  comparing	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  to	  attorney-­‐client	  privilege,	  not	  priest-­‐penitent	  privilege.	  Moreover,	  while	  much	  of	  the	  legislation	  proposed	  by	  Beck	  was	  placed	  in	  the	  medical	  section	  of	  the	  code,	  New	  York’s	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  law	  was	  included	  in	  the	  state’s	  evidentiary	  code,	  a	  topic	  on	  which	  neither	  Beck	  nor	  the	  MSSNY	  likely	  would	  have	  been	  consulted.	  	  	   Furthermore,	  the	  revisers	  would	  have	  had	  their	  own	  reasons	  to	  take	  issue	  with	  the	  common	  law	  position	  on	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  To	  the	  proponents	  of	  codification,	  judicial	  decisions	  like	  Lord	  Mansfield’s	  ruling	  on	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  were	  symptoms	  of	  two	  of	  the	  major	  problems	  plaguing	  the	  judicial	  system:	  First,	  as	  unelected	  officials,	  judges	  were	  afforded	  too	  much	  power	  to	  interpret	  and	  enforce	  the	  laws.	  Second,	  the	  common	  law,	  which	  depended	  upon	  the	  interpretation	  of	  legal	  precedent,	  was	  virtually	  incomprehensible	  to	  laymen.	  Replacing	  this	  arcane	  legal	  doctrine	  with	  a	  precise	  and	  proscriptive	  law	  would	  have	  solved	  each	  of	  these	  dilemmas.	  	  	   Whatever	  the	  motivations	  of	  the	  Revisers,	  the	  New	  York	  statute	  quickly	  influenced	  other	  states	  to	  follow	  suit	  (see	  Table	  1).	  Missouri	  passed	  a	  law	  guaranteeing	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  in	  1835.	  Mississippi	  enacted	  a	  statute	  the	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following	  year.23	  By	  1840,	  both	  Arkansas	  and	  Wisconsin	  had	  enacted	  statutes.	  For	  the	  most	  part,	  these	  laws	  echoed	  the	  language	  of	  New	  York’s	  statutory	  provision.	  In	  Missouri,	  the	  legal	  code	  stated	  that	  no	  physician	  “shall	  be	  required	  or	  allowed	  to	  disclose”	  patients’	  confidences.	  Though	  the	  states’	  revisers	  added	  the	  word	  required	  to	  the	  statute,	  this	  minor	  alteration	  did	  little	  to	  change	  the	  effect	  or	  intent	  of	  the	  law.24	  	  	   	   Significantly,	  each	  of	  these	  states—like	  New	  York—passed	  their	  statutes	  guaranteeing	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  as	  part	  of	  larger	  processes	  of	  codification,	  often	  using	  New	  York	  as	  an	  example.	  The	  language	  of	  most	  of	  these	  subsequent	  statutes	  mirrored	  the	  New	  York	  law.	  	  Mississippi,	  for	  example,	  adopted	  the	  New	  York	  statute	  word-­‐for-­‐word.	  	  Other	  states	  made	  minor	  alterations.	  Moreover,	  the	  revisers	  of	  later	  codes	  often	  had	  connections	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  The	  Mississippi	  Statute	  appears	  in	  the	  state’s	  Revised	  Statutes	  of	  the	  State	  of	  
Mississippi	  (Jackson,	  MI:	  1836),	  1052.	  Yet	  the	  statute	  was	  short-­‐lived.	  The	  law	  does	  not	  appear	  in	  any	  of	  the	  states’	  later	  Revisions	  and	  was	  never	  mentioned	  in	  later	  publications	  on	  the	  history	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  See,	  for	  example,	  Revised	  
Code	  of	  the	  Statute	  Laws	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Mississippi	  (Jackson,	  MI:	  1857);	  Wigmore,	  On	  
Evidence	  1st	  e.,	  3348-­‐3349;	  or	  the	  list	  of	  statutes	  compiled	  in	  the	  1882	  case,	  Gartside	  
v.	  The	  Connecticut	  Mutual	  Life	  Insurance	  Company	  (76	  Mo.	  446,	  1882	  WL	  10036).	  24	  The	  Revised	  Statutes	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Missouri,	  Revised	  and	  Digested	  by	  the	  Eighth	  
General	  Assembly…With	  the	  Constitutions	  of	  Missouri	  and	  the	  United	  States	  (St.	  Louis,	  1835),	  623.	  	  
Table	  1:	  Physician-­‐Patient	  
Privilege	  (through	  1850)	  	  
State/Territory	   Date	  Enacted	  
New	  York	   1828	  
Missouri	   1835	  
Mississippi	   1836	  
Arkansas	   1838	  
Wisconsin	   1839	  
Michigan	   1846	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New	  York’s	  legal	  establishment.	  The	  revised	  codes	  of	  both	  Michigan	  and,	  later,	  Arizona,	  for	  example,	  were	  both	  written	  by	  William	  Thompson	  Howell,	  an	  attorney	  who	  had	  practiced	  in	  New	  York.25	  	   Only	  Wisconsin	  and	  Arkansas	  made	  changes	  that	  might	  affect	  the	  application	  of	  the	  law.	  Each	  of	  these	  states	  replaced	  the	  New	  York	  statutory	  prohibition	  on	  disclosing	  patients’	  secrets	  with	  a	  weaker	  provision	  that	  merely	  prevented	  doctors	  from	  being	  compelled	  to	  reveal	  their	  patients’	  secrets.	  For	  example,	  the	  Wisconsin	  statute	  read:	  “No	  Person	  duly	  authorized	  to	  practice	  physic	  or	  surgery,	  shall	  be	  compelled	  to	  disclose	  any	  information	  which	  he	  may	  have	  acquired	  in	  attending	  any	  patient	  in	  a	  professional	  capacity	  and	  which	  information	  was	  necessary	  to	  enable	  him	  to	  prescribe	  for	  such	  patient	  as	  a	  physician	  or	  do	  any	  act	  for	  him	  as	  a	  surgeon.”26	  	  	  Legal	  scholars	  have	  attributed	  this	  change	  in	  language	  to	  the	  authors’	  desire	  to	  limit	  the	  power	  of	  the	  privilege.27	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  these	  statutes	  would	  become	  models	  for	  doctors	  in	  their	  later	  attempts	  to	  lobby	  for	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  because	  their	  language	  left	  decisions	  about	  whether	  to	  disclose	  patients’	  secrets	  to	  individual	  physicians.	  	   In	  the	  1840s,	  legal	  developments	  in	  New	  York	  facilitated	  the	  further	  spread	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  The	  state	  adopted	  a	  new	  constitution	  in	  1846.	  One	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Alfred	  Lucking,	  “Privileged	  Communications	  to	  Physicians,”	  Physician	  and	  
Surgeon:	  A	  Professional	  Medical	  Journal	  20	  (1898),	  493-­‐496.	  	  26	  The	  Revised	  Statutes	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Wisconsin…	  to	  which	  are	  Prefixed	  the	  
Declaration	  of	  Independence	  and	  the	  Constitutions	  of	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  State	  
of	  Wisconsin	  (Southport,	  WI:	  1849),	  526.	  	  	  27	  John	  B.	  Sanbourn	  made	  this	  argument	  in	  his	  article,	  “Physician’s	  Privilege	  in	  Wisconsin”	  Wisconsin	  Law	  Review	  1	  (Madison:	  1922),	  141-­‐146.	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provisions	  of	  this	  new	  constitution	  called	  for	  the	  “appointment	  of	  three	  commissioners	  to	  revise,	  reform,	  simplify	  and	  abridge	  the	  rules	  and	  practice,	  pleadings,	  form	  and	  proceedings	  of	  the	  courts	  of	  record	  of	  this	  state.”28	  Like	  earlier	  codification	  movements,	  the	  newly	  appointed	  revising	  committee	  sparked	  controversy	  amongst	  the	  state’s	  legal	  establishment.	  Horrified	  by	  the	  expansive	  powers	  entrusted	  in	  the	  committee,	  several	  commissioners	  resigned	  before	  completing	  their	  task.	  When	  the	  dust	  had	  settled,	  the	  committee	  was	  headed	  by	  David	  Dudley	  Field,	  a	  young	  New	  York	  attorney	  who	  would	  quickly	  rise	  to	  	  	  prominence	  as	  America’s	  foremost	  proponent	  of	  codification.29	  	   	   Like	  Spencer	  two	  decades	  earlier,	  Field	  was	  committed	  to	  simplifying	  and	  improving	  New	  York’s	  legal	  system.	  He	  took	  issue	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  uniformity	  in	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  cases	  were	  brought	  and	  pleaded	  before	  the	  state’s	  courts,	  arguing	  that	  the	  states’	  myriad	  common	  law	  precedents	  should	  be	  replaced	  with	  a	  uniform	  and	  easily	  accessible	  code	  of	  procedure.	  In	  1848,	  Field	  and	  his	  colleagues	  presented	  the	  New	  York	  State	  Legislature	  with	  a	  revised	  Code	  of	  Civil	  Procedure.	  Modeled	  upon	  the	  French	  civil	  code,	  Field’s	  Code	  of	  Civil	  Procedure	  challenged	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  American	  law.	  Field	  took	  issue	  with	  the	  jargon	  and	  Latin	  that	  underpinned	  nineteenth-­‐century	  legal	  procedure,	  sometimes	  suggesting	  radical	  changes.	  He	  posited,	  for	  example,	  that	  the	  new	  Code	  of	  Civil	  Procedure	  should	  replace	  “habeas	  corpus”	  with	  a	  “writ	  of	  deliverance	  from	  prison.”	  	  Even	  more	  than	  the	  revisions	  of	  the	  1820s,	  the	  new	  code	  “was	  a	  colossal	  affront	  to	  the	  common-­‐	  law	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Laws	  of	  the	  State	  of	  New	  York	  (1848),	  c.	  379.	  Quoted	  in	  Friedman,	  293.	  29	  Friedman,	  A	  History	  of	  American	  Law,	  293-­‐298.	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tradition.”30	  While	  the	  state	  legislature	  rejected	  some	  of	  Field’s	  more	  radical	  proposals,	  the	  bulk	  of	  Field’s	  Code	  was	  accepted	  into	  law	  in	  1848.31	  	  	   	   Field’s	  Code	  did	  not	  change	  New	  York’s	  medical	  confidentiality	  law.	  The	  1848	  revisions	  of	  the	  New	  York	  code	  maintained	  the	  state’s	  statute	  on	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  The	  New	  York	  revisions,	  however,	  sparked	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  codification	  that	  	  	   brought	  similar	  statutes	  to	  numerous	  jurisdictions,	  especially	  in	  the	  Western	  United	  States	  (see	  Table	  2).	  Compared	  to	  the	  older	  eastern	  states,	  the	  American	  west	  featured	  a	  young,	  progressive	  bar;	  greater	  exposure	  to	  civil	  law;	  and	  less	  established	  common	  law	  traditions—characteristics	  that	  made	  these	  states	  especially	  receptive	  to	  codification.	  Missouri	  adopted	  Field’s	  Code	  in	  1849.	  California	  followed	  suit	  in	  1851.	  In	  the	  following	  decades,	  Iowa,	  Minnesota,	  Indiana,	  Ohio,	  Washington	  Territory,	  Nebraska,	  Wisconsin,	  and	  Kansas	  all	  adopted	  the	  code.	  By	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century	  the	  Dakotas,	  Idaho,	  Arizona,	  Montana,	  Wyoming,	  North	  Carolina,	  South	  Carolina,	  Utah,	  Colorado,	  Oklahoma,	  and	  New	  Mexico	  had	  all	  adopted	  Field’s	  Code	  of	  Civil	  Procedure.32	  	  	   Some	  of	  these	  jurisdictions,	  like	  Missouri	  and	  Wisconsin	  had	  already	  adopted	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  In	  these	  states	  the	  existing	  statutes	  were	  incorporated	  into	  the	  new	  Code	  of	  Civil	  Procedure.	  In	  many	  more	  jurisdictions,	  however,	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  was	  adopted	  alongside	  Field’s	  Code.	  Among	  other	  states,	  California,	  Kansas,	  and	  Indiana	  adopted	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  in	  this	  manner.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  numerous	  states	  rejected	  the	  Field’s	  controversial	  code	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Ibid.,	  293.	  	  31	  Ibid.,	  293-­‐298.	  32	  Ibid.	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altogether.	  Much	  of	  the	  eastern	  seaboard	  remained	  what	  one	  legal	  scholar	  termed,	  “common	  law	  states.”	  Rejecting	  codification,	  these	  “older	  states,	  particularly	  of	  English	  origin,	  [stuck]	  to	  the	  common	  law,	  and	  never	  attempt[ed]	  to	  define	  it,	  rarely	  even	  to	  improve	  it	  by	  statute.”	  These	  states	  remained	  bound	  to	  the	  precedent	  	  established	  in	  the	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston’s	  trial	  for	  bigamy.33	  	  	   The	  middle	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  brought	  more	  legislation	  on	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  than	  any	  time	  before	  or	  since.	  Between	  1828	  and	  1870,	  seventeen	  states	  or	  territories	  enacted	  statutory	  guarantees	  of	  medical	  confidentiality.	  Though	  there	  were	  small	  variations	  between	  individual	  statutes,	  by	  and	  large,	  all	  of	  these	  laws	  shared	  a	  common	  language	  that	  had	  been	  inherited	  from	  earlier	  legal	  scholarship.	  More	  importantly,	  each	  statute	  was	  enacted	  as	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  scheme	  of	  codification.	  Physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  appeared	  in	  jurisdictions	  where	  codification	  was	  most	  popular	  and	  remained	  absent	  where	  codification	  failed	  to	  take	  hold.	  By	  the	  latter	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Friedman,	  293-­‐298;	  Frederick	  J.	  Stimson,	  “Privileged	  Communications	  to	  Physicians,”	  Medical	  Communications	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  Medical	  Society	  v.	  19:1	  (Boston:	  1904),	  pp.	  607-­‐617,	  at	  608.	  
Table	  2:	  Physician-­‐Patient	  
Privilege	  (1850-­‐1875)	  
State/Territory	   Date	  Enacted	  
Iowa	   1851	  
Indiana	  	   1852	  
California	   1853	  
Kansas	   1855	  
Nebraska	   1858	  
Dakota,	  Oregon	   1862	  
Arizona	   1864	  




Montana	   1871	  
Idaho	   1875	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half	  of	  the	  century,	  the	  dividing	  line	  that	  would	  characterize	  later	  debates	  over	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  had	  been	  set.	  Western	  States,	  most	  of	  which	  embraced	  Field’s	  Code	  of	  Civil	  Procedure,	  almost	  all	  guaranteed	  medical	  confidentiality	  in	  the	  courtroom.	  Eastern	  States,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  remained	  reluctant	  to	  enact	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  	  	  	  	  	   	   Throughout	  much	  of	  this	  period,	  both	  doctors	  and	  lawyers	  viewed	  the	  privilege	  as	  a	  legal	  issue	  and,	  as	  such,	  it	  was	  often	  overshadowed	  by	  other	  legal	  developments.	  For	  legal	  scholars,	  codification	  carried	  so	  many	  pressing	  implications	  that	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  seemed	  trivial	  by	  comparison.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  doctors—seldom	  trained	  in	  how	  to	  carry	  themselves	  in	  the	  courtroom—often	  failed	  to	  notice	  slight	  changes	  in	  states’	  evidentiary	  codes.	  Nevertheless,	  medical	  developments	  gradually	  led	  a	  small	  cadre	  of	  physicians	  to	  embrace	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  In	  time,	  these	  doctors	  would	  recast	  the	  privilege	  not	  as	  a	  legal	  issue	  but	  rather	  as	  medical	  issue,	  and,	  in	  doing	  so,	  they	  would	  bring	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  into	  the	  public	  eye.	  	  




MEDICAL	  ETHICS	  IN	  THE	  EARLY	  NINETEENTH	  CENTURY	  	   “…Secrecy	  and	  delicacy,	  when	  required	  by	  peculiar	  circumstances,	  should	  be	  strictly	  observed;	  and	  the	  familiar	  and	  confidential	  intercourse	  to	  which	  physicians	  are	  admitted	  in	  their	  professional	  visits,	  should	  be	  used	  with	  discretion,	  and	  with	  the	  most	  scrupulous	  regard	  to	  fidelity	  and	  honour.	  The	  obligation	  of	  secrecy	  extends	  beyond	  the	  period	  of	  professional	  services;—none	  of	  the	  privacies	  of	  personal	  and	  domestic	  life,	  no	  infirmity	  of	  disposition	  or	  flaw	  of	  character	  observed	  during	  professional	  attendance,	  should	  ever	  be	  divulged	  by	  him	  except	  when	  he	  is	  imperatively	  required	  to	  do	  so.	  The	  force	  and	  necessity	  of	  this	  obligation	  are	  indeed	  so	  great,	  that	  professional	  men	  have,	  under	  certain	  circumstances,	  been	  protected	  in	  their	  observance	  of	  secrecy	  by	  courts	  of	  justice.”	  —AMA	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  (1847)	  	   While	  codification	  brought	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  to	  numerous	  states	  in	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century,	  few	  scholars	  took	  note	  of	  the	  changes	  taking	  place.	  To	  the	  legal	  profession,	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  was	  merely	  a	  minor	  consequence	  of	  a	  larger	  phenomenon.	  Lawyers	  and	  legal	  scholars	  were	  justifiably	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  broad	  implications	  of	  codification	  than	  one	  specific	  piece	  of	  evidentiary	  law.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  doctors,	  the	  group	  to	  which	  the	  privilege	  had	  the	  most	  significance,	  often	  failed	  to	  take	  notice	  of	  this	  medico-­‐legal	  development.	  By	  mid-­‐century,	  however,	  the	  professional	  landscape	  had	  changed	  dramatically.	  When	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association	  convened	  for	  the	  first	  time	  in	  1847,	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  had	  become	  so	  accepted	  and	  commonplace	  that	  physicians	  could	  no	  longer	  ignore	  it.	  The	  privilege	  was	  formally	  acknowledged	  in	  the	  organization’s	  Code	  of	  
Ethics,	  marking	  an	  important	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  history	  of	  medical	  confidentiality.	  	  This	  chapter	  examines	  the	  nineteenth-­‐century	  developments	  in	  medical	  ethics	  that	  led	  doctors	  to	  embrace	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  Faced	  with	  challenges	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from	  irregular	  practitioners,	  the	  medical	  profession	  remained	  conspicuously	  weak	  throughout	  much	  of	  the	  period.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  standards	  in	  medical	  education	  declined	  precipitously	  in	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century.	  Many	  of	  the	  nation’s	  medical	  schools	  became	  little	  more	  than	  diploma	  mills.	  These	  developments	  sparked	  a	  series	  of	  reforms	  aimed	  at	  improving	  the	  status	  of	  the	  medical	  profession.	  Medical	  societies	  instituted	  licensing	  laws,	  fee	  bills,	  and	  codes	  ethics	  as	  means	  to	  discipline	  wayward	  practitioners	  and	  wrest	  control	  of	  the	  profession	  from	  their	  sectarian	  rivals.	  Gradually,	  medical	  societies	  such	  as	  the	  Medical	  Society	  of	  the	  State	  of	  New	  York	  and	  the	  AMA	  began	  to	  see	  privileged	  communications	  as	  a	  powerful	  indicator	  of	  professional	  status.	  	  While	  the	  legal	  profession	  had	  led	  the	  push	  for	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  during	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  physicians	  would	  emerge	  as	  the	  most	  vocal	  advocates	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  during	  the	  last	  half	  of	  the	  century.	  	  	  	   Though	  the	  number	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  statutes	  increased	  throughout	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century,	  these	  laws	  remained,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  surprisingly	  absent	  from	  medical	  or	  legal	  scholarship.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  specialized	  literature	  on	  privileged	  communications,	  legal	  treatises	  on	  evidence	  offered	  physicians	  and	  lawyers	  the	  most	  reliable	  source	  of	  information	  on	  local	  medical	  confidentiality	  laws.	  Published	  with	  increasing	  regularity	  throughout	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century,	  these	  texts	  often	  professed	  to	  offer	  a	  definitive	  list	  of	  local	  statutes	  and	  landmark	  cases.	  Yet,	  until	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  no	  American	  scholar	  attempted	  to	  catalog	  the	  complete	  rules	  of	  evidence.	  Instead,	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attorneys	  were	  forced	  to	  rely	  upon	  American	  editions	  of	  British	  treatises.1	  Not	  surprisingly,	  these	  texts	  often	  failed	  to	  offer	  complete	  and	  accurate	  depictions	  of	  American	  law.	  The	  list	  of	  statutes	  in	  one	  publication	  could,	  and	  often	  did,	  contradict	  the	  list	  of	  another	  publication.	  Some	  statutes,	  such	  as	  Mississippi’s	  medical	  confidentiality	  law,	  escaped	  comment	  altogether.2	  	  	   Perhaps	  for	  these	  reasons,	  few	  medical	  men	  seem	  to	  have	  understood	  the	  laws	  surrounding	  privileged	  communications	  or	  their	  own	  obligations	  in	  the	  courtroom.	  While	  medical	  scholarship	  suggests	  that	  these	  issues	  arose	  frequently	  and	  were	  “very	  important,”	  even	  purported	  experts	  on	  the	  subject	  had	  a	  limited	  understanding	  of	  the	  cases	  and	  statutes	  that	  defined	  the	  status	  of	  privileged	  communications.	  In	  the	  early	  1830s,	  for	  example,	  numerous	  doctors	  wrote	  to	  the	  
American	  Journal	  of	  Medical	  Sciences	  asking,	  “are	  there	  certain	  questions	  which	  a	  medical	  man	  in	  a	  court	  of	  justice	  may	  refuse	  to	  answer?”	  The	  journal’s	  editors	  responded	  by	  haphazardly	  compiling	  scraps	  of	  text	  from	  other	  publications,	  splicing	  bits	  of	  text	  into	  two	  rambling	  and	  incoherent	  pages.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  a	  brief	  introduction,	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  text	  was	  lifted	  directly	  from	  transcripts	  of	  the	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston’s	  trial	  and	  Wilson	  v.	  Rastall.	  The	  article	  gave	  little	  context	  for	  either	  court	  case	  and	  made	  no	  mention	  of	  New	  York’s	  medical	  confidentiality	  law.	  Based	  upon	  these	  sources,	  the	  journal	  editors	  concluded	  “that	  medical	  persons	  have	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See,	  for	  example,	  the	  American	  edition	  of	  Thomas	  Starkie’s	  A	  Practical	  Treatise	  on	  
the	  Law	  of	  Evidence	  and	  Digest	  of	  Proofs	  in	  Civil	  and	  Criminal	  Proceedings	  (Philadelphia:	  1834).	  For	  a	  critique	  of	  Starkie’s	  work	  and	  its	  application	  to	  American	  law,	  see:	  “Notices	  of	  New	  Books,”	  American	  Jurist	  and	  Law	  Magazine	  12	  (Boston:	  July	  and	  October,	  1834),	  547-­‐548.	  	  2	  Missing	  from	  most	  legal	  sources,	  the	  Mississippi	  statue	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Revised	  
Statutes	  of	  the	  State	  of	  Mississippi	  (Jackson:	  1836),	  1052.	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no	  privilege	  whatever,	  not	  to	  disclose	  circumstances	  revealed	  to	  them	  professionally;	  and	  that	  the	  only	  communications	  privileged	  are	  those	  to	  their	  legal	  advisers	  entrusted	  with	  those	  communications	  as	  such.” ⁠3	  	   Similarly,	  medico-­‐legal	  texts	  offered	  little	  clarification	  of	  questions	  regarding	  privileged	  communications.	  In	  1823,	  Theodric	  Romeyn	  Beck,	  the	  foremost	  American	  medico-­‐legal	  scholar,	  authored	  Elements	  of	  Medical	  Jurisprudence.	  As	  a	  practical	  guide	  for	  physicians,	  Elements	  was	  revolutionary.	  Considered	  by	  many	  to	  be	  the	  seminal	  medico-­‐legal	  work	  of	  its	  time,	  the	  book	  compiled	  contemporary	  medico-­‐legal	  writing	  into	  one	  comprehensive	  volume,	  featuring	  sections	  on	  disparate	  issues	  such	  as	  “Doubtful	  Sex,”	  “Infanticide,”	  or	  “Persons	  Found	  Dead.”	  In	  each,	  Beck	  offered	  practical	  advice	  to	  would-­‐be	  medical	  witnesses,	  instructing	  them	  how	  to	  diagnose	  insanity	  or	  detect	  feigned	  illnesses.	  Yet	  the	  first	  edition	  featured	  little	  discussion	  of	  evidentiary	  procedure	  or	  the	  duties	  of	  medical	  witnesses.4	  	   This	  lack	  of	  interest	  in	  courtroom	  procedure	  was	  characteristic	  of	  the	  medico-­‐legal	  field	  as	  a	  whole.	  For	  these	  scholars,	  the	  most	  pressing	  contemporary	  medico-­‐legal	  issues	  included	  forensic	  toxicology	  and	  the	  diagnosis	  of	  insanity.	  Contemporary	  medico-­‐legal	  journals	  were	  littered	  with	  countless	  articles	  that	  detailed	  new	  ways	  to	  detect	  poisons	  and	  numerous	  articles	  debating	  sometimes-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  “Miscellaneous	  Intelligence,”	  Western	  Journal	  of	  the	  Physical	  and	  Medical	  Sciences	  5	  (1832),	  289-­‐291;	  “Medical	  Jurisprudence,”	  The	  American	  Journal	  of	  the	  Medical	  
Sciences	  (May,	  1831),	  523-­‐524.	  	  4	  Theodric	  Remeyn	  Beck,	  Elements	  of	  Medical	  Jurisprudence	  1st	  ed.	  For	  more	  analysis	  of	  Beck,	  see:	  Mohr,	  Doctors	  and	  the	  Law,	  15-­‐28.	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conflicting	  definitions	  of	  insanity.5	  Though	  Beck	  and	  other	  medico-­‐legal	  scholars	  wrote	  profusely	  throughout	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century,	  their	  scholarship	  focused	  primarily	  upon	  practical	  matters	  and	  the	  professional	  relations	  between	  doctors	  and	  lawyers,	  often	  neglecting	  the	  medico-­‐legal	  implications	  of	  the	  physician-­‐patient	  relationship.	  	  Nevertheless,	  during	  this	  period,	  physicians	  slowly	  embraced	  medical	  confidentiality	  as	  one	  of	  the	  foundational	  principles	  of	  medical	  ethics.	  As	  early	  as	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  century,	  well-­‐educated,	  urban	  doctors	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Britain	  began	  to	  show	  a	  general	  awareness	  and	  acceptance	  of	  notions	  of	  medical	  confidentiality.	  From	  around	  1730	  through	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  every	  physician	  graduating	  from	  the	  University	  of	  Edinburgh	  medical	  school	  swore	  an	  oath	  to	  “practice	  physic	  cautiously,	  chastely,	  and	  honourably…	  and	  never,	  without	  great	  cause	  to	  divulge	  anything	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  concealed,	  which	  may	  be	  seen	  or	  heard	  during	  professional	  attendance.”6	  In	  the	  history	  of	  medical	  ethics,	  the	  
Edinburgh	  Oath	  was	  nothing	  short	  of	  revolutionary.	  Its	  predecessor,	  the	  Sponsio	  
Academica,	  had	  mandated	  that	  physicians’	  primary	  allegiances	  would	  always	  be	  to	  the	  crown	  and	  the	  church.	  Under	  this	  arrangement	  doctors	  would	  have	  had	  little	  reason	  and	  no	  justification	  to	  withhold	  medical	  secrets	  in	  a	  court	  of	  law.	  The	  
Edinburgh	  Oath,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  asserted	  that	  doctors,	  foremost	  duties	  were	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Mohr,	  Doctors	  and	  the	  Law,	  57-­‐75.	  	  6	  “Edinburgh	  University	  Medical	  Oath,	  Circa	  1732-­‐1735	  Onward,”	  quoted	  in	  Robert	  Baker,	  Before	  Bioethics,	  37.	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their	  patients.	  With	  this	  shift	  came	  an	  implication	  that	  physicians’	  duties	  to	  their	  patients	  could	  conflict	  with	  their	  obligations	  to	  the	  state	  and	  the	  courts.7	  	  This	  shift	  did	  not	  always	  bring	  immediate	  changes	  in	  medical	  practice.	  Doctors	  continued	  ethically	  suspect	  practices	  such	  as	  flyting,	  in	  which	  physicians	  would	  publish	  short	  treatises	  defaming	  rival	  practitioners	  and,	  in	  the	  process,	  often	  violate	  the	  confidences	  of	  their	  patients.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  Edinburgh	  model	  proved	  extremely	  influential	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  In	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  and	  early	  nineteenth	  centuries	  there	  were	  very	  few	  American	  medical	  schools.	  The	  most	  prominent	  American	  physicians	  were	  often	  educated	  overseas—almost	  all	  of	  them	  in	  Edinburgh.	  Well-­‐to-­‐do	  physicians	  such	  as	  Samuel	  Bard	  and	  Benjamin	  Rush	  were	  educated	  at	  Edinburgh	  and	  would	  have	  sworn	  versions	  of	  the	  Edinburgh	  Oath.	  	  When	  American	  physicians	  founded	  their	  own	  medical	  schools,	  they	  often	  modeled	  these	  programs	  upon	  their	  experiences	  in	  Edinburgh.	  John	  Morgan	  and	  William	  Shippen	  modeled	  America’s	  first	  medical	  school,	  The	  College	  of	  Philadelphia	  (now	  the	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania)	  on	  their	  experiences	  abroad.	  Likewise,	  in	  1767,	  Samuel	  Bard,	  one	  of	  the	  foremost	  physicians	  of	  the	  early	  republic,	  created	  an	  Edinburgh-­‐style	  medical	  college	  at	  King’s	  College	  (Now	  Columbia).8	  By	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  college-­‐educated	  American	  doctors	  would	  have	  all	  sworn	  some	  version	  of	  the	  Edinburgh	  Oath,	  vowing	  to	  maintain	  the	  confidences	  of	  their	  patients.	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  Baker,	  Before	  Bioethics,	  43-­‐45.	  	  8	  Rothstein,	  87-­‐93.	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  For	  the	  most	  part,	  contemporary	  physicians	  took	  these	  commitments	  seriously.	  Medical	  texts	  frequently	  attested	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  medical	  confidentiality.	  In	  a	  widely	  published	  essay,	  Benjamin	  Rush,	  the	  primary	  architect	  of	  the	  heroic	  medicine	  that	  dominated	  regular	  practice	  in	  the	  United	  States	  throughout	  much	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  argued	  that	  the	  physician-­‐patient	  relationship	  “imposes	  an	  obligation	  of	  secrecy	  upon	  [the	  physician]	  and	  thus	  prevents	  his	  making	  public	  what	  he	  cannot	  avoid	  seeing	  or	  hearing	  accidentally	  in	  intercourse	  with	  the	  [patient’s]	  family.”9	  Increasingly,	  well-­‐educated	  doctors	  viewed	  medical	  confidentiality	  as	  one	  of	  the	  central	  tenets	  of	  the	  physician-­‐patient	  relationship.	  Though	  some	  early	  nineteenth-­‐century	  doctors	  argued	  vehemently	  in	  favor	  of	  medical	  confidentiality,	  there	  is	  little	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  their	  position	  was	  representative	  of	  the	  medical	  profession	  as	  a	  whole.	  Esteemed	  physicians	  like	  Benjamin	  Rush,	  a	  signer	  of	  the	  Declaration	  of	  Independence,	  would	  have	  had	  little	  in	  common	  with	  the	  average	  practitioner.	  While	  writings	  on	  medical	  ethics	  and	  confidentiality	  circulated	  amongst	  a	  small	  circle	  of	  physicians,	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  practitioners	  would	  have	  had	  little	  exposure	  to	  these	  ideas.	  Until	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  medical	  education	  was	  informal	  and	  poorly	  organized.	  Medical	  schools,	  especially	  outside	  of	  the	  New	  York	  and	  Philadelphia,	  were	  expensive	  and	  few.	  To	  earn	  a	  degree,	  medical	  students	  were	  required	  to	  attend	  two	  four-­‐month	  terms,	  often	  in	  successive	  years.	  	  Depending	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  Benjamin	  Rush,	  “On	  the	  Duties	  of	  Patients	  to	  their	  Physicians,”	  in	  Sixteen	  
Introductory	  Lectures,	  to	  Courses	  of	  Lectures	  upon	  the	  Institutes	  and	  Practices	  of	  
Medicine,	  with	  a	  Syllabus	  of	  the	  Latter…Delivered	  in	  the	  University	  of	  Pennsylvania	  (Philadelphia:	  Bradford	  and	  Innskeep,	  1811),	  pp.	  336-­‐337.	  Quoted	  in	  Robert	  Baker,	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upon	  the	  location	  and	  prestige	  of	  the	  school,	  medical	  students	  could	  expect	  to	  pay	  between	  $150	  and	  $300	  per	  term.	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  fees,	  students	  would	  need	  to	  furnish	  the	  costs	  of	  travel,	  room,	  and	  board.	  For	  those	  who	  could	  bear	  the	  costs,	  options	  were	  still	  sparse.	  In	  1810,	  the	  United	  States	  contained	  just	  six	  medical	  schools.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  University	  of	  Maryland,	  all	  were	  clustered	  in	  the	  Northeast.	  By	  1830,	  the	  number	  of	  medical	  schools	  had	  grown	  to	  thirteen.	  All	  but	  three,	  however,	  were	  located	  in	  New	  York,	  Philadelphia,	  or	  New	  England.	  Students	  from	  outside	  the	  northeast	  would	  have	  to	  move	  to	  urban	  centers,	  far	  from	  home.10	  	   For	  many	  practitioners,	  however,	  these	  expenses	  and	  hassles	  were	  unnecessary.	  	  Throughout	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century,	  most	  American	  physicians	  were	  field-­‐trained,	  developing	  their	  skills	  through	  apprenticeships	  with	  established	  local	  physicians.	  The	  typical	  apprenticeship	  lasted	  three	  years.	  Fees	  were	  negotiated	  between	  physicians	  and	  apprentices,	  but	  averaged	  $100	  per	  year	  (including	  room	  and	  board).	  For	  many	  established	  physicians,	  apprentices	  served	  as	  a	  source	  of	  cheap	  labor.	  In	  addition	  to	  their	  studies,	  apprentices	  carried	  out	  numerous	  menial	  household	  chores.	  Likewise,	  with	  few	  pharmacists	  or	  apothecaries,	  the	  physician’s	  apprentice	  was	  frequently	  tasked	  with	  the	  gathering	  of	  necessary	  roots	  and	  herbs	  as	  well	  as	  the	  grinding	  and	  mixing	  of	  drugs.	  In	  lieu	  of	  a	  diploma,	  the	  mentor	  furnished	  the	  apprentice	  with	  a	  certificate	  upon	  completion	  of	  his	  apprenticeship.11	  	   Though	  numerous	  medical	  societies	  enacted	  provisions	  to	  control	  the	  quality	  of	  medical	  education,	  standards	  of	  education	  were	  erratic	  and,	  often,	  unenforceable.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Rothstein,	  85-­‐100.	  	  11	  Ibid,	  85-­‐87.	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As	  medical	  schools	  proliferated	  in	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century,	  the	  quality	  of	  these	  schools	  varied	  drastically.	  While	  some	  of	  the	  more	  prestigious	  medical	  schools	  maintained	  rigorous	  standards,	  others	  were	  merely	  diploma	  mills,	  churning	  out	  graduates	  regardless	  of	  their	  competency.	  Apprenticeships	  were	  even	  more	  difficult	  to	  regulate,	  as	  medical	  societies	  could	  do	  little	  to	  disciple	  substandard	  or	  opportunistic	  educators.	  By	  leaving	  medical	  education	  to	  local,	  informal	  arrangements,	  this	  system	  created	  a	  diverse	  medical	  landscape	  in	  which	  therapeutic	  and	  ethical	  practices	  varied	  greatly	  from	  region	  to	  region.12	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  contemporary	  doctors	  faced	  numerous	  challenges	  from	  outside	  the	  profession.	  Thompsonian	  botanists,	  hydropaths,	  and,	  later,	  homeopaths	  and	  eclectics,	  all	  purported	  to	  offer	  alternatives	  to	  regular	  medicine.	  Though	  Regular	  physicians	  considered	  each	  of	  these	  sects	  to	  be	  quacks,	  regulars	  could	  cite	  little	  evidence	  to	  show	  that	  their	  treatments	  were	  more	  effective.	  Furthermore,	  in	  many	  places,	  especially	  the	  small	  towns	  and	  rural	  outposts	  of	  the	  west,	  the	  boundaries	  between	  doctors	  and	  other	  practitioners	  were	  often	  poorly	  defined.	  Midwives	  and	  other	  non-­‐physician	  healers	  conducted	  many	  services	  that	  have	  since	  been	  controlled	  by	  the	  medical	  profession.	  Likewise,	  folk	  medicine,	  home	  remedies,	  and	  patent	  medicines	  proliferated	  throughout	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  Until	  well	  into	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  family	  members	  or	  lay	  healers	  carried	  much	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  For	  example,	  the	  South	  developed	  notions	  of	  a	  distinct	  therapeutic	  identity.	  See:	  John	  Harley	  Warner,	  “The	  Idea	  of	  Southern	  Medical	  Distinctiveness:	  Medical	  Knowledge	  and	  Practice	  in	  the	  Old	  South,”	  Sickness	  and	  Health	  in	  America:	  Readings	  
in	  the	  History	  of	  Medicine	  and	  Public	  Health	  2nd	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  (Madison:	  1985),	  pp.	  53-­‐70.	  
	  	  64	  
of	  the	  nation’s	  primary	  care	  within	  the	  household.13	  Throughout	  much	  of	  the	  period,	  the	  medical	  profession	  remained	  mired	  in	  a	  series	  of	  intra-­‐professional	  disputes	  that	  weakened	  the	  professional	  status	  of	  physicians	  throughout	  the	  country.	  Even	  if	  doctors	  had	  actively	  pursued	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege,	  their	  appeals	  would	  have	  carried	  little	  weight.	  Nevertheless,	  nineteenth-­‐century	  physicians	  found	  several	  means	  to	  improve	  the	  status	  of	  the	  medical	  profession.14	  	  Beginning	  in	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  century,	  wealthy,	  well-­‐educated	  physicians	  increasingly	  formed	  medical	  societies	  in	  the	  nation’s	  urban	  centers.	  In	  1780,	  Boston	  physicians	  founded	  the	  Massachusetts	  Medical	  Society.	  Likewise,	  in	  Philadelphia,	  a	  small	  group	  of	  wealthy	  doctors	  founded	  the	  College	  of	  Physicians	  in	  1787.	  New	  York	  had	  several	  short-­‐lived	  medical	  societies	  in	  the	  late	  eighteenth	  century	  before	  New	  York	  City	  physicians	  created	  the	  Medical	  Society	  of	  the	  State	  of	  New	  York	  (MSSNY).15	  	  All	  of	  these	  societies	  were	  exclusive	  organizations	  that	  limited	  membership	  to	  only	  the	  wealthiest	  and	  most	  prestigious	  physicians.	  To	  join	  Philadelphia’s	  College	  of	  Physicians,	  a	  doctor	  needed	  to	  be	  elected	  by	  the	  society’s	  current	  members.	  This	  was	  so	  rare	  that,	  between	  1787	  and	  1849,	  only	  180	  physicians	  were	  selected	  to	  join	  the	  exclusive	  organization.	  If	  a	  physician	  were	  elected	  to	  join	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  For	  an	  example	  of	  this	  phenomena,	  see	  Laurel	  Thatcher	  Ulrich’s	  discussion	  of	  the	  medical	  profession	  in	  A	  Midwife’s	  Tale	  (New	  York:	  Vintage	  Books,	  1990).	  Paul	  Starr	  elaborates	  on	  the	  relationships	  between	  physicians	  and	  lay	  healers	  in	  The	  Social	  
Transformation	  of	  American	  Medicine.	  	  14	  My	  discussion	  of	  the	  weakness	  of	  the	  medical	  profession	  in	  the	  chapter	  is	  culled	  from	  Starr,	  Rothstein,	  and	  Warner.	  	  15	  Rothstein,	  63-­‐68.	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College	  of	  Physicians,	  he	  would	  then	  be	  expected	  to	  pay	  a	  membership	  fee	  of	  $26.66	  and	  annual	  dues	  of	  $4—prices	  well	  out	  of	  reach	  for	  the	  average	  practitioner.	  The	  Massachusetts	  Medical	  Society	  was	  similarly	  exclusive.	  Its	  charter	  limited	  membership	  to	  seventy	  physicians,	  effectively	  barring	  all	  but	  the	  most	  prestigious	  Boston	  physicians.16	  Initially,	  these	  societies	  largely	  eschewed	  ethical	  regulation.	  Because	  of	  their	  exclusive	  nature,	  members	  were	  assumed	  to	  be	  gentlemen	  of	  considerable	  honor.	  Instead,	  these	  organizations	  used	  other	  means	  to	  limit	  medical	  practice	  to	  a	  small	  and	  exclusive	  group	  of	  physicians.	  One	  of	  their	  favorite	  tools	  was	  the	  enactment	  of	  medical	  licensing	  laws.	  Between	  1780	  and	  1812,	  Massachusetts,	  New	  Hampshire,	  Connecticut,	  Maryland,	  New	  York,	  and	  Rhode	  Island	  all	  granted	  licensing	  authority	  to	  state	  medical	  societies.	  Yet,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  this	  legislation	  lacked	  any	  means	  of	  enforcement.	  State	  medical	  societies	  were	  allowed	  to	  issue	  licenses,	  but,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  New	  York,	  no	  state	  mandated	  any	  punishment	  for	  unlicensed	  practitioners.	  Moreover,	  these	  licensing	  laws	  proved	  short-­‐lived.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1830s,	  most	  had	  been	  repealed.17	  As	  the	  medical	  profession	  grew	  in	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century,	  medical	  societies	  became	  more	  inclusive.	  From	  1781	  to	  1801	  the	  Massachusetts	  Medical	  Society	  admitted	  95	  members.	  In	  1803,	  when	  the	  organization	  lifted	  its	  membership	  cap,	  55	  new	  members	  were	  admitted.	  The	  MSSNY	  reorganized	  in	  1806	  as	  a	  society	  that	  served	  the	  county	  of	  New	  York,	  pulling	  in	  new	  members	  from	  outside	  the	  city	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Ibid.	  	  17	  Rothstien,	  75;	  Konold,	  3-­‐4.	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limits.	  While	  many	  exclusive	  societies	  like	  Philadelphia’s	  College	  of	  Physicians	  remained	  prestigious	  organizations	  open	  to	  only	  the	  medical	  elite,	  physicians	  founded	  larger	  state	  and	  county	  medical	  societies	  that	  professed	  represent	  greater	  portions	  of	  the	  medical	  profession.	  By	  1800	  most	  of	  the	  northeastern	  states	  had	  a	  statewide	  medical	  society.	  Forty	  years	  later,	  nearly	  every	  state	  in	  the	  union	  had	  its	  own	  medical	  society.18	  	  	  	  As	  medical	  societies	  became	  more	  inclusive,	  these	  organizations	  increasingly	  took	  it	  upon	  themselves	  to	  regulate	  doctors’	  activities	  and	  to	  police	  medical	  ethics.	  	  Physicians	  frequently	  complained	  that	  unscrupulous	  practitioners	  were	  undercutting	  their	  fees,	  limiting	  their	  ability	  to	  make	  an	  honest	  living.	  Accordingly,	  medical	  societies	  frequently	  imposed	  fee	  bills	  that	  mandated	  the	  going	  rate	  for	  medical	  services,	  the	  charges	  for	  distance	  traveled,	  and	  as	  well	  as	  differing	  rates	  for	  rich	  and	  poor	  clients.	  Almost	  all	  regular	  medical	  societies	  instituted	  fee	  bills	  as	  a	  necessary	  condition	  for	  membership.	  These	  restrictions	  proved	  hard	  to	  enforce,	  however,	  as	  many	  fee	  bills	  only	  applied	  to	  members	  of	  regular	  medical	  societies.	  	  Physicians	  in	  urban	  areas	  and	  other	  regions	  with	  numerous	  irregular	  practitioners	  were	  often	  forced	  to	  disregard	  these	  restrictions	  altogether.19	  	  Codes	  of	  medical	  police	  constituted	  a	  second	  form	  of	  control	  over	  the	  medical	  profession.	  Upon	  admission	  into	  a	  medical	  society,	  physicians	  would	  often	  swear	  an	  oath	  to	  abide	  by	  a	  series	  of	  rules	  and	  regulations.	  Societies	  often	  mandated	  that	  their	  members	  refrain	  from	  using	  secret	  nostrums	  or	  patent	  medicines.	  Most	  prohibited	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Rothstein,	  70-­‐72.	  	  19	  Ibid.,	  81-­‐82.	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consultations	  with	  irregular	  practitioners.	  Codes	  of	  medical	  police	  relied	  upon	  a	  system	  of	  restorative	  justice	  to	  discipline	  wayward	  practitioners.	  Doctors	  who	  violated	  these	  codes	  were	  threatened	  with	  censure	  and,	  in	  extreme	  cases,	  expulsion	  from	  the	  medical	  society.	  If	  one	  member	  of	  a	  medical	  society	  believed	  that	  another	  had	  violated	  one	  of	  the	  society’s	  rules,	  the	  offending	  practitioner	  would	  be	  called	  before	  a	  disciplinary	  committee,	  which	  would	  mete	  out	  the	  necessary	  punishment.	  Like	  fee	  bills,	  however,	  these	  restrictions	  only	  applied	  to	  members	  of	  specific	  medical	  societies.	  Codes	  of	  medical	  police	  could	  not	  be	  used	  to	  discipline	  irregular	  practitioners.20	  By	  contrast,	  codes	  of	  ethics	  constituted	  a	  much	  stronger	  means	  of	  control	  over	  the	  medical	  profession.	  While	  adopted	  by	  individual	  medical	  societies,	  codes	  of	  ethics	  purported	  to	  apply	  to	  all	  practitioners	  regardless	  of	  their	  affiliation	  with	  local	  or	  state	  medical	  societies.	  Nathaniel	  Davis,	  the	  future	  president	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association	  summarized	  the	  difference	  between	  codes	  of	  medical	  police	  and	  codes	  of	  ethics	  as	  follows:	  “A	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  for	  our	  profession	  must	  partake…	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  a	  moral	  essay,	  developing	  principles	  or	  guidance	  equally	  applicable	  to	  all	  places	  and	  times,	  instead	  of	  a	  few	  simple	  rules	  applicable	  to	  the	  members	  of	  some	  particular	  society.”21	  Unlike	  earlier	  modes	  of	  ethical	  policing,	  which	  pertained	  only	  to	  relations	  amongst	  medical	  practitioners,	  codes	  of	  ethics	  expressed	  notions	  about	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  physicians	  interacted	  with	  their	  patients.	  	  	  As	  regular	  physicians	  increasingly	  deemed	  fee	  bills	  and	  codes	  of	  medical	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Baker,	  Before	  Bioethics,	  112-­‐123.	  	  21	  Nathaniel	  Davis,	  Transactions	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association	  (1874),	  29.	  Quoted	  in	  Baker,	  Before	  Bioethics,	  at	  95.	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police	  inadequate,	  medical	  societies	  frequently	  instituted	  codes	  of	  ethics.	  The	  MSSNY	  provided	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  From	  1808	  to	  1822,	  members	  of	  the	  medical	  society	  had	  observed	  a	  code	  of	  medical	  police.	  When	  the	  code	  was	  to	  be	  revised	  in	  1822,	  however,	  the	  revisers,	  John	  Steele	  and	  James	  Manley,	  demurred.	  Steele	  and	  Manley	  were	  able	  to	  convince	  their	  peers	  that	  the	  code	  of	  police	  was	  in	  need	  of	  a	  complete	  overhaul.	  Instead	  of	  reforming	  the	  code	  of	  medical	  police,	  members	  of	  the	  MSSNY	  opted	  to	  draft	  a	  new	  code	  of	  ethics.	  Felix	  Pascalis,	  a	  New	  York	  City	  physician	  joined	  Steele	  and	  Manley	  and	  the	  committee	  immediately	  began	  drafting	  a	  new	  code	  of	  ethics.22	  	  The	  following	  year,	  Manley,	  Steele,	  and	  Pascalis	  presented	  System	  of	  Ethics	  to	  the	  MSSNY.	  The	  document	  was	  adopted	  with	  overwhelming	  support	  from	  the	  society,	  making	  the	  MSSNY	  the	  first	  American	  medical	  society	  to	  publish	  its	  own	  code	  of	  ethics.	  While	  the	  new	  document	  maintained	  many	  of	  the	  intra-­‐professional	  restrictions	  of	  the	  society’s	  earlier	  code	  of	  medical	  police,	  System	  of	  Ethics	  incorporated	  numerous	  restrictions	  on	  physician-­‐patient	  interactions.	  The	  new	  code	  explicitly	  mandated	  that	  physicians	  should	  maintain	  medical	  confidentiality	  at	  all	  times:	  A	  great	  reserve,	  and	  even	  secrecy	  respecting	  the	  deliberations	  of	  a	  consultation	  is	  indispensable.	  No	  communication	  is	  to	  be	  made	  to	  the	  patient	  or	  friends	  but	  by	  unanimous	  order	  and	  consent;	  because,	  whatever	  opinions	  are	  emitted,	  become	  subject	  to	  frequent	  alterations	  or	  interventions	  from	  mouth	  to	  mouth,	  and	  may	  become	  a	  source	  of	  contradiction	  perhaps	  injurious	  to	  some	  of	  the	  physicians	  in	  attendance.23	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Baker,	  Before	  Bioethics,	  112-­‐113.	  	  23	  Medical	  Society	  of	  the	  State	  of	  New	  York,	  System	  of	  Ethics	  (New	  York:	  1823),	  IX.	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The	  authors	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  “a	  matter	  of	  justice,	  necessity	  and	  propriety	  that	  the	  business	  of	  a	  surgeon	  should	  always	  be	  considered	  of	  a	  confidential	  nature.”	  	  Moreover,	  System	  of	  Ethics	  suggested	  that	  physicians’	  duties	  to	  their	  patients	  superseded	  their	  obligations	  to	  the	  law	  and	  that	  medical	  confidentiality	  should	  be	  observed	  in	  the	  courtroom:	  “Even	  secrecy	  in	  certain	  circumstances,	  as	  will	  be	  explained	  hereafter,	  is	  the	  privilege	  of	  the	  faculty,	  and	  inviolable	  even	  in	  a	  court	  of	  justice.”	  24	  	  
System	  of	  Ethics	  and	  other	  similar	  codes	  abandoned	  the	  language	  of	  earlier	  professional	  regulations,	  seeking	  to	  cast	  doctors	  as	  the	  benevolent	  protectors	  of	  their	  patients.	  The	  authors	  likened	  the	  physician	  to	  a	  Catholic	  priest.	  Doctors	  were	  privy	  to	  a	  patient’s	  most	  intimate	  secrets	  “such	  as…	  the	  judgment	  and	  treatment	  of	  syphilitic	  and	  gonorrheal	  disease;	  the	  able	  or	  disabled	  state	  of	  a	  person,	  in	  limb	  or	  constitution;	  the	  fallacy	  of	  virginity	  and	  other	  circumstances.”	  Honorable	  physicians	  were	  bound	  to	  resist	  revealing	  any	  secret	  that	  might	  confer	  “a	  degree	  of	  shame.”	  Women’s	  secrets	  were	  especially	  in	  need	  of	  protection.	  Under	  the	  new	  System	  of	  
Ethics,	  doctors	  were	  not	  allowed	  to	  disclose,	  “whether	  an	  apparent	  pregnancy	  can	  be	  real;	  the	  gestation	  and	  birth	  of	  a	  child;	  [or]	  its	  parentage,	  colour,	  and	  age;25	  Published	  in	  New	  York	  several	  years	  before	  the	  state	  adopted	  its	  medical	  confidentiality	  statute,	  System	  of	  Ethics	  may	  have	  influenced	  Spencer	  and	  the	  other	  revisers	  to	  incorporate	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  into	  New	  York’s	  statutory	  code.	  Regardless	  of	  whether	  the	  MSSNY’s	  System	  of	  Ethics	  influenced	  the	  revisers	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Ibid.	  	  25	  Ibid.	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New	  York	  code,	  however,	  the	  text	  had	  a	  profound	  impact	  on	  medical	  ethics	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  As	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  medical	  profession	  deteriorated	  even	  further	  in	  the	  1830s	  and	  1840s,	  doctors	  turned	  to	  medical	  ethics	  as	  a	  powerful	  tool	  for	  the	  advancement	  of	  the	  regular	  profession.	  In	  the	  1830s	  numerous	  medical	  societies	  enacted	  ethical	  regulations,	  including	  provisions	  mandating	  medical	  confidentiality.	  The	  Codes	  of	  Ethics	  of	  the	  State	  Medical	  Society	  of	  Ohio	  in	  1831,	  the	  Medical	  and	  Chirurgical	  Faculty	  of	  Maryland	  in	  1832	  all	  mandated	  that	  physicians’	  maintain	  their	  patients’	  confidences.26	  	  At	  the	  local	  level,	  many	  regular	  physicians	  viewed	  these	  codes	  as	  unequivocal	  successes.	  Yet	  these	  codes	  failed	  to	  address	  some	  of	  the	  problems	  plaguing	  medicine	  on	  the	  national	  scale.	  Quacks	  and	  irregular	  practitioners	  thrived	  in	  the	  de-­‐regulated	  medical	  marketplace.	  Likewise,	  medical	  education	  continued	  to	  decline	  as	  increased	  competition	  led	  medical	  schools	  to	  relax	  standards	  in	  attempts	  to	  gather	  a	  greater	  share	  of	  the	  available	  student	  fees.	  In	  May	  of	  1845,	  delegates	  from	  medical	  societies	  across	  the	  country	  convened	  in	  New	  York	  City	  to	  address	  the	  problems	  facing	  medical	  education.	  The	  convention	  proposed	  several	  resolutions	  to	  address	  the	  problem.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  delegates	  appointed	  committees	  to	  form	  a	  national	  medical	  organization.	  Two	  years	  later,	  these	  committees	  convened	  in	  Philadelphia	  to	  draft	  a	  constitution	  for	  the	  organization	  that	  would	  become	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association.	  The	  250	  delegates	  in	  attendance	  quickly	  moved	  beyond	  their	  stated	  goal	  of	  educational	  reform,	  instead	  advocating	  sweeping	  reforms	  designed	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Konold,	  9-­‐10.	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reshape	  the	  entire	  medical	  profession.	  In	  1847,	  the	  new	  organization	  adopted	  a	  code	  of	  ethics	  similar	  to	  the	  MSSNY’s	  System	  of	  Ethics.27	  The	  authors	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association’s	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  based	  their	  document	  on	  the	  writings	  of	  Thomas	  Percival’s	  Medical	  Ethics.	  Percival,	  an	  eighteenth	  century	  moralist	  had	  authored	  Medical	  Ethics	  as	  a	  practical	  guide	  for	  his	  son,	  an	  aspiring	  physician.	  28	  When	  Isaac	  Hays	  presented	  the	  code	  to	  the	  AMA	  convention	  in	  1847,	  he	  stated	  that	  the	  committee	  had	  retained	  Percival’s	  original	  language	  whenever	  possible.	  The	  committee	  did	  deviate	  from	  Percival’s	  text	  in	  several	  crucial	  ways,	  however,	  including	  in	  its	  treatment	  of	  medical	  confidentiality.	  	  In	  Medical	  Ethics,	  Percival	  had	  argued	  that	  doctors	  should	  be	  weary	  of	  “false	  tenderness	  or	  misguided	  conscience”	  and	  that	  no	  practitioner	  should	  let	  these	  errors	  lead	  him	  into	  “withholding	  any	  necessary	  proofs”	  in	  a	  court	  of	  justice.	  To	  Percival,	  when	  called	  into	  court,	  a	  physician	  was	  required	  “not	  to	  conceal	  any	  part	  of	  what	  he	  knows,	  whether	  interrogated	  particularly	  to	  that	  point	  or	  not.”29	  	  By	  contrast,	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association’s	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  echoed	  the	  MSSNY’s	  broad	  definition	  of	  medical	  confidentiality,	  stating:	  “The	  obligation	  of	  secrecy	  extends	  beyond	  the	  period	  of	  professional	  services;—none	  of	  the	  privacies	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Ibid.,	  8-­‐9.	  	  28	  For	  more	  analysis	  of	  the	  AMA’s	  reading	  of	  Percival,	  see:	  Robert	  Baker,	  “Deciphering	  Percival’s	  Code,”	  in	  The	  Codification	  of	  Medical	  Morality:	  Historical	  and	  
Philosophical	  Studies	  of	  the	  Formation	  of	  Western	  Medical	  Morality	  in	  the	  Eighteenth	  
and	  Nineteenth	  Centuries,	  Vol.	  1:	  Medical	  Ethics	  and	  Etiquette	  in	  the	  Eighteenth	  
Century	  (Dordrecht,	  1993),	  pp.	  179-­‐211.	  	  29	  Thomas	  Percival,	  Medical	  Ethics.	  This	  passage	  was	  quoted	  in	  Robert	  Baker,	  “Deciphering	  Percival’s	  Code,”	  The	  Codification	  of	  Medical	  Morality	  (Dordrecht:	  Kluwer,	  1993),	  pp.	  179-­‐211,	  at	  190.	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of	  personal	  and	  domestic	  life,	  no	  infirmity	  of	  disposition	  or	  flaw	  of	  character	  observed	  during	  professional	  attendance,	  should	  ever	  be	  divulged	  by	  [the	  physician]	  except	  when	  he	  is	  imperatively	  required	  to	  do	  so.”	  To	  regular	  physicians,	  this	  was	  not	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  self-­‐policing.	  The	  authors	  of	  the	  code	  explicitly	  linked	  these	  ideals	  to	  the	  growing	  number	  of	  statutes	  that	  guaranteed	  confidentiality	  in	  the	  courtroom:	  “The	  force	  and	  necessity	  of	  this	  obligation	  are	  indeed	  so	  great	  that	  professional	  men	  have,	  under	  certain	  circumstances,	  been	  protected	  in	  their	  observance	  of	  secrecy	  by	  courts	  of	  justice.”30	  	  	   The	  evolution	  of	  these	  codes	  of	  medical	  ethics	  in	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  developments	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  medical	  confidentiality.	  For	  the	  first	  time,	  doctors	  began	  to	  speak	  publicly	  in	  favor	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  In	  doing	  so,	  these	  physicians	  seized	  a	  once-­‐arcane	  legal	  doctrine	  and	  recast	  it	  as	  a	  key	  tenet	  of	  medical	  ethics.	  The	  formal	  recognition	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  by	  what	  would	  become	  the	  nation’s	  most	  powerful	  medical	  society	  in	  1847	  marked	  an	  important	  turning	  point.	  While	  doctors	  had	  little	  to	  say	  about	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  in	  the	  early	  nineteenth	  century,	  by	  the	  final	  decades	  of	  the	  century,	  they	  would	  emerge	  as	  the	  foremost	  proponents	  of	  the	  privilege.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  American	  Medical	  Association,	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association	  
[Reprinted	  from	  the	  American	  Edition]	  (Oxford:	  John	  Henry	  Parker,	  1849).	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   Indiscretion,	  weakness,	  fear,	  sin,	  all	  seek	  the	  family	  physician	  as	  a	  father	  confessor.	  He	  holds	  the	  honor	  of	  the	  patient	  and	  the	  character	  and	  social	  standing	  of	  families	  in	  his	  hands.	  He	  knows	  what	  is	  unknown	  in	  the	  family	  itself.	  In	  every	  relation	  of	  human	  life	  the	  doctor	  holds,	  and	  holds	  sacred	  the	  secret	  history	  of	  many	  families;	  and	  carries	  to	  the	  grave	  with	  him	  knowledge	  which	  would	  revolutionize	  the	  life	  of	  whole	  communities.	  	   	   Massachusetts	  physician,	  David	  Cheever,	  1904	  	   On	  December	  4,	  1880,	  the	  Philadelphia	  Medical	  Times	  issued	  a	  call	  to	  arms.	  In	  Pennsylvania	  courtrooms,	  attorneys	  and	  priests	  were	  afforded	  the	  benefits	  of	  privileged	  communications,	  but	  doctors	  were	  not.	  	  To	  the	  journal’s	  editor,	  the	  well-­‐respected	  Philadelphia	  physician	  Horatio	  C.	  Wood,	  this	  glaring	  omission	  was	  a	  matter	  of	  professional	  pride.	  “Is	  not	  the	  relation	  between	  physician	  and	  patient	  as	  delicate	  and	  as	  important	  as	  that	  between	  lawyer	  and	  client?”	  He	  asked,	  “Are	  not	  the	  revelations	  known	  to	  be	  necessary	  for	  the	  ills	  of	  the	  body	  as	  worthy	  of	  recognition	  of	  the	  law	  as	  those	  believed	  to	  be	  necessary	  for	  the	  cure	  of	  the	  ills	  of	  the	  soul?”1	  	   These	  were	  rhetorical	  questions.	  Wood	  took	  for	  granted	  that	  the	  Pennsylvania	  doctors	  who	  read	  his	  journal	  would	  share	  his	  sentiments.	  Throughout	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century,	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  had	  spread	  quietly	  throughout	  the	  West	  and	  Midwest.	  By	  1880,	  eighteen	  states	  or	  territories	  had	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  “Editorial:	  The	  Secrets	  of	  the	  Consulting	  Room,”	  Philadelphia	  Medical	  Times	  and	  
Register	  11	  (December	  4,	  1880),	  147.	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enacted	  other	  statutes	  guaranteeing	  medical	  confidentiality	  in	  the	  courtroom.	  2	  Yet,	  aside	  from	  New	  York,	  much	  of	  the	  eastern	  United	  States	  remained	  bound	  by	  the	  common	  law	  precedent	  established	  in	  the	  Duchess	  of	  Kingston’s	  trial	  for	  bigamy.	  Doctors	  would	  not	  be	  given	  privileged	  communications	  in	  the	  courtroom	  and	  could	  be	  forced	  to	  reveal	  their	  patients	  secrets.	  To	  Wood	  and	  many	  other	  physicians,	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  statute	  guaranteeing	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  was	  deeply	  troubling	  because	  it	  threatened	  to	  undermine	  doctors’	  relationships	  with	  their	  patients	  and	  because	  it	  challenged	  their	  sense	  of	  professional	  honor.	  	  As	  physicians,	  especially	  those	  practicing	  in	  the	  Northeast,	  increasingly	  sought	  to	  bring	  their	  states’	  laws	  into	  agreement	  with	  their	  own	  views	  on	  medical	  ethics,	  they	  continued	  practices	  that	  had	  long	  proven	  successful	  in	  other	  policy	  arenas—they	  lobbied	  legislators	  and	  courted	  legal	  scholars.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  the	  lobbying	  efforts	  of	  Wood	  and	  his	  peers	  departed	  from	  their	  predecessors	  in	  several	  important	  ways.	  By	  publishing	  open	  appeals	  for	  legislative	  action	  in	  medical	  journals,	  doctors	  thrust	  discussion	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  into	  the	  public	  eye.	  Until	  1880,	  few	  journals	  had	  ever	  mentioned	  the	  issue.	  Statutory	  guarantees	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  were	  often	  enacted	  with	  little	  fanfare,	  packed	  into	  omnibus	  bills	  alongside	  numerous	  other	  revisions	  to	  the	  evidentiary	  codes.	  Beginning	  in	  the	  early	  1880s,	  however,	  journals	  ran	  frequent	  articles	  discussing	  the	  professional	  benefits	  and,	  sometimes,	  the	  hazards	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  A	  list	  of	  statutes	  enacted	  before	  1882	  was	  compiled	  in	  Gartside	  v.	  The	  Connecticut	  
Mutual	  Life	  Insurance	  Commpany	  (76	  Mo.	  446,	  1882	  WL	  10036).	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  This	  chapter	  examines	  the	  medical	  literature	  on	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  that	  became	  increasingly	  common	  throughout	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  centuries.	  Often,	  journals	  made	  explicit	  links	  between	  medical	  confidentiality	  and	  larger	  developments	  within	  the	  profession.	  Just	  as	  doctors	  debated	  the	  value	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege,	  institutional	  changes	  and	  technological	  developments	  radically	  reshaped	  medical	  practice	  and	  challenged	  its	  fundamental	  relationships—both	  between	  physicians	  and	  with	  their	  patients.	  Doctors	  began	  to	  question	  established	  therapeutic	  practices.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  rise	  of	  irregular	  practitioners,	  regular	  physicians	  mobilized	  to	  enact	  strict	  licensing	  laws	  and	  reform	  medical	  education.	  3	  A	  small	  cadre	  of	  physicians	  challenged	  contemporary	  notions	  of	  medical	  ethics	  by	  suggesting	  that	  ethical	  policing	  should	  be	  abandoned	  altogether.	  	  As	  the	  medical	  profession	  changed,	  so	  did	  the	  discourse	  on	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  	  When	  Horatio	  Wood	  called	  on	  his	  peers	  to	  push	  for	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege,	  he	  initiated	  one	  of	  the	  first	  public	  lobbying	  campaigns	  on	  behalf	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  Yet,	  in	  many	  ways,	  Wood’s	  efforts	  echoed	  earlier	  attempts	  to	  gain	  statutory	  guarantees	  of	  medical	  confidentiality.	  By	  1880,	  Doctors	  had	  long	  worked	  closely	  with	  state	  legislators	  to	  enact	  statutory	  guarantees	  of	  medical	  confidentiality.	  Citing	  the	  several	  prominent	  medical	  scholars	  in	  his	  1860	  treatise,	  for	  example,	  the	  medico-­‐legal	  scholar	  John	  Elwell	  stated,	  “physicians,	  as	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  For	  analysis	  of	  regular	  physicians’	  drive	  to	  enact	  licensing	  laws	  during	  this	  period,	  see	  James	  C.	  Mohr,	  Licensed	  to	  Practice:	  The	  Supreme	  court	  Defines	  the	  Medical	  
Profession	  (Baltimore:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University	  Press,	  2013).	  The	  transformation	  of	  the	  medical	  profession	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  is	  discussed	  at	  length	  by	  Rothstein	  and	  Starr.	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class,	  have	  never	  given	  up	  the	  idea	  that	  they	  were	  entitled	  to	  the	  immunities	  and	  privileges	  enjoyed	  by	  the	  attorney,	  and	  that	  their	  patients	  were	  worthy	  of	  the	  same	  protection	  as	  that	  meted	  out	  by	  the	  courts	  to	  the	  client	  of	  the	  attorney.”4	  Drawing	  upon	  this	  tradition,	  Wood	  believed	  that	  “individual	  effort	  by	  doctors	  throughout	  the	  state”	  would	  be	  the	  key	  to	  securing	  favorable	  legislation	  in	  Pennsylvania.	  He	  prodded	  his	  fellow	  practitioners	  to	  “make	  it	  a	  point	  to	  see	  personally,	  or,	  if	  this	  be	  impossible,	  to	  write	  urgently	  to,	  your	  representatives	  in	  the	  two	  legislative	  bodies,	  and	  pledge	  them	  if	  possible.”5	  	  Neither	  Wood	  nor	  the	  journal	  lacked	  familiarity	  with	  the	  lobbying	  process.	  Wood	  and	  his	  peers	  were	  members	  of	  a	  generation	  of	  medical	  practitioners	  who	  had	  witnessed	  both	  numerous	  challenges	  and	  profound	  gains	  in	  medical	  professionalization.	  Throughout	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century,	  the	  regular	  medical	  profession	  had	  weathered	  challenges	  from	  several	  irregular	  sects—first	  from	  Thompsonian	  botanists	  who	  challenged	  the	  regulars’	  monopoly	  on	  medical	  services,	  then	  from	  homeopaths	  and	  eclectics	  who	  aimed	  to	  upend	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  regular	  profession.	  For	  many	  physicians,	  medical	  ethics,	  embodied	  by	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association’s	  Code	  of	  Ethics,	  served	  as	  one	  of	  the	  defining	  characteristics	  of	  regular	  medicine.	  Regular	  physicians	  viewed	  members	  of	  rival	  sects	  as	  morally	  irresponsible	  because	  of	  their	  seemingly	  dangerous	  therapeutic	  practices,	  but	  also	  because	  of	  their	  failure	  to	  abide	  by	  the	  same	  ethical	  codes	  and	  standards.	  	  Given	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  John	  J.	  Ellwell,	  A	  Medico-­‐Legal	  Treatise	  on	  Malpractice	  and	  Medical	  Evidence	  
Comprising	  the	  Elements	  of	  Medical	  Jurisprudence	  (New	  York:	  Voorhies,	  1860),	  320-­‐322.	  	  5	  “Editorial:	  The	  Secrets	  of	  the	  Consulting	  Room.”	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regular	  practitioners	  could	  not	  prove	  their	  therapeutics	  were	  any	  safer	  than	  those	  of	  their	  sectarian	  rivals,	  medical	  ethics	  served	  as	  a	  crucial	  tool	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  maintain	  control	  of	  the	  medical	  profession.	  Regular	  physicians	  used	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  medical	  ethics	  to	  push	  state	  legislatures	  to	  enact	  strict	  legislation,	  portraying	  tough	  licensing	  laws	  as	  an	  answer	  to	  the	  dangers	  of	  sectarian	  medicine.	  6	  	  To	  Wood	  and	  his	  colleagues,	  the	  fate	  of	  regular	  medicine	  rested	  on	  its	  ability	  to	  work	  cooperatively	  with	  legislators.	  Just	  as	  Wood	  extolled	  his	  colleagues	  to	  push	  for	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege,	  the	  journal	  was	  also	  leading	  the	  charge	  to	  re-­‐enact	  medical	  licensing	  laws	  in	  Pennsylvania.7	  The	  journal’s	  concurrent	  attempts	  to	  reshape	  Pennsylvania	  medicine	  and	  to	  take	  control	  of	  several	  crucial	  medico-­‐legal	  issues	  reflected	  a	  deep-­‐seated	  belief	  that	  “the	  Medical	  Profession	  can,	  if	  it	  will,	  mould	  legislation	  in	  regard	  to	  itself.”8	  Wood’s	  views	  echoed	  those	  of	  earlier	  architects	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  He	  hoped	  to	  enact	  a	  law	  that	  mirrored	  New	  York’s	  medical	  confidentiality	  law.	  Wood’s	  proposed	  law	  made	  only	  one	  minor	  alteration	  to	  the	  language	  of	  the	  New	  York	  statute.	  Like	  the	  physician-­‐statutes	  already	  on	  the	  books	  in	  Wisconsin,	  Arkansas,	  and	  several	  other	  states,	  9	  Wood	  amended	  the	  New	  York	  statute	  to	  read:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  sectarian	  medicine	  in	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  see	  Rothstein,	  
American	  Physicians	  in	  the	  Nineteenth	  and	  Starr,	  The	  Social	  Transformation	  of	  
American	  Medicine.	  For	  a	  discussion	  of	  the	  difference	  in	  therapeutics	  between	  differing	  sects,	  see	  Rothstein	  and	  John	  Harley	  Warner,	  The	  Therapeutic	  Perspective.	  	  7	  “Editorial:	  Medical	  Legislation,”	  Philadelphia	  Medical	  Times	  and	  Register	  11	  (January	  1,	  1881),	  205–6.	  	  8	  “Editorial:	  The	  Secrets	  of	  the	  Consulting	  Room.”	  	  9	  Wigmore,	  On	  Evidence	  1st	  Ed.,	  3348;	  Sanbourn,	  141-­‐146.	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No	  person	  duly	  authorized	  to	  practice	  physic	  or	  surgery	  shall	  be	  allowed	  or	  
compelled	  to	  disclose	  any	  information	  which	  he	  may	  have	  acquired	  in	  attending	  to	  any	  patient	  in	  his	  professional	  character,	  and	  which	  information	  was	  necessary	  for	  him	  to	  prescribe	  for	  such	  patient	  as	  a	  physician,	  or	  do	  any	  act	  as	  a	  surgeon.	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  pass	  this	  bill	  through	  the	  state	  legislature,	  Wood	  urged	  influential	  physicians	  to	  use	  their	  personal	  connections	  to	  influence	  lawmakers.10	  	  While	  these	  methods	  had	  long	  proven	  successful,	  Wood’s	  proposed	  law	  drew	  some	  unlikely	  criticism.	  Only	  two	  months	  after	  Wood’s	  editorial,	  the	  journal	  and	  its	  editor	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  respond	  to	  a	  letter	  that	  “assault[ed]	  the	  position	  assumed	  by	  this	  journal.”11	  Authored	  by	  the	  prominent	  New	  York	  physician	  Frederick	  Sturgis,	  	  the	  letter	  argued	  that	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  constituted	  “a	  gross	  injustice	  to	  all	  concerned.”	  To	  Sturgis,	  the	  New	  York	  law	  and	  Wood’s	  proposed	  legislation,	  “converts	  the	  family	  physician	  into	  a	  wolf	  in	  sheep’s	  clothing.”	  As	  proof	  of	  this	  claim,	  Sturgis	  cited	  the	  New	  York	  law’s	  applications	  to	  his	  specialty,	  the	  treatment	  of	  venereal	  disease.	  Citing	  a	  recent	  article	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Medical	  Record,	  he	  recounted	  a	  case	  in	  which	  a	  young	  man,	  suffering	  from	  syphilis,	  brought	  his	  bride-­‐to-­‐be	  to	  a	  doctor	  to	  be	  cured	  of	  a	  minor	  ailment.	  Horrified	  that	  the	  unknowing	  bride	  might	  soon	  be	  infected,	  the	  doctor	  “took	  occasion	  privately	  to	  remonstrate	  very	  emphatically	  with	  the	  young	  man,	  informing	  him	  of	  the	  evil	  consequences	  that	  were	  sure	  to	  follow.”	  The	  young	  man,	  however,	  stated	  that	  there	  was	  nothing	  to	  be	  done:	  “the	  invitations	  are	  out,	  and	  I	  cannot	  withdraw.”	  In	  the	  end,	  Sturgis	  lamented,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  “Editorial:	  Medical	  Legislation,”	  205–6.	  	  11	  “Editorial:	  Professional	  Secrets	  and	  the	  Law,”	  Philadelphia	  Medical	  Times	  and	  
Register	  (February	  26,	  1881),	  337.	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doctor’s	  “remonstrance	  was	  unheeded,	  and	  now	  the	  most	  beautiful	  young	  lady	  the	  physician	  had	  ever	  seen	  is	  suffering	  with	  syphilis	  in	  a	  severe	  form.”	  12	  	  New	  York’s	  confidentiality	  laws,	  Sturgis	  argued,	  left	  the	  physician	  powerless	  to	  stop	  the	  spread	  of	  disease;	  “thus,	  through	  ignorance	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  lady,	  criminality	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  man,	  and	  ‘professional	  obligations’	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  medical	  adviser,	  was	  this	  work	  accomplished.”	  By	  recounting	  the	  case,	  Sturgis	  inverted	  the	  rhetoric	  often	  employed	  by	  physicians	  like	  Wood.	  To	  Sturgis,	  instead	  of	  protecting	  the	  patient,	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  sealed	  the	  doctor’s	  lips,	  preventing	  him	  from	  acting	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  his	  clients	  and	  society.	  Rather	  than	  protect	  the	  physician’s	  honor,	  the	  law	  transformed	  the	  virtuous	  physician	  into	  a	  “scoundrel.”13	  To	  Sturgis	  and	  to	  numerous	  other	  physicians,	  the	  developing	  movement	  to	  restrict	  medical	  practice	  compounded	  these	  fears.	  All	  of	  the	  statutes	  guaranteeing	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  specified	  that	  the	  law	  applied	  only	  to	  practitioners	  that	  were	  “duly	  authorized	  to	  practice	  physic	  or	  surgery.”	  Increasingly,	  as	  licensing	  laws	  and	  the	  regulation	  of	  medical	  education	  became	  more	  onerous,	  	  this	  phrase	  meant	  that	  the	  law	  was	  applied	  only	  to	  licensed,	  regular	  physicians.	  Homeopaths	  and	  eclectics,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  numerous	  quacks	  who	  practiced	  on	  the	  peripheries	  of	  the	  medical	  profession,	  were	  exempt	  from	  the	  law.	  If,	  as	  Sturgis	  believed,	  the	  law	  restricted	  the	  physician’s	  ability	  to	  serve	  his	  patients,	  its	  effects	  were	  even	  more	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  F.R.	  Sturgis,	  “Correspondence:	  To	  the	  Editor	  of	  the	  Philadelphia	  Medical	  Times,”	  
Philadelphia	  Medical	  Times	  and	  Register	  (February	  26,	  1881),	  339.	  	  13	  Ibid.	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harmful	  because	  it	  “gags	  the	  mouth	  of	  the	  reputable	  physician,	  but	  permits	  the	  gabble	  of	  the	  charlatan.”14	  Horatio	  Wood	  responded	  to	  Sturgis	  in	  a	  brief	  editorial	  published	  alongside	  the	  letter.	  He	  countered	  Sturgis’s	  claim	  that	  the	  law	  might	  do	  harm	  to	  the	  physician’s	  honor,	  stating	  that	  although	  “occasions	  would	  arise	  in	  which	  the	  law	  would	  work	  hardship,	  or,	  possibly,	  injustice…	  these	  cases	  must	  be	  few.”	  More	  importantly,	  Wood	  recast	  the	  proposed	  law	  as	  a	  protection	  of	  the	  physician-­‐patient	  relationship	  rather	  than	  a	  hindrance.	  He	  argued,	  “the	  present	  code	  [without	  a	  statute]…	  attempts	  to	  make	  the	  doctor	  a	  legal	  spy	  on	  those	  who	  come	  to	  him…	  and	  report	  every	  case	  of	  abortion,	  ect.,	  which	  comes	  to	  his	  knowledge.”	  Unmoved	  by	  Sturgis’s	  arguments,	  Horatio	  Wood	  maintained	  his	  position	  that	  medical	  secrets	  should	  be	  beyond	  reproach.	  He	  did,	  however,	  alter	  the	  language	  in	  his	  proposed	  legislation.	  Wood	  struck	  the	  word	  “allowed”	  from	  the	  proposed	  statute,	  effectively	  leaving	  the	  decision	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  disclose	  medical	  testimony	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  physician.15	  This	  gesture	  signified	  that	  the	  law’s	  intent	  was,	  first	  and	  foremost,	  the	  protection	  of	  physicians	  independent	  discretion,	  hence	  his	  honor.16	  	  Ultimately,	  the	  journal’s	  efforts	  proved	  unsuccessful.	  Either	  Wood	  was	  unable	  to	  convince	  his	  peers	  of	  the	  need	  to	  enact	  a	  statute,	  or	  the	  state	  legislature	  refused	  to	  cooperate.	  Though	  the	  Pennsylvania	  legislature	  would	  eventually	  enact	  a	  statute	  in	  1895	  guaranteeing	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  in	  some	  cases,	  the	  law	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Sturgis,	  339.	  	  15	  The	  newly	  proposed	  legislation	  read,	  “A	  person	  duly	  authorized	  to	  practice	  physic	  or	  surgery	  shall	  not	  be	  compelled	  to	  disclose	  any	  information.”	  	  16	  “Editorial:	  Professional	  Secrets	  and	  the	  Law.”	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went	  into	  effect	  bore	  little	  resemblance	  to	  the	  bill	  Wood	  had	  proposed.	  The	  new	  legislation	  applied	  only	  to	  civil	  cases	  and	  was	  restricted	  by	  the	  addition	  of	  several	  limiting	  clauses.	  It	  was	  hardly	  the	  ironclad	  guarantee	  of	  professional	  privilege	  that	  Wood	  had	  proposed	  in	  1880.	  Instead,	  legal	  scholars	  and	  reformers	  would	  later	  tout	  Pennsylvania’s	  1895	  statute	  as	  a	  model	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  moderate	  and	  flexible	  legislation	  that	  left	  the	  admissibility	  of	  evidence	  in	  the	  courtroom	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  judges.	  17	  	  Viewed	  solely	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  rapid	  expansion	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege,	  the	  journal’s	  failure	  seems	  rather	  surprising.	  This	  brief	  exchange	  between	  two	  prominent	  physicians,	  however,	  echoed	  larger	  discussions	  taking	  place	  within	  the	  medical	  profession.	  Just	  a	  few	  decades	  earlier,	  Sturgis’s	  position	  would	  have	  been	  anathema	  to	  the	  values	  of	  regular	  medicine.	  The	  fathers	  of	  American	  medicine—often	  Edinburgh-­‐educated	  physicians	  like	  Samuel	  Bard	  and	  Benjamin	  Rush—had	  long	  held	  the	  maintenance	  of	  a	  patient’s	  confidences	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  sacred	  duties	  of	  a	  physician	  even	  when	  they	  themselves	  did	  not	  practice	  it.	  Although	  there	  were	  undoubtedly	  numerous	  examples	  in	  which	  physicians	  failed	  to	  live	  up	  to	  these	  lofty	  promises,	  in	  general,	  the	  regular	  medical	  profession	  took	  matters	  of	  confidentiality	  very	  seriously.	  	  In	  1869,	  for	  example,	  the	  New	  York	  Academy	  of	  Medicine	  (NYAM),	  expelled	  James	  Marion	  Sims,	  the	  nation’s	  most	  prominent	  gynecologist,	  for	  violating	  a	  patient’s	  confidentiality.	  Sims	  had	  invoked	  the	  ire	  of	  his	  fellow	  physicians	  when	  he	  published	  a	  letter	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  detailing	  the	  health	  of	  one	  of	  his	  patients,	  the	  Shakespearian	  actor	  Charlotte	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Stimson,	  610-­‐611.	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Cushman.	  Aimed	  at	  clarifying	  uncertainty	  and	  quelling	  public	  speculation	  over	  the	  actor’s	  health,	  Sims’	  letter	  stated	  bluntly	  that	  Miss	  Cushman	  “had	  had	  for	  some	  time	  a	  little	  indurated	  gland	  that	  gave	  her	  great	  medical	  anxiety.”	  18	  To	  his	  peers,	  Sims’s	  letter	  constituted	  a	  grave	  violation	  of	  professional	  ethics.	  The	  NYAM’s	  Committee	  of	  Ethics	  censored	  Sims	  for	  violating	  two	  tenets	  of	  the	  AMA’s	  Code	  of	  Ethics.	  In	  their	  letter,	  they	  claimed	  Sims	  had	  not	  only	  revealed	  the	  secrets	  of	  a	  patient,	  but	  also	  had	  violated	  the	  AMA’s	  prohibition	  on	  advertising	  by	  publicly	  declaring	  himself	  to	  be	  Cushman’s	  physician.	  With	  the	  evidence	  published	  in	  the	  New	  York	  Times,	  Sims	  could	  hardly	  muster	  a	  solid	  defense.	  The	  affair	  was	  quickly	  settled.	  The	  NYAM	  Committee	  of	  Ethics	  “declared	  that	  the	  charges	  against	  Dr.	  J.	  Marion	  Sims	  are	  fully	  sustained.”	  As	  punishment,	  Sims	  was	  to	  be	  “reprimanded	  by	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Academy”	  and	  forced	  to	  apologize.	  Not	  wanting	  to	  subject	  himself	  to	  the	  indignity	  of	  apologizing	  to	  the	  society,	  Sims	  refused,	  at	  which	  point,	  he	  was	  expelled	  from	  the	  NYAM.	  19	  Seemingly	  minor	  by	  modern	  standards,	  the	  punishment	  is	  indicative	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  nineteenth	  century	  physicians	  thought	  about	  medical	  ethics.	  To	  his	  peers,	  Sims’s	  most	  egregious	  crime	  was	  not	  the	  violation	  of	  his	  patient’s	  confidences,	  but	  rather	  publicly	  defying	  the	  standards	  of	  professional	  medicine.	  Accordingly,	  the	  punishment	  was	  intended	  to	  offer	  justice	  to	  the	  victims	  of	  the	  crime—Sims’s	  fellow	  practitioners.	  Within	  the	  small	  community	  of	  nineteenth-­‐century	  medicine	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  James	  Marion	  Sims,	  “Miss	  Charlotte	  Cushman’s	  Health,”	  New	  York	  Times	  (October	  3,	  1869).	  	  19	  Committee	  on	  Ethics	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Academy	  of	  Medicine,	  date	  unknown.	  Quoted	  in	  Baker,	  Before	  Bioethics,	  108-­‐109.	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punishment	  was	  daunting.	  Rather	  than	  face	  the	  humiliation	  of	  public	  reprimand	  and	  a	  forced	  apology,	  Sims,	  arguably	  the	  most	  famous	  surgeon	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  fled	  to	  Europe.20	  As	  this	  brief	  episode	  demonstrates,	  nineteenth-­‐century	  physicians	  took	  ethical	  standards	  and	  policing	  very	  seriously.	  For	  the	  regular	  profession	  of	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century,	  this	  was	  essential	  to	  their	  survival.	  Prior	  to	  developments	  in	  bacteriology	  and	  scientific	  medicine	  that	  occurred	  in	  the	  last	  decades	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  regular	  physicians	  could	  not	  convincingly	  argue	  that	  their	  therapeutics	  were	  any	  more	  effective	  than	  the	  therapeutics	  their	  sectarian	  rivals.	  This	  meant	  that	  medical	  ethics—especially	  when	  sanctioned	  by	  the	  state,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege—proved	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  only	  legitimate	  claims	  regular	  physicians	  could	  make	  to	  justify	  their	  claims	  to	  a	  monopoly	  over	  the	  profession.	  Bans	  on	  advertising	  and	  secret	  medicines	  only	  applied	  to	  regular	  physicians	  and	  served	  as	  a	  means	  of	  differentiating	  these	  doctors	  from	  members	  of	  rival	  sects.	  Likewise,	  promises	  of	  confidentiality,	  especially	  when	  supported	  by	  statutory	  law,	  helped	  distinguish	  ethical,	  regular	  medicine	  from	  its	  competitors.	  According	  to	  regulars,	  irregular	  quacks	  and	  charlatans	  were	  not	  bound	  to	  any	  oath	  or	  code	  of	  conduct	  and	  instead	  callously	  gambled	  with	  their	  patients’	  lives	  in	  pursuit	  of	  greater	  profits.	  	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  last	  few	  decades	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  however,	  the	  regular	  position	  began	  to	  change.	  The	  debate	  between	  Wood	  and	  Sturgis	  was	  not	  an	  isolated	  incident,	  but	  rather	  serves	  as	  a	  powerful	  example	  of	  a	  gradual	  shift	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Baker,	  Before	  Bioethics,	  108-­‐109.	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regulars’	  views	  on	  medical	  ethics.	  During	  the	  1880s	  and	  1890s,	  similar	  arguments	  played	  out	  in	  numerous	  medical	  journals	  as	  physicians	  debated	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  in	  several	  states.	  	  In	  these	  debates,	  physicians	  served	  as	  both	  advocates	  and	  critics	  of	  the	  privilege.	  Supporters	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  embraced	  mid-­‐nineteenth-­‐century	  notions	  of	  medical	  ethics.	  They	  saw	  practitioners’	  relationships	  with	  their	  clients	  as	  the	  fundamental	  building	  block	  upon	  which	  the	  medical	  profession	  was	  built.	  To	  these	  physicians,	  the	  practitioner	  was	  responsible	  first	  and	  foremost	  to	  his	  patient;	  all	  other	  relationships—to	  fellow	  practitioners,	  to	  society,	  and	  even	  the	  law—were	  secondary	  and	  could	  not	  be	  advanced	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  individual	  patients.	  Critics	  of	  the	  privilege,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  held	  that	  some	  relationships	  were	  more	  important	  than	  the	  physician’s	  relations	  with	  specific	  patients,	  emphasizing	  that	  medical	  practitioners	  had	  a	  duty	  to	  protect	  the	  health	  and	  morality	  of	  the	  public	  even	  if	  that	  meant	  betraying	  the	  confidences	  of	  individual	  patients.	  	  For	  proof,	  critics	  repeatedly	  cited	  the	  moral	  quandary	  that	  often	  faced	  physicians	  in	  venereal	  cases.	  Within	  this	  example,	  physicians	  could	  find	  all	  of	  their	  often	  conflicting	  obligations:	  their	  duty	  to	  protect	  women	  as	  respectable	  gentlemen,	  their	  responsibility	  to	  maintain	  the	  darkest	  secrets	  of	  their	  patients,	  and	  their	  obligation	  to	  protect	  the	  public	  by	  preventing	  of	  the	  spread	  of	  disease.	  Late-­‐nineteenth-­‐century	  medical	  journals	  featured	  numerous	  articles	  with	  titles	  such	  as,	  “Venereal	  Disease	  and	  the	  Medical	  Secret,”	  “The	  Professional	  Secret	  in	  Reference	  to	  Marriage,”	  or	  “The	  Professional	  Secret	  in	  Syphilis	  and	  Marriage.”	  Frederick	  Sturgis	  and	  other	  critics	  cited	  cases	  in	  which	  husbands	  selfishly	  risked	  infecting	  their	  wives	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with	  syphilis	  and	  other	  contagious	  diseases,	  despite	  the	  warnings	  of	  their	  physicians.	  To	  critics,	  medical	  confidentiality	  bound	  the	  doctors’	  tongues,	  enabling	  the	  spread	  of	  disease	  and	  vice.	  Though	  these	  instances	  were	  likely	  very	  rare—the	  literature	  of	  numerous	  contemporary	  legal	  scholars	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  privilege	  was	  most	  often	  applied	  to	  insurance	  and	  malpractice	  suits—critics	  found	  them	  especially	  troubling.	  In	  a	  reversal	  of	  the	  traditional	  rhetoric	  surrounding	  medical	  confidentiality,	  these	  practitioners	  argued	  that	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  and	  codified	  medical	  confidentiality	  constituted	  not	  a	  protection	  of	  physicians’	  professional	  status,	  but	  rather	  a	  direct	  challenge	  to	  the	  honor	  of	  their	  profession.21	  	  Proponents	  of	  medical	  confidentiality	  and	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  were	  no	  less	  hyperbolic.	  For	  many	  of	  these	  physicians,	  their	  obligation	  to	  secrecy	  stemmed	  from	  something	  deeper	  than	  the	  AMA	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  or	  statutory	  law.	  Daniel	  Strock,	  the	  architect	  of	  a	  proposed	  New	  Jersey	  statute,	  attributed	  doctors’	  respect	  of	  patient’s	  confidences	  to	  “the	  innate	  sense	  of	  honor	  that	  is	  so	  conspicuous	  a	  component	  of	  the	  character	  of	  the	  true	  physician.”22	  Likewise,	  Louis	  Gompertz,	  a	  Connecticut	  physician,	  suggested	  that	  many	  physicians	  would	  merely	  violate	  the	  law	  if	  it	  compelled	  them	  to	  betray	  their	  patients’	  secrets:	  “there	  are	  among	  us,	  not	  a	  few	  who	  would	  be	  tempted	  to	  risk	  judicial	  censure	  or	  punishment	  rather	  than	  make	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  E.	  Castelli,	  “The	  Professional	  Secret	  in	  Reference	  to	  Mairrage,”	  American	  Medicine	  
10	  (September	  16,	  1906),	  477-­‐478;	  L.	  Stevenard,	  “The	  Professional	  Secret	  in	  Syphilis	  and	  Marriage,”	  American	  Journal	  of	  Urology	  (1916),	  33-­‐37;	  Austin	  O’Malley,	  “The	  Professional	  Secret	  and	  Venereal	  Diseases,”	  American	  Medicine	  20	  (December,	  1916),	  837-­‐843;	  and	  Sturgis,	  “Correspondence.”	  	  	  	  22	  Daniel	  Strock,	  “The	  Patient’s	  Secret,”	  The	  Philadelphia	  Monthly	  Medical	  Journal	  1:6	  (June,	  1899),	  327.	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public,	  without	  the	  patient’s	  consent,	  the	  information	  acquired	  in	  confidence	  from	  him.”23	  Others	  gave	  long-­‐winded	  odes	  to	  Hippocrates,	  linking	  contemporary	  medico-­‐legal	  issues	  to	  supposedly	  ancient	  traditions.	  Strock	  began	  his	  “Plea	  for	  the	  Physician	  on	  the	  Witness	  Stand”	  by	  stating:	  “It	  was	  Hippocrates	  about	  2,500	  years	  ago,	  who	  put	  in	  concrete	  form	  the	  rules	  of	  medical	  practice	  that	  had	  been	  observed,	  no	  doubt	  even	  for	  ages	  before	  his	  time.”	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  advocates	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  glossed	  over	  millennia	  of	  medical	  developments.	  	  From	  ancient	  Greece	  to	  nineteenth	  century	  America,	  they	  argued,	  doctors	  had	  always	  maintained	  the	  same	  relationship	  to	  their	  patients:	  “the	  medical	  profession	  of	  civilized	  countries	  have	  preserved	  inviolate	  the	  secrets	  learned	  in	  the	  performance	  of	  their	  duties.”24	  In	  the	  final	  decades	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  however,	  radical	  transformations	  within	  the	  medical	  profession	  led	  a	  small	  cadre	  of	  physicians	  to	  begin	  to	  challenge	  the	  basic	  principles	  behind	  these	  laws.	  Throughout	  much	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  there	  had	  been	  little	  development	  in	  medical	  science.	  Toward	  the	  close	  of	  the	  century,	  however,	  major	  advancements	  in	  scientific	  medicine	  promised	  new	  therapeutic	  practices	  and	  engendered	  increased	  popular	  support	  for	  regular	  medicine.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  development	  of	  the	  hospital	  as	  the	  primary	  location	  of	  medical	  practice	  opened	  new	  avenues	  for	  regulars	  to	  control	  the	  medical	  profession.	  In	  certain	  fields—	  including	  obstetrics,	  gynecology,	  ophthalmology—	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Louis	  M.	  Gompertz,	  “Confidential	  Communications	  Between	  Patient	  and	  Physician:	  The	  Law	  Relative	  Thereto,”	  New	  York	  Medical	  Journal	  (December	  28,	  1912),	  1333-­‐1334.	  	  	  24	  Daniel	  Strock,	  327.	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therapeutic	  advancements	  and	  the	  restructuring	  of	  medical	  practice	  enabled	  some	  practitioners	  to	  specialize	  in	  certain	  procedures.	  Occurring	  across	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  and	  into	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  each	  of	  these	  developments	  supported	  regulars’	  claims	  to	  a	  monopoly	  over	  the	  medical	  profession.	  They	  underpinned	  regulars’	  attempts	  to	  reform	  medical	  education,	  to	  enact	  strict	  licensing	  laws,	  and	  to	  expel	  irregulars	  from	  professional	  organizations.25	  	  As	  regular	  physicians	  found	  new	  arguments	  to	  support	  their	  control	  over	  the	  medical	  profession,	  some	  began	  to	  see	  medical	  ethics	  as	  a	  restriction	  on	  the	  freedoms	  of	  physicians	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  protection.	  Few	  physicians	  embraced	  this	  position	  as	  wholeheartedly	  as	  James	  Marion	  Sims.	  Disgraced	  in	  the	  early	  1870s	  for	  his	  violations	  of	  medical	  ethics,	  Sims	  found	  new	  life	  in	  the	  ensuing	  decade	  as	  an	  ardent	  critic	  of	  ethical	  policing.	  By	  the	  late	  1870s,	  Sims	  had	  so	  successfully	  rehabilitated	  his	  image	  that	  he	  was	  elected	  President	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association.	  He	  did	  not,	  however,	  win	  this	  position	  through	  conciliation	  with	  the	  AMA’s	  most	  ardent	  supporters	  of	  medical	  ethics.	  Instead,	  Sims	  retrenched	  his	  position	  as	  a	  critic	  of	  medical	  ethics.	  To	  Sims,	  the	  rapid	  transformation	  of	  American	  medicine	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century	  had	  rendered	  the	  Code	  obsolete.	  In	  his	  1876	  Presidential	  address,	  he	  characterized	  the	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  as	  “a	  dead	  letter”	  and	  “an	  instrument	  of	  torture	  and	  oppression	  [for]	  prosecuting	  a	  fellow	  [AMA]	  member.”26	  Though	  Sims	  failed,	  as	  president,	  to	  substantially	  alter	  the	  code,	  other	  physicians	  quickly	  adopted	  the	  cause.	  In	  New	  York,	  dispute	  over	  the	  Code’s	  prohibition	  on	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Starr,	  Rothstein.	  	  26	  James	  Marion	  Sims,	  AMA	  Presidential	  Address	  (1876),	  quoted	  in	  Baker,	  Before	  
Bioethics,	  199.	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collaboration	  with	  irregular	  practitioners	  led	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  rival	  national	  medical	  association.	  Its	  founder	  boldly	  claimed	  that	  the	  offshoot	  society	  would	  contain	  “no	  medical	  politics	  and	  no	  medical	  ethics.”27	  	  Debate	  over	  medical	  ethics	  plagued	  the	  AMA	  throughout	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  eventually	  forcing	  the	  organization	  to	  revise	  its	  Code	  of	  Ethics.	  In	  1903,	  the	  AMA	  retitled	  the	  Code,	  Principles	  of	  Medical	  Ethics.	  In	  most	  cases,	  the	  revisers	  maintained	  the	  language	  of	  the	  original,	  though	  they	  limited	  its	  proscriptive	  capacities	  by	  removing	  any	  reference	  to	  penalties	  for	  violations	  of	  its	  core	  principles.	  More	  importantly,	  the	  election	  of	  a	  vocal	  critic	  of	  ethical	  policing	  as	  president	  of	  the	  AMA	  and	  the	  revision	  of	  the	  society’s	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  signaled	  a	  major	  shift	  in	  physicians’	  views	  on	  medical	  ethics.	  Increasingly,	  physicians	  embraced	  what	  historian	  Robert	  Baker	  has	  termed	  laissez-­‐faire	  medical	  ethics—the	  notion	  that	  decisions	  regarding	  what	  practices	  are	  ethical	  should	  be	  left	  to	  individual	  practitioners.	  Though	  the	  revised	  Code	  maintained	  a	  guarantee	  of	  patients’	  secrets,	  the	  debates	  over	  medical	  confidentiality	  and	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  that	  occurred	  throughout	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  were	  profoundly	  influenced	  by	  this	  new	  rhetoric.	  Critics	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  embraced	  laissez-­‐faire	  medical	  ethics,	  arguing	  that	  physicians	  were	  often	  faced	  with	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Francis	  Delafield,	  “President’s	  Address:	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Association	  of	  American	  Physicians,”	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association	  7(1):	  16.	  Quoted	  in	  Baker,	  Before	  Bioethics,	  205.	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contradictory	  ethical	  mandates	  and	  that	  no	  overarching	  ethical	  code	  or	  law	  could	  address	  these	  dilemmas	  adequately.	  28	  	  Proponents	  of	  the	  privilege	  were	  influenced	  by	  these	  larger	  debates	  as	  well.	  The	  physicians	  who	  argued	  vehemently	  in	  favor	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  were	  alike	  in	  several	  ways.	  All	  were	  ardent	  regulars.	  Often,	  these	  physicians	  came	  of	  age	  during	  the	  1850s	  and	  1860s,	  at	  the	  height	  of	  sectarian	  medicine.	  Like	  Horatio	  Wood,	  they	  came	  almost	  exclusively	  from	  the	  highest	  ranks	  of	  the	  medical	  profession.	  Daniel	  Roberts	  Brower,	  a	  noted	  psychologist	  and	  the	  primary	  architect	  of	  a	  proposed	  Illinois	  statute,	  for	  example,	  held	  multiple	  teaching	  positions	  in	  several	  different	  medical	  schools	  and	  served	  as	  a	  consulting	  physician	  at	  several	  Chicago	  hospitals.	  Throughout	  his	  long	  and	  successful	  career,	  Brower	  published	  numerous	  articles	  on	  nervous	  and	  mental	  disorders,	  served	  terms	  as	  the	  president	  of	  the	  Chicago	  and	  Illinois	  State	  Medical	  Societies,	  and	  accumulated	  three	  law	  degrees.29	  Likewise,	  Daniel	  Strock	  urged	  his	  colleagues	  in	  New	  Jersey	  to	  adopt	  a	  	  statute	  guaranteeing	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  while	  serving	  as	  President	  of	  the	  Camden	  County	  Medical	  Society	  and	  the	  New	  Jersey	  Sanitary	  Association.30	  As	  leaders	  of	  the	  profession,	  these	  physicians	  often	  had	  enough	  personal	  clout	  to	  influence	  both	  legislators	  and	  their	  fellow	  physicians.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  For	  more	  on	  the	  Revision	  of	  the	  AMA	  code,	  see:	  Baker,	  “The	  Anti-­‐Code	  Revolt,”	  
Before	  Bioethics,	  199-­‐231.	  	  	  29	  History	  of	  Medicine	  and	  Surgery	  in	  Chicago	  (Chicago:	  1920),	  111;	  Samuel	  T.	  Wiley,	  
Biographical	  and	  Portrait	  Cyclopedia	  of	  Montgomery	  County,	  Pennsylvania	  (Philadelphia:	  Biographical	  Publishing	  Company,	  1895),	  585-­‐604.	  	  30	  Strock,	  327-­‐329.	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At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  realities	  of	  medical	  practice	  led	  many	  practitioners	  to	  embrace	  their	  message.	  At	  a	  meeting	  of	  the	  Medico-­‐Legal	  Society	  of	  Chicago,	  four	  different	  physicians	  attested	  that	  they	  or	  a	  peer	  had	  been	  forced	  to	  reveal	  patients’	  secrets	  in	  court.	  	  For	  Dr.	  R.	  W.	  Bishop,	  compelled	  testimony	  cost	  him	  his	  client	  and	  a	  sizeable	  check.	  All	  four	  physicians	  heartily	  supported	  Dr.	  Brower’s	  proposed	  statute,	  and	  the	  proposal	  was	  put	  before	  the	  Illinois	  legislature.31	  	  Throughout	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  century,	  these	  powerful	  physicians	  and	  their	  allies	  managed	  to	  secure	  numerous	  legislative	  victories	  (see	  Table	  3).	  Between	  1860	  and	  1880,	  ten	  more	  states	  followed	  New	  York	  by	  enacting	  statutes	  codifying	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  The	  1880s	  and	  1890s	  brought	  another	  flurry	  of	  legislative	  activity	  on	  this	  issue.	  Ohio,	  Washington,	  North	  Carolina,	  Oklahoma,	  Colorado,	  Pennsylvania,	  West	  Virginia,	  Hawaii,	  Utah,	  Alaska,	  and	  the	  District	  of	  Columbia	  all	  enacted	  statutes.	  Similarly,	  in	  1899,	  Arkansas	  became	  the	  first	  state	  to	  extend	  the	  privilege	  to	  trained	  nurses.	  By	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century,	  twenty-­‐six	  states	  or	  territories	  had	  extended	  privileged	  communications	  to	  medical	  practitioners.	  In	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  the	  newly	  acquired	  Philippines	  and	  Puerto	  Rico	  adopted	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  Additional	  lobbying	  campaigns	  successfully	  placed	  bills	  before	  the	  state	  legislature	  in	  Illinois,	  Connecticut,	  and	  New	  Jersey.32	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  “Medico	  Legal	  Society	  of	  Chicago,”	  The	  Chicago	  Medical	  Recorder	  12	  (1897),	  81.	  32	  Sturgis,	  “Correspondence";	  Francis	  W.	  Shain,	  “When	  Is	  a	  Physician	  Legally	  Exempt	  from	  Testifying	  to	  Confidential	  Communications	  Made	  to	  Him	  by	  His	  Patient?,”	  
Medical	  News	  42	  (January	  20,	  1883),	  70–72;	  David	  W.	  Cheever,	  “Privileged	  Medical	  Communications,”	  Medical	  Communications	  of	  the	  Massachusetts	  Medical	  Society	  19,	  no.	  1	  (1904),	  583-­‐586.;	  Arthur	  N.	  Taylor,	  The	  Law	  in	  Its	  Relations	  to	  Physicians	  (New	  York:	  D.	  Appleton	  &	  Co.,	  1904),	  488–491.	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Still,	  legislative	  victories	  proved	  elusive	  in	  the	  South	  and	  Northeast.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  New	  York,	  and	  later	  Pennsylvania,	  states	  in	  the	  West	  claimed	  the	  majority	  of	  statutes	  into	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  Moreover,	  when	  compared	  to	  earlier	  legislation,	  many	  of	  these	  new	  statutes	  had	  limited	  applications.	  Pennsylvania’s	  law	  limited	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  to	  civil	  suits.	  Washington	  D.C.’s	  statute	  did	  not	  apply	  to	  “evidence	  in	  criminal	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  accused	  is	  charged	  with	  causing	  the	  death	  of	  or	  inflicting	  injuries	  upon	  a	  human	  being.”	  The	  North	  Carolina	  Statute	  included	  a	  provision	  that	  allowed	  the	  judge	  to	  “compel	  [a	  physician’s]	  disclosure	  [of	  medical	  secrets]	  if	  in	  his	  opinion	  [the	  information]	  is	  necessary	  to	  a	  proper	  administration	  of	  justice.”33	  	  Nevertheless,	  many	  physicians	  viewed	  these	  statutes	  as	  a	  harbinger	  of	  future	  success.	  Following	  these	  legislative	  victories,	  Daniel	  Cheever,	  a	  renowned	  surgeon	  and	  Harvard	  professor,	  sought	  to	  bring	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  to	  New	  England.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Wigmore,	  On	  Evidence	  1st	  Ed.,	  3348-­‐3349.	  
Table	  3:	  Physician-­‐Patient	  
Privilege	  (1880-­‐1906)	  
State/Territory	   Date	  Enacted	  
Ohio	   1880	  
Washington	   1881	  
North	  Carolina	   1885	  
Oklahoma	   1890	  
Colorado	   1891	  




Utah	   1898	  




Mississippi	   1906	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In	  1903,	  he	  stood	  before	  the	  Massachusetts	  Medical	  Society	  and	  offered	  “A	  Plea	  for	  a	  Change	  in	  the	  Massachusetts	  Law.”	  His	  speech,	  part	  of	  a	  panel	  on	  privileged	  communications,	  marked	  the	  culmination	  Cheever’s	  two-­‐year	  lobbying	  effort	  to	  enact	  a	  statute	  guaranteeing	  medical	  confidentiality.	  Cheever’s	  rhetoric	  echoed	  the	  successful	  appeals	  of	  earlier	  advocates	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  He	  linked	  medical	  confidentiality	  to	  ancient	  traditions,	  invoking	  the	  Hippocratic	  oath	  and	  Roman	  law.	  In	  his	  address,	  Cheever	  passionately	  argued	  that	  the	  state’s	  current	  laws	  placed	  the	  physician	  in	  a	  precarious	  situation.	  To	  Cheever,	  medical	  men	  were	  entrusted	  with	  great	  secrets;	  betraying	  these	  secrets	  under	  any	  circumstances	  would	  damage	  the	  welfare	  of	  their	  patients	  and	  the	  honor	  of	  their	  profession.	  Physicians’	  dual	  obligations	  to	  their	  patients	  and	  to	  the	  courts,	  Cheever	  argued,	  meant	  that	  “the	  doctor	  in	  a	  court	  of	  law	  is	  in	  a	  false	  position—false	  in	  proportion	  to	  his	  sense	  of	  honor.”	  By	  invoking	  a	  physician’s	  gentlemanly	  honor,	  Cheever	  suggested	  that	  physicians	  were	  bound	  to	  a	  code	  of	  ethics	  that	  placed	  them	  above	  the	  law,	  maintaining	  that	  “some	  [physicians]	  would	  go	  to	  prison	  rather	  than	  betray	  a	  confidence.”34	  	  To	  Cheever,	  the	  only	  solution	  to	  this	  problem	  was	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  new	  statute	  guaranteeing	  medical	  confidentiality	  to	  protect	  medical	  practitioners	  from	  the	  need	  to	  reveal	  their	  patients’	  secrets.	  In	  Cheever’s	  eyes	  the	  United	  States	  fell	  into	  two	  camps	  with	  respect	  to	  this	  issue:	  states	  like	  Massachusetts	  that	  followed	  English	  common	  law,	  forcing	  practitioners	  to	  testify	  and	  betray	  their	  honor;	  and	  others	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  Cheever,	  583-­‐586.	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followed	  New	  York	  by	  privileging	  communications	  between	  physician	  and	  patient.35	  For	  Cheever	  and	  other	  physicians	  who	  came	  of	  age	  during	  the	  Civil	  War,	  the	  list	  of	  states	  protecting	  the	  physician	  in	  the	  courtroom	  had	  doubled	  over	  the	  course	  of	  their	  practice.	  Even	  more	  promising,	  similar	  legislative	  victories	  appeared	  attainable	  in	  Illinois	  and	  several	  other	  states.36	  With	  Cheever’s	  advocacy	  and	  the	  promise	  of	  similar	  victories	  elsewhere,	  the	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  
Association	  stated	  hopefully	  that	  “this	  [would]	  be	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  change	  in	  the	  laws	  of	  Massachusetts.”	  If	  Massachusetts	  were	  to	  enact	  a	  statute,	  many	  physicians	  hoped	  this	  legislative	  victory	  would	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  similar	  legislation	  across	  the	  Northeast.	  37	  	   Cheever	  seemed	  to	  be	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  successfully	  securing	  a	  new	  statute.	  Two	  years	  had	  passed	  since	  Cheever	  first	  read	  his	  paper	  to	  the	  State	  Medical	  Society.	  During	  that	  time,	  he	  had	  managed	  to	  convince	  the	  councilors	  of	  the	  society	  to	  compile	  a	  panel	  of	  medico-­‐legal	  experts	  to	  discuss	  and	  potentially	  draft	  a	  new	  law.	  Within	  the	  previous	  two	  decades,	  physicians	  in	  Illinois	  had	  executed	  similar	  strategies	  to	  great	  effect,	  using	  medical	  and	  medico-­‐legal	  society	  meetings	  to	  successfully	  draft	  new	  legislation.	  At	  the	  Illinois	  conference,	  the	  few	  legal	  scholars	  in	  the	  room	  acquiesced	  to	  physicians’	  demands,	  and	  the	  new	  bills	  were	  quickly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Ibid.	  	  36	  John	  Ridlon,	  “Medico-­‐Legal	  Society	  of	  Chicago,”	  Chicago	  Medical	  Recorder	  12	  (June	  1897),	  74–82.	  	  37	  “Medical	  News,”	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association	  34	  (June	  1903).	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ushered	  to	  the	  state	  legislature.38	  Cheever’s	  proposal—a	  bill	  that	  would	  allow	  physicians	  to	  divulge	  medical	  secrets	  only	  with	  the	  patient’s	  consent,	  in	  malpractice	  suits,	  or	  to	  “expose	  crime”—mirrored	  this	  recent	  legislation	  by	  offering	  several	  amendments	  to	  lessen	  the	  perceived	  negative	  effects	  of	  these	  laws.39	  	  	   The	  panel’s	  final	  two	  speakers,	  however,	  were	  unimpressed	  by	  this	  proposal.	  Following	  Cheever,	  Walter	  Soren,	  a	  Brookline	  attorney,	  gave	  a	  speech	  on	  “The	  Workings	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Law.”	  The	  paper	  charted	  the	  evolution	  of	  court	  rulings	  on	  New	  York’s	  medical	  confidentiality	  law,	  highlighting	  several	  legal	  dilemmas	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  statute.	  Through	  a	  detailed	  and	  extensive	  list	  of	  court	  cases,	  Soren	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  New	  York	  courts—seventy	  years	  after	  the	  law’s	  adoption—were	  still	  unclear	  regarding	  whose	  communications	  were	  protected	  by	  the	  statute	  and	  what	  communications	  were	  considered	  “necessary”	  to	  prescribe	  to	  patients.	  Furthermore,	  while	  Cheever	  had	  framed	  his	  discussion	  around	  the	  law’s	  relation	  to	  a	  physician’s	  honor,	  Soren	  stated	  that	  “the	  statute	  has	  been	  considered	  [by	  the	  courts]	  as	  passed	  solely	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  patient,	  and	  has	  been	  construed	  liberally	  in	  his	  favor.”	  Instead	  of	  a	  crucial	  protection	  of	  physicians’	  honor,	  Soren’s	  analysis	  of	  recent	  New	  York	  court	  rulings	  depicted	  the	  proposed	  statute	  as	  a	  morally	  ambiguous	  law	  that	  could	  both	  protect	  and	  harm	  physicians.40	  	  	   While	  Soren’s	  paper	  challenged	  Cheever’s	  assertion	  that	  the	  proposed	  law	  would	  serve	  primarily	  to	  protect	  physicians,	  the	  panel’s	  final	  speaker	  challenged	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Ridlon,	  “Medico-­‐Legal	  Society	  of	  Chicago.”	  39	  Cheever,	  “Privileged	  Medical	  Communications,”	  586.	  	  40	  Walter	  Soren,	  “The	  Workings	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Law,”	  Medical	  Communications	  of	  
the	  Massachusetts	  Medical	  Society	  19:1	  (1904),	  pp.	  587-­‐605.	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notion	  that	  a	  new	  statute	  would	  provide	  practical	  utility	  to	  any	  parties.	  In	  a	  paper	  titled	  “Privileged	  Communications	  to	  Physicians,”	  Frederick	  Stimson,	  a	  Dedham	  attorney,	  outlined	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  laws	  of	  various	  states.	  Rather	  than	  addressing	  the	  matter	  as	  a	  medical	  issue,	  Stimson	  recast	  the	  debate	  as	  a	  contest	  between	  statutory	  and	  common	  law.	  Common	  law,	  Stimson	  argued,	  was	  preferable	  for	  all	  parties	  because	  it	  gave	  judges	  the	  discretion	  to	  judge	  each	  case	  individually.	  Speaking	  “for	  [his]	  profession,”	  Stimson	  promised	  the	  assembled	  physicians	  that,	  under	  common	  law	  jurisdictions,	  there	  been	  no—or	  at	  least	  very	  few—instances	  where	  physicians	  had	  been	  compelled	  to	  testify.	  Judges	  were	  flexible	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  specifics	  of	  each	  case,	  often	  relieving	  physicians	  of	  their	  duty	  to	  testify.	  Instead	  of	  a	  challenge	  to	  physicians’	  honor,	  Stimson	  recast	  the	  malleability	  of	  the	  common	  law	  system	  as	  a	  benefit	  to	  physicians.41	  	  	   At	  the	  conclusion	  of	  the	  panel,	  the	  Medical	  Society	  of	  Massachusetts	  declined	  to	  draft	  a	  new	  statute.	  	  The	  decision—won	  through	  the	  successful	  challenges	  of	  the	  attorneys,	  Soren	  and	  Stimson—marked	  a	  landmark	  victory	  for	  a	  new	  cadre	  of	  legal	  scholars	  who	  challenged	  the	  utility	  of	  medical	  confidentiality	  laws.	  A	  few	  years	  earlier	  it	  had	  seemed	  as	  though	  lawyers	  and	  judges	  were	  largely	  content	  to	  yield	  to	  physicians,	  allowing	  the	  medical	  profession	  to	  enact	  laws	  and	  to	  regulate	  medical	  ethics.	  In	  Illinois,	  for	  example,	  a	  judge	  had	  been	  willing	  to	  support	  Brower’s	  proposed	  statute,	  even	  though	  he	  believed	  that	  “no	  one	  felt	  the	  necessity	  for	  a	  law	  making	  communications	  to	  physicians	  privileged.”42	  The	  arrival	  of	  a	  new	  generation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Stimson,	  "Privileged	  Communications	  to	  Physicians.”	  	  42	  “Medico	  Legal	  Society	  of	  Chicago,”	  81.	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of	  legal	  scholars,	  however,	  upset	  the	  cooperative	  relationship	  between	  doctors,	  lawyers,	  and	  judges.	  These	  new	  legal	  scholars	  would	  become	  the	  most	  vociferous	  critics	  of	  the	  privilege,	  railing	  against	  it	  at	  any	  opportunity.43	  Their	  literature	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  medico-­‐legal	  discourse	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  	  	   Yet	  Cheever’s	  failure	  to	  change	  Massachusetts	  law	  also	  revealed	  the	  deepening	  of	  a	  schism	  within	  the	  medical	  profession.	  A	  few	  decades	  earlier,	  the	  medical	  profession’s	  failure	  to	  rally	  around	  one	  of	  its	  own	  in	  the	  face	  of	  criticism	  from	  outsiders	  would	  have	  been	  unthinkable.	  By	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century,	  however,	  it	  had	  become	  clear	  that	  doctors	  were	  no	  longer	  united	  in	  their	  support	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  Cheever,	  the	  ardent	  regular	  never	  wavered.	  To	  him,	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  and	  codified	  medical	  ethics	  served	  as	  a	  means	  to	  distinguish	  the	  regular	  practitioner	  from	  the	  quack.	  As	  scientific	  medicine	  took	  hold	  of	  the	  profession	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  however,	  these	  distinctions	  became	  less	  important.	  Increasingly	  popular,	  the	  laissez-­‐faire	  medical	  ethics	  of	  J.	  Marion	  Sims	  and	  his	  followers	  led	  many	  physicians	  to	  question	  the	  utility	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  and	  medical	  ethics.	  	  	   Cheever	  never	  accepted	  these	  changes.	  He	  had	  come	  of	  age	  in	  an	  era	  in	  which	  regular	  physicians	  united	  against	  common	  foes—irregular	  practitioners	  and	  quacks.	  Until	  the	  end	  of	  his	  career,	  Cheever	  always	  identified	  himself	  as	  	  “a	  follower	  of	  the	  old	  leaders	  who	  allowed	  the	  term	  ‘regular,’	  but	  scorned	  all	  other	  appellations.”	  By	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  however,	  these	  distinctions	  no	  longer	  seemed	  relevant.	  Upon	  his	  retirement	  in	  1907,	  the	  elderly	  physician	  took	  the	  opportunity	  to	  address	  his	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Of	  this	  new	  literature,	  John	  Henry	  Wigmore's	  On	  Evidence	  would	  prove	  the	  most	  influential.	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colleagues	  one	  last	  time.	  Cheever	  acknowledged	  that	  his	  views	  on	  irregular	  practitioners	  and	  medical	  ethics	  made	  him	  a	  “fossil,”	  yet	  he	  cautioned	  his	  peers	  to	  remember	  him	  “as	  an	  enduring	  reminder	  of	  what	  is	  past.”44	  As	  Cheever	  and	  his	  peers	  retired,	  the	  medical	  profession	  lost	  its	  most	  vocal	  advocates	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  Over	  the	  next	  two	  decades,	  professional	  journals	  and	  society	  meetings	  would	  continue	  to	  host	  heated	  debates	  between	  physicians	  and	  lawyers	  over	  the	  utility	  of	  medical	  confidentiality	  laws.	  These	  gatherings,	  however,	  often	  brought	  diminishing	  returns.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  powerful	  criticism	  from	  legal	  scholars	  and	  with	  dwindling	  support	  amongst	  the	  medical	  ranks,	  the	  spread	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  slowed	  substantially	  in	  early	  twentieth	  century.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Testimonial	  to	  David	  W.	  Cheever:	  February	  25,	  1907	  (Boston:	  David	  Clapp	  &	  Son,	  1907),	  24-­‐27.	  	  
	   98	  
	   	  
CHAPTER	  VI	  
	  
	  PHYSICIAN-­‐PATIENT	  PRIVILEGE	  IN	  THE	  TWENTIETH	  CENTURY	  	  There	  is	  but	  one	  form	  in	  which	  the	  argument	  for	  the	  privilege	  can	  be	  put	  with	  any	  semblance	  of	  plausibility,	  and	  in	  that	  form	  it	  doubtless	  commonly	  presents	  itself	  to	  the	  view	  of	  medical	  men	  jealous	  for	  their	  position.	  —John	  Henry	  Wigmore,	  On	  Evidence	  (1904)	  	   In	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  criticism	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege—from	  both	  the	  legal	  and	  medical	  professions—became	  increasingly	  vocal.	  As	  Frederick	  Stimson’s	  arguments	  against	  David	  Cheever’s	  proposed	  Massachusetts	  statute	  demonstrate,	  legal	  scholars	  found	  the	  application	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  in	  the	  courtroom	  unnecessarily	  onerous.	  Medico-­‐legal	  developments	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  centuries	  brought	  new	  institutions	  and	  new	  types	  of	  legislation	  to	  which	  the	  privilege	  could	  not	  be	  easily	  applied.	  Insurance,	  malpractice,	  and	  worker’s	  compensation	  cases	  proved	  especially	  difficult	  to	  adjudicate	  with	  liberal	  use	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  Accordingly,	  numerous	  states,	  prompted	  by	  this	  new	  criticism,	  began	  to	  rewrite	  their	  civil	  codes,	  limiting	  the	  applications	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  	   Some	  legal	  critics	  went	  even	  further,	  however,	  arguing	  that	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  was	  inherently	  unjust.	  To	  these	  legal	  scholars,	  the	  privilege	  impeded	  courts’	  ability	  to	  ascertain	  the	  truth.	  Moreover,	  they	  argued	  that	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  failed	  to	  improve	  doctor-­‐patient	  relations—physicians	  would	  get	  all	  the	  necessary	  information	  to	  properly	  treat	  their	  patients	  regardless	  of	  whether	  their	  communications	  were	  privileged.	  John	  Henry	  Wigmore,	  the	  most	  influential	  of	  these	  critics,	  suggested	  that	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  merely	  served	  as	  a	  means	  to	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improve	  the	  professional	  status	  of	  the	  medical	  profession—often	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  justice.	  Accordingly,	  he	  argued	  that	  the	  privilege	  should	  be	  abolished	  altogether.	  	  	   At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	  some	  physicians	  continued	  to	  push	  for	  new	  statutes,	  but	  these	  efforts	  often	  proved	  unsuccessful.	  As	  many	  doctors	  embraced	  laissez-­‐faire	  medical	  ethics,	  critics	  like	  Frederick	  Sturgis,	  the	  New	  York	  physician	  who	  spoke	  out	  against	  Horatio	  Wood’s	  proposed	  Pennsylvania	  statute,	  became	  more	  numerous.	  In	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  many	  physicians	  argued	  that	  the	  privilege	  put	  doctors	  in	  a	  precarious	  situation,	  sometimes	  preventing	  physicians	  from	  acting	  ethically.	  To	  these	  doctors,	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  and,	  more	  broadly,	  the	  AMA’s	  code	  of	  medical	  ethics	  increasingly	  seemed	  like	  antiquated	  relics	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  	  	   The	  nineteenth-­‐century	  statutes	  that	  granted	  physicians	  privileged	  communications	  had	  been	  enacted	  in	  response	  to	  specific	  medico-­‐legal	  problems	  including:	  doctors’	  conflicting	  loyalties	  to	  their	  patients	  and	  the	  law,	  uncertainty	  over	  the	  admissibility	  of	  specific	  pieces	  of	  testimony	  in	  the	  courtroom,	  and	  a	  desire	  for	  a	  more	  precise	  and	  proscriptive	  legal	  code.	  A	  period	  of	  rapid	  change,	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  brought	  numerous	  developments	  that	  challenged	  these	  nineteenth-­‐century	  trends.	  1	  New	  institutions	  added	  complications	  to	  the	  doctor-­‐patient	  relationship.	  Railroad	  companies	  and	  other	  large	  corporations	  hired	  their	  own	  doctors.	  Many	  physicians	  wondered	  whether	  their	  primary	  allegiance	  should	  be	  to	  their	  corporate	  employers	  or	  their	  patients.	  What	  should	  a	  doctor	  do	  when	  his	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  transformation	  of	  American	  society	  in	  this	  period	  has	  long	  interested	  historians.	  See:	  Robert	  H.	  Wiebe,	  A	  Search	  for	  Order:	  1877-­‐1920	  (New	  York:	  Hill	  and	  Wang,	  1967).	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  impacts	  of	  these	  changes	  on	  the	  medical	  profession,	  see:	  Starr	  and	  Rothstein.	  	  
	  	  100	  
patient	  sues	  the	  company	  writing	  signing	  his	  checks?	  Physicians	  debated	  these	  ethical	  dilemmas	  in	  professional	  journals.2	  As	  personal	  injury	  cases	  became	  more	  frequent	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  centuries,	  these	  discussions	  frequently	  found	  their	  way	  into	  the	  courtroom,	  where	  physicians	  and	  lawyers	  were	  often	  uncertain	  how	  to	  apply	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.3	  	   Similarly,	  the	  transformation	  of	  hospitals	  in	  the	  late	  nineteenth	  and	  early	  twentieth	  centuries	  profoundly	  shaped	  discourse	  over	  medical	  confidentiality.	  Throughout	  much	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  hospitals	  had	  served	  as	  houses	  of	  last	  resort,	  where	  the	  poor	  and	  destitute	  received	  palliative	  care.	  By	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century,	  however,	  the	  advent	  of	  professional	  nursing	  and	  antiseptic	  surgery	  had	  remade	  the	  hospital	  into	  the	  primary	  locus	  of	  both	  treatment	  and	  medical	  research.4	  Like	  the	  intrusion	  of	  corporations	  into	  medical	  care,	  the	  reorganization	  of	  the	  hospital	  brought	  new	  ethical	  dilemmas	  doctors	  had	  to	  confront,	  creating	  exceptional	  cases	  where	  “the	  professional	  honor	  and	  the	  legal	  obligation…	  to	  preserve	  the	  patient’s	  secrets”	  no	  longer	  applied.	  By	  entering	  the	  hospital,	  physicians	  argued,	  “the	  patient…	  necessarily	  and	  properly	  assumed	  to	  waive	  all	  claim	  to	  privacy	  so	  far	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Clark	  Bell,	  “The	  Duty	  and	  Responsibility	  of	  the	  Attending	  Physician	  in	  Cases	  of	  Railway	  Surgery,”	  Medico-­‐Legal	  Journal	  14	  (1896),	  pp.	  7-­‐14;	  Clark	  Bell,	  “The	  Future	  of	  Railway	  Surgery,	  Medico-­‐Legal	  Journal	  14	  (1896),	  pp.	  202-­‐206.	  	  3	  Barbara	  Young	  Welke,	  Recasting	  American	  Liberty:	  Gender,	  Race,	  Law,	  and	  the	  
Railroad	  Revolution,	  1865-­‐1920	  (Cambridge:	  University	  Press,	  2001);	  Tracy	  C.	  Becker,	  “Observations	  Concerning	  the	  Law	  of	  Privileged	  Communications	  Between	  Physician	  and	  Patient,	  as	  Applicable	  to	  the	  Duties	  of	  Railway	  Surgeons,”	  Journal	  of	  
the	  American	  Medical	  Association	  	  (May	  30,	  1896),	  pp.	  1065-­‐1067.	  	  4	  Starr,	  The	  Social	  Transformation	  of	  American	  Medicine.	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the	  purposes	  of	  clinical	  instruction	  and	  hospital	  administration	  are	  concerned.”5	  	  Likewise,	  the	  emergence	  of	  insurance	  companies	  brought	  numerous	  trials	  necessitating	  medical	  testimony.6	  	  The	  application	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  to	  injury	  lawsuits	  and	  insurance	  claims	  provoked	  numerous	  unwanted	  complications.	  One	  legal	  scholar	  remarked,	  “It	  needs	  no	  argument	  to	  show	  the	  unfairness,	  if	  not	  dishonesty,	  as	  a	  general	  rule,	  of	  those	  who	  bring	  actions	  to	  recover	  damages	  for	  their	  physical	  injuries,	  yet	  will	  not	  permit	  the	  best	  evidence	  of	  the	  nature	  and	  extent	  of	  those	  injuries	  to	  be	  put	  before	  the	  jury.”7	  The	  legal	  critic,	  Zachariah	  Chafee	  cited	  several	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  enforcement	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  seemed	  to	  hamper	  the	  judicial	  process.	  In	  one	  case,	  a	  drunk	  accident	  victim	  was	  able	  to	  fraudulently	  recover	  damages	  because	  his	  attending	  physicians	  were	  unable	  to	  testify.	  In	  another,	  a	  widow	  sought	  to	  receive	  an	  insurance	  claim	  for	  the	  wrongful	  death	  of	  her	  husband.	  Because	  her	  husband’s	  physician	  was	  the	  only	  witness	  who	  could	  attest	  to	  the	  cause	  of	  death	  and	  was	  barred	  from	  testifying,	  she	  was	  unable	  to	  recover	  damages	  for	  the	  accidental	  death	  of	  her	  husband.8	  In	  his	  examination	  of	  the	  applications	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege,	  Walter	  Soren	  concluded,	  “the	  working	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Edmund	  Andrews,	  “The	  Secrets	  of	  Hospital	  Patients,”	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  
medical	  Association	  (January	  7,	  1899),	  pp.	  3-­‐4.	  	  	  6	  Starr,	  The	  Social	  Transformation	  of	  American	  Medicine.	  
	  7	  W.A.	  Purrington,	  “An	  Abused	  Privilege,”	  Columbia	  Law	  Review	  35:6	  (June,	  1906),	  pp.	  388-­‐422.	  	  8	  Zacheriah	  Chafee	  Jr.,	  "Progress	  of	  the	  Law,"	  Harvard	  Law	  Review	  35:6	  (1921),	  pp.	  673-­‐714.	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the	  New	  York	  law	  of	  privileged	  communications	  is	  a	  little	  hard	  on	  life	  and	  accident	  insurance	  companies.”9	  	   In	  response	  to	  these	  cases,	  legal	  scholars	  suggested	  reform.	  Many	  scholars	  echoed	  Stimson’s	  claim	  that	  the	  judicial	  authority	  of	  the	  common	  laws	  was	  preferable	  to	  the	  strict	  provisions	  of	  statutory	  law.	  W.A.	  Purrington	  concluded,	  “if	  these	  statutes	  be	  not	  repealed	  altogether	  they	  should	  be	  modified	  so	  as	  not	  to	  enable	  the	  unscrupulous	  to	  suppress	  in	  evidence	  what	  is	  no	  secret	  outside	  the	  court	  room.”10	  Numerous	  states	  amended	  their	  statutes,	  limiting	  the	  applications	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  In	  1909,	  for	  example,	  the	  Michigan	  legislature	  passed	  an	  amendment	  to	  the	  state’s	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  statute,	  limiting	  its	  applications	  to	  malpractice	  suits.	  Likewise,	  in	  1923,	  Minnesota	  amended	  its	  statue	  to	  allow	  a	  physician	  to	  testify	  to	  “the	  pregnancy	  of	  his	  patient	  without	  her	  consent.”11	  	  The	  evolution	  of	  California’s	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  statute	  provides	  a	  powerful	  example	  of	  the	  transformation	  of	  these	  laws	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century.	  The	  law	  mirrored	  many	  of	  the	  other	  statutes	  enacted	  in	  the	  mid-­‐nineteenth	  century.	  Limited	  to	  civil	  actions,	  it	  barred	  “a	  licensed	  physician	  or	  surgeon”	  from	  disclosing	  “any	  information	  acquired	  in	  attending	  the	  patient	  which	  was	  necessary	  to	  enable	  him	  to	  act	  for	  the	  patient.”	  By	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  however,	  many	  had	  come	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Soren,	  “The	  Workings	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Law,”	  601.	  	  10	  Purrington,	  “An	  Abused	  Privilege.”	  	  11	  Wigmore,	  A	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  System	  of	  Evidence	  in	  Trials	  at	  
Common	  Law	  Including	  the	  Statutes	  and	  Judicial	  Decisions	  of	  All	  Jurisdictions	  of	  the	  
United	  States	  and	  Canada	  4th	  ed.,	  vol.	  8	  (Boston:	  Little,	  Brown	  and	  Co.,	  1940),	  805.	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view	  the	  one-­‐sentence,	  1853	  law	  as	  inadequate.	  In	  1917,	  the	  state	  legislature	  amended	  the	  statute,	  adding	  a	  waiver	  that	  could	  be	  executed	  by	  deceased	  patients’	  spouses	  or	  children	  and	  provisions	  barring	  the	  privilege	  from	  wrongful	  death	  and	  personal	  injury	  suits.	  The	  resulting	  law,	  a	  tangled	  mess	  of	  legalistic	  jargon,	  effectively	  rendered	  the	  earlier	  statute	  illegible	  to	  all	  but	  the	  savviest	  legal	  scholar.12	  	  Few	  scholars	  influenced	  this	  discourse	  as	  much	  as	  John	  Henry	  Wigmore.	  Born	  in	  1863,	  Wigmore	  rose	  to	  prominence	  in	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  as	  the	  nation’s	  foremost	  expert	  in	  evidence	  law.	  First	  published	  in	  1904,	  his	  magnum	  opus,	  
A	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  System	  of	  Evidence	  in	  Trials	  at	  Common	  Law,	  quickly	  became	  the	  definitive	  work	  in	  the	  field.	  The	  first	  edition	  of	  On	  Evidence	  consisted	  3842	  pages	  split	  into	  four	  volumes.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  however,	  the	  text	  would	  be	  reprinted	  numerous	  times,	  eventually	  spanning	  ten	  volumes.	  In	  the	  first	  edition	  of	  On	  Evidence,	  Wigmore	  dedicated	  nineteen	  pages	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  The	  new	  law	  read:	  “A	  licensed	  physician	  or	  surgeon	  cannot	  without	  consent	  of	  his	  patient,	  be	  examined	  in	  a	  civil	  action	  as	  to	  any	  information	  acquired	  in	  attending	  the	  patient	  which	  was	  necessary	  to	  enable	  him	  to	  act	  for	  the	  patient.	  Provided,	  however,	  that	  after	  the	  death	  of	  a	  patient,	  the	  executor	  of	  his	  will	  or	  the	  administrator	  of	  his	  estate	  of	  the	  surviving	  spouse	  of	  the	  deceased,	  or,	  if	  there	  be	  no	  surviving	  spouse,	  the	  children,	  of	  the	  deceased	  personally,	  or,	  if	  minors,	  by	  their	  guardian,	  may	  give	  such	  consent,	  in	  any	  action	  proceeding	  brought	  to	  recover	  damages	  on	  account	  of	  the	  death	  of	  the	  patient;	  provided,	  further	  that	  where	  any	  person	  brings	  an	  action	  to	  recover	  damages	  for	  personal	  injuries,	  such	  action	  shall	  be	  deemed	  to	  constitute	  a	  consent	  by	  the	  person	  bringing	  	  such	  action	  that	  any	  physician	  who	  has	  prescribed	  for	  or	  treated	  said	  person	  and	  whose	  testimony	  is	  material	  in	  said	  action	  shall	  testify;	  and	  provided,	  further,	  that	  the	  bringing	  of	  an	  action	  to	  recover	  the	  death	  of	  a	  patient,	  by	  the	  executor	  of	  his	  will,	  or	  by	  the	  administrator	  of	  his	  estate,	  or	  by	  the	  surviving	  spouse	  of	  the	  deceased,	  or	  if	  there	  be	  no	  surviving	  spouse,	  by	  the	  children	  personally,	  or	  if	  minors,	  by	  their	  guardian,	  shall	  constitute	  a	  consent	  by	  such	  executor,	  administrator,	  surviving	  spouse	  or	  children	  or	  guardian,	  to	  the	  testimony	  of	  any	  physician	  who	  attended	  said	  deceased.”	  All	  but	  the	  first	  sentence	  was	  added	  in	  1917	  (Wigmore,	  
On	  Evidence	  4th	  ed.,	  804).	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to	  the	  history	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege,	  offering	  medical	  and	  legal	  scholars	  the	  most	  complete	  history	  of	  the	  privilege	  available.13	  	  By	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  century,	  the	  legal	  treatise	  was	  hardly	  a	  new	  medium.	  In	  the	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  legal	  scholars	  had	  produced	  dozens	  of	  treatises	  on	  evidence.	  Simon	  Greenleaf’s	  oft-­‐cited	  treatise,	  first	  published	  in	  1842	  was	  largely	  representative	  of	  the	  genre.	  In	  a	  brief	  note	  on	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege,	  Greenleaf	  offered	  a	  one-­‐sentence	  synopsis	  of	  the	  contemporary	  state	  of	  the	  law:	  “Neither	  is	  this	  protection	  [privileged	  communications]	  extended	  to	  medical	  persons…	  in	  regard	  to	  information	  which	  they	  have	  acquired	  confidentially,	  by	  attending	  in	  their	  professional	  characters.”	  The	  remainder	  of	  the	  text	  was	  dedicated	  to	  detailed	  footnotes	  documenting	  every	  case	  and	  precedent	  that	  related	  to	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  Rather	  than	  editorializing	  on	  the	  propriety	  of	  specific	  legal	  doctrines,	  Greenleaf	  sought	  to	  present	  the	  state	  of	  contemporary	  law	  in	  an	  objective	  manner.14	  Like	  Greenleaf	  and	  many	  of	  his	  predecessors,	  Wigmore	  offered	  a	  comprehensive	  overview	  of	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  law.	  Yet	  once	  the	  facts	  were	  laid	  bare,	  Wigmore	  took	  a	  decidedly	  different	  strategy	  and	  tone.	  	  While	  previous	  legal	  treatises	  had	  chronicled	  the	  rise	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  with	  a	  list	  of	  statutes	  and	  the	  dates	  they	  were	  enacted	  or	  modified,	  Wigmore	  sought	  to	  explain	  how	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Wigmore,	  On	  Evidence	  1st	  ed.;	  William	  R.	  Roalfe,	  John	  Henry	  Wigmore:	  Scholar	  and	  
Reformer	  (Evanston:	  Northwestern	  University	  Press,	  1977).	  	  14	  Simon	  Greenleaf,	  A	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Evidence	  in	  Three	  Volumes:	  Revised	  With	  
Large	  Editions	  by	  William	  Draper	  Lewis,	  Ph.D.	  (Philadelphia,	  Rees	  Welsh	  and	  Co,	  1897),	  390-­‐391.	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egregious	  doctrine	  appeared	  in	  the	  books	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  To	  Wigmore,	  the	  privilege	  arose	  out	  of	  the	  advocacy	  of	  “medical	  men	  jealous	  for	  their	  profession.”15	  	  	  With	  sarcasm	  and	  cutting	  wit,	  On	  Evidence	  argued	  vehemently	  against	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  Wigmore	  laid	  out	  the	  most	  important	  arguments	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  privilege—he	  cited	  notes	  of	  the	  revisers	  to	  the	  New	  York	  code,	  the	  original	  justification	  for	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege,	  and	  a	  more	  recent	  judicial	  decision	  in	  the	  case,	  Edington	  v.	  Aetna.	  Accepting	  these	  sources	  as	  the	  best	  evidence	  that	  medical	  communications	  ought	  to	  be	  privileged,	  Wigmore	  then	  set	  out	  to	  deconstruct	  and	  dismiss	  each	  piece	  of	  evidence	  one-­‐by-­‐one.	  To	  Wigmore,	  any	  communication	  needed	  to	  meet	  four	  criteria	  to	  justifiably	  qualify	  as	  a	  privileged	  communication	  in	  the	  courtroom.	  “A	  negative	  answer	  to	  any	  of	  these	  questions,”	  Wigmore	  suggested,	  “would	  leave	  the	  privilege	  without	  support.”	  16	  First,	  the	  communication	  had	  to	  “originate	  in	  confidence.”	  If	  patients	  did	  not	  view	  their	  medical	  conditions	  as	  secrets,	  then	  there	  would	  be	  no	  need	  to	  maintain	  medical	  confidentiality	  in	  the	  courtroom.	  To	  this	  point,	  Wigmore	  argued	  that,	  most	  disease	  and	  injuries	  were	  readily	  apparent.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  venereal	  diseases	  and	  criminal	  abortions,	  there	  “is	  hardly	  a	  fact	  in	  the	  categories	  of	  pathology	  in	  which	  the	  patient	  himself	  attempts	  to	  preserve	  any	  real	  secrecy.”	  As	  these	  laws	  had	  never	  been	  intended	  to	  protect	  abortionists	  and	  other	  criminals,	  Wigmore	  concluded	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Wigmore	  On	  Evidence	  1st	  Ed.,	  3350.	  	  16	  Ibid.	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their	  current	  application	  in	  the	  courtroom	  constituted	  an	  unjust	  and	  unnecessary	  impediment	  to	  the	  legal	  process.17	  The	  second	  criteria	  required	  to	  justify	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  was	  that	  secrecy	  needed	  to	  be	  essential	  for	  the	  proper	  function	  of	  the	  physician-­‐patient	  relationship.	  If	  doctors	  were	  capable	  of	  treating	  patients	  without	  the	  trust	  engendered	  by	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege,	  then	  there	  would	  be	  no	  need	  for	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  Wigmore	  argued,	  “even	  where	  the	  disclosure	  is	  actually	  confidential,	  it	  would	  none	  the	  less	  be	  made	  though	  no	  privilege	  existed.”	  To	  Wigmore,	  it	  was	  absurd	  to	  suggest	  that	  a	  patient	  might	  endanger	  his	  or	  her	  own	  life	  out	  of	  fear	  that	  any	  information	  confided	  in	  a	  physician	  could	  be	  used	  as	  testimony	  in	  a	  court	  of	  law.	  Patients	  would	  always	  seek	  medical	  attention	  whether	  they	  knew	  their	  communications	  were	  privileged	  or	  not.	  To	  this	  point,	  Wigmore	  concluded	  with	  a	  sarcastic	  quip,	  “Is	  it	  noted	  in	  medical	  chronicles	  that	  after	  the	  privilege	  was	  established	  in	  New	  York,	  the	  floodgates	  of	  patronage	  were	  let	  open	  upon	  the	  medical	  profession	  and	  long-­‐concealed	  ailments	  were	  then	  for	  the	  first	  time	  brought	  forth	  to	  receive	  the	  blessings	  of	  cure?”18	  	   Third,	  Wigmore	  asked,	  “Is	  the	  [physician-­‐patient]	  relation	  one	  that	  should	  be	  fostered?”	  To	  this	  point	  Wigmore	  gave	  an	  unequivocal	  yes—“that	  the	  relation	  of	  physician	  and	  patient	  should	  be	  fostered,	  no	  one	  will	  deny.”	  Yet	  the	  privilege	  could	  be	  justified	  only	  if	  the	  injury	  caused	  to	  the	  physician-­‐patient	  relationship	  by	  disclosure	  of	  medical	  secrets	  was	  greater	  than	  the	  “injury	  to	  justice”	  caused	  by	  non-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Ibid.	  	  18	  Ibid.	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disclosure.	  On	  this	  fourth	  point,	  Wigmore	  suggested,	  physicians’	  arguments	  for	  the	  privilege	  fell	  apart.	  Like	  Mansfield	  more	  than	  a	  century	  before,	  Wigmore	  acknowledged	  that	  medical	  confidentiality	  had	  long	  been	  an	  important	  part	  of	  the	  physician-­‐patient	  relationship,	  and	  to	  disclose	  medical	  secrets	  outside	  of	  the	  courtroom	  would	  be	  wrong.	  Yet	  doctors’	  obligations	  to	  maintain	  their	  patients’	  secrets	  should	  not	  carry	  over	  into	  the	  courtroom.	  “In	  truth,”	  Wigmore	  concluded,	  each	  of	  these	  criteria	  except	  the	  last	  “may	  justly	  be	  answered	  in	  the	  negative…There	  is	  nothing	  to	  be	  said	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  privilege,	  and	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  be	  said	  against	  it.”	  He	  suggested	  that	  states	  should	  remove	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  from	  the	  statute	  books	  and	  that	  “the	  adoption	  of	  it	  in	  any	  other	  jurisdictions	  is	  earnestly	  to	  be	  deprecated.”19	  	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  Wigmore’s	  On	  Evidence	  proved	  to	  be	  one	  of	  the	  most	  influential	  works	  on	  the	  evolution	  of	  evidence	  law.	  Many	  legal	  scholars	  have	  accepted	  Wigmore’s	  four	  instrumental	  criteria	  as	  the	  best	  test	  for	  whether	  specific	  communications	  should	  be	  privileged.20	  In	  the	  decades	  following	  the	  publication	  of	  On	  Evidence,	  both	  legal	  and	  medical	  scholars	  frequently	  cited	  Wigmore	  as	  the	  definitive	  authority	  on	  evidentiary	  law.	  Even	  scholars	  advocating	  for	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  engage	  with	  Wigmore.	  	  In	  1913,	  for	  example,	  William	  Chandler,	  a	  physician	  from	  South	  Orange,	  New	  Jersey,	  urged	  his	  state’s	  medical	  society	  to	  push	  for	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  A	  decade	  after	  Daniel	  Strock	  had	  unsuccessfully	  lobbied	  for	  a	  New	  Jersey	  statute,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Ibid.,	  3350-­‐3352.	  	  	  20	  Edward	  J	  Imwinkelried,	  The	  New	  Wigmore:	  A	  Treatise	  on	  Evidence,	  Evidentiary	  
Privileges	  v.	  1	  (New	  York:	  Aspen	  Law	  and	  Business,	  2002),	  444-­‐445.	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Chandler	  urged	  his	  peers	  to	  “refer	  the	  matter	  back	  to	  [the	  society’s]	  legislative	  committee.”	  With	  “a	  united	  effort…	  by	  the	  [medical]	  profession,”	  Chandler	  hoped	  “to	  place	  New	  Jersey	  with	  those	  other	  States,	  which	  have	  decided	  to	  protect	  professional	  honor,	  conserve	  the	  confidence	  necessary	  to	  obtain	  health	  or	  preserve	  life,	  and	  above	  all	  to	  secure	  the	  dispensation	  of	  justice	  with	  the	  least	  injury	  and	  the	  
greatest	  beneficence	  to	  the	  whole	  commonwealth.”21	  Even	  in	  this	  impassioned	  speech,	  however,	  Chandler	  was	  forced	  to	  acknowledge	  the	  new	  challenges	  facing	  his	  cause.	  Legislators	  were	  increasingly	  rejecting	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  because	  “it	  makes	  physicians	  a	  privileged	  class”—one	  of	  Wigmore’s	  harshest	  critiques	  of	  the	  privilege—and	  because	  “it	  would	  in	  too	  many	  instances	  defeat	  the	  ends	  of	  justice.”22	  Unwilling	  to	  completely	  reject	  the	  arguments	  of	  “Dean	  Wigmore,”	  however,	  Chandler	  repurposed	  Wigmore’s	  four	  criteria	  in	  his	  speech.	  To	  Chandler,	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  was	  justified	  because	  it	  met	  all	  four	  criteria	  necessary	  to	  justify	  privileged	  communications.	  Chandler’s	  plea	  fell	  upon	  deaf	  ears,	  however,	  as	  New	  Jersey	  failed	  to	  enact	  a	  new	  statute.	  	  In	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century,	  many	  doctors	  were	  beginning	  to	  agree	  with	  Wigmore.	  Dating	  back	  to	  the	  1880s,	  there	  had	  long	  been	  doctors	  opposed	  to	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  and,	  more	  broadly,	  codified	  medical	  ethics.	  By	  1900,	  however,	  dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  AMA’s	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  had	  reached	  a	  boiling	  point.	  The	  most	  vocal	  critics	  of	  the	  Code	  took	  issue	  with	  the	  consultation	  provision,	  a	  clause	  that	  prohibited	  cooperation	  with	  irregular	  practitioners.	  Yet	  when	  John	  Allen	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  William	  J.	  Chandler,	  “Privileged	  Communications,”	  Journal	  of	  the	  Medical	  Society	  of	  
New	  Jersey	  (July,	  1913),	  pp.	  67-­‐71,	  at	  71.	  	  22	  Ibid.,	  69-­‐70.	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Wyeth,	  the	  AMA	  president,	  called	  upon	  the	  organization	  to	  repeal	  the	  provision	  in	  1902,	  reformers	  seized	  the	  opportunity	  to	  make	  wholesale	  revisions	  to	  the	  document.	  The	  following	  year,	  a	  committee	  appointed	  to	  revise	  the	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  produced	  a	  new	  document,	  titled	  Principles	  of	  Medical	  Ethics.	  While	  the	  1903	  revision	  retained	  much	  of	  the	  original	  language	  of	  the	  1847	  Code,	  Principles	  removed	  several	  of	  the	  more	  offensive	  provisions.	  The	  new	  document	  removed	  the	  controversial	  consultation	  provision,	  omitted	  any	  mention	  of	  the	  public’s	  obligations	  to	  physicians,	  and	  relaxed	  restrictions	  on	  the	  use	  of	  patent	  medicines	  and	  proprietary	  drugs.23	  More	  importantly	  for	  the	  politics	  of	  medical	  confidentiality,	  Principles	  stripped	  the	  code	  of	  any	  regulatory	  mechanisms.	  In	  the	  Preface	  to	  the	  new	  code,	  the	  revisers	  noted	  that	  they	  “deemed	  it	  wiser	  to	  formulate	  the	  principles	  of	  medical	  ethics	  without	  definite	  reference	  to	  code	  or	  penalties.”	  Accordingly,	  they	  maintained	  that	  the	  new	  Principles	  of	  Medical	  Ethics,	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  the	  old	  AMA	  Code,	  would	  be	  merely	  “suggestive	  and	  advisory.”	  The	  policing	  of	  ethical	  infractions	  was	  	  “thus	  left	  to	  the	  respective	  state	  and	  territorial	  societies.”	  These	  societies	  were	  free	  to	  “form	  such	  codes	  and	  establish	  such	  rules	  for	  the	  professional	  conduct	  of	  their	  members	  as	  they	  may	  consider	  proper,	  provided,	  of	  course,	  that	  there	  shall	  be	  no	  infringement	  of	  the	  established	  ethical	  principles	  of	  this	  Association.”24	  	  Supporters	  of	  the	  new	  Principles	  of	  Medical	  Ethics	  argued	  that	  the	  new	  document	  was	  preferable	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  American	  Medical	  Association,	  Principles	  of	  Medical	  Ethics	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  
Association	  (Chicago:	  1903).	  For	  more	  analysis	  of	  the	  1903	  revisions,	  see:	  Konold,	  68-­‐75	  and	  Baker,	  215-­‐218.	  	  24	  AMA,	  Principles	  of	  Medical	  Ethics	  (1903),	  Preface.	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to	  the	  old	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  because	  left	  individual	  physicians	  free	  to	  make	  decisions	  in	  accordance	  with	  their	  own	  standards	  of	  medical	  ethics.	  “Character	  must	  be	  the	  foundation	  upon	  which	  ethical	  action	  is	  to	  be	  built,”	  a	  Colorado	  physician	  declared.	  “Proper	  conduct	  among	  men	  and	  affairs	  must	  be	  left	  to	  the	  man,	  his	  tact,	  his	  judgment,	  his	  education	  and	  his	  experience.”25	  	  	  Yet	  this	  sentiment	  did	  not	  resonate	  throughout	  the	  medical	  profession.	  Despite	  support	  for	  some	  the	  revisions	  incorporated	  into	  Principles	  of	  Medical	  
Ethics,	  many	  physicians	  felt	  the	  new	  document	  erred	  too	  far	  in	  favor	  of	  laissez-­‐faire	  medical	  ethics.	  	  As	  a	  series	  of	  high	  profile	  quarrels	  rocked	  the	  medical	  profession,	  critics	  of	  the	  new	  code	  began	  to	  rail	  against	  its	  lack	  of	  disciplinary	  authority.	  In	  1909,	  when	  Frank	  Lydston,	  a	  Chicago	  gynecologist,	  openly	  challenged	  the	  integrity	  of	  George	  H.	  Simmons,	  the	  AMA	  Secretary-­‐General,	  many	  physicians	  began	  to	  call	  for	  a	  second	  revision	  of	  the	  code.	  Led	  by	  Simmons,	  this	  group	  of	  physicians	  successfully	  lobbied	  for	  a	  second	  revision	  of	  the	  AMA	  code,	  and,	  in	  1912,	  the	  AMA	  adopted	  a	  new	  version	  of	  Principles	  of	  Medical	  Ethics	  that	  restored	  the	  society’s	  capacity	  for	  ethical	  enforcement.26	  Yet	  the	  second	  batch	  of	  revisions	  did	  not	  abandon	  laissez-­‐faire	  ethics	  altogether.	  	  Rather	  than	  merely	  relax	  the	  standards	  of	  ethical	  policing,	  the	  1913	  
Principles	  incorporated	  laissez-­‐faire	  ethics	  into	  many	  of	  the	  Code’s	  provisions.	  The	  treatment	  of	  confidentiality	  was	  a	  case	  in	  point.	  Compared	  to	  earlier	  ethical	  codes,	  the	  1913	  Principles	  offered	  a	  merely	  tepid	  endorsement	  of	  medical	  confidentiality.	  	  While	  the	  1847	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  had	  praised	  the	  protection	  of	  patients’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Denver	  Medical	  Times,	  quoted	  in	  the	  Journal	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  Association	  45:1263	  and	  Konold,	  69-­‐70.	  	  26	  Konold,	  68-­‐75;	  Baker,	  Before	  Bioethics,	  220-­‐223.	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secrets	  as	  one	  of	  the	  basic	  tenets	  of	  the	  physician-­‐patient	  relationship,	  the	  laissez-­‐faire	  medical	  ethics	  of	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century	  found	  these	  restrictions	  increasingly	  onerous.	  Accordingly,	  the	  revisers	  who	  authored	  the	  1913	  Principles	  tempered	  the	  proscriptive	  language	  of	  the	  old	  Code	  of	  Ethics.	  	  While	  the	  1847	  document	  had	  mandated	  that	  “secrecy	  and	  delicacy…	  should	  be	  strictly	  observed”	  and	  that	  	  “no	  infirmity	  of	  disposition	  or	  flaw	  of	  character	  observed	  during	  professional	  attendance,	  should	  ever	  be	  divulged	  by	  him	  except	  when	  he	  is	  imperatively	  required	  to	  do	  so,”27	  the	  1913	  Principles	  read:	  There	  are	  occasions…	  when	  a	  physician	  must	  determine	  whether	  or	  not	  his	  duty	  to	  society	  requires	  him	  to	  take	  definite	  action	  to	  protect	  a	  healthy	  individual	  from	  becoming	  infected	  because	  the	  physician	  has	  knowledge	  obtained	  through	  the	  confidences	  entrusted	  to	  him	  as	  a	  physician	  of	  a	  communicable	  disease	  to	  which	  the	  healthy	  individual	  is	  about	  to	  be	  exposed.	  In	  such	  a	  case	  the	  physician	  should	  act	  as	  he	  would	  desire	  another	  to	  act	  toward	  one	  of	  his	  own	  family	  under	  like	  circumstances.	  Before	  he	  determines	  his	  course,	  the	  physician	  should	  know	  the	  civil	  law	  of	  his	  commonwealth	  concerning	  privileged	  communications.28	  	  Like	  earlier	  versions,	  this	  new	  clause	  acknowledged	  the	  physician’s	  need	  to	  maintain	  the	  confidences	  of	  his	  patients.	  Yet	  the	  1913	  Principles	  also	  introduced	  new	  ethical	  duties	  that	  superseded	  the	  physician’s	  obligation	  to	  his	  patient,	  allowing	  the	  physician	  to	  exercise	  his	  own	  judgment	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis.	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  revisions	  demonstrated	  a	  drastic	  shift	  in	  the	  AMA’s	  position	  on	  privileged	  communications.	  	  The	  1847	  Code	  had	  praised	  privileged	  communications	  as	  a	  powerful	  indicator	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  professional	  ethics	  and	  medical	  confidentiality,	  stating,	  “the	  force	  and	  necessity	  of	  [physicians’]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  AMA,	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  (1847).	  	  28	  American	  Medical	  Association,	  Principles	  of	  Medical	  Ethics	  of	  the	  American	  Medical	  
Association	  (Chicago:	  1912),	  Chapter	  I,	  Section	  2.	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obligation	  [to	  maintain	  their	  patients’	  secrets]	  are	  indeed	  so	  great,	  that	  professional	  men	  have,	  under	  certain	  circumstances,	  been	  protected	  in	  their	  observance	  of	  secrecy	  by	  courts	  of	  justice.”29	  By	  contrast,	  the	  1913	  Principles	  urged	  physicians	  to	  be	  familiar	  with	  “the	  civil	  law	  of	  his	  commonwealth	  regarding	  privileged	  communications”	  as	  means	  of	  self-­‐protection,	  implying	  that	  privileged	  communications	  were	  a	  negative	  duty	  that	  could,	  and	  often	  did,	  conflict	  with	  a	  physician’s	  obligation	  to	  society	  and	  impinge	  upon	  a	  his	  ability	  to	  act	  ethically.	  	  	   This	  shift	  in	  relation	  to	  medical	  confidentiality	  demonstrates	  the	  AMA’s	  increasing	  acceptance	  of	  laissez-­‐faire	  ethics	  throughout	  the	  early	  twentieth	  century.	  The	  change	  in	  ethical	  practices	  reverberated	  throughout	  all	  levels	  of	  the	  medical	  profession.	  Just	  as	  the	  AMA	  relaxed	  its	  policies	  on	  medical	  confidentiality,	  individual	  physicians	  across	  the	  country	  were	  increasingly	  willing	  to	  violate	  patients’	  secrets	  in	  service	  of	  other,	  conflicting	  ethical	  duties.	  Increasingly,	  these	  practices	  brought	  physicians	  into	  conflict	  with	  their	  patients.	  	  In	  1920,	  for	  example,	  the	  Nebraska	  Supreme	  Court	  convened	  to	  adjudicate	  a	  dispute	  between	  a	  doctor	  and	  his	  disgruntled	  patient.	  Simonsen	  v.	  Swenson	  caught	  national	  attention	  as	  the	  first	  time	  a	  court	  was	  “called	  on	  to	  determine	  a	  physician’s	  liability	  for	  voluntarily	  revealing	  out	  of	  court	  a	  patient’s	  confidences.”30	  The	  trouble	  began	  when	  Simonsen,	  an	  employee	  of	  a	  telephone	  company,	  stopped	  in	  Oakland,	  Nebraska	  along	  with	  several	  colleagues.	  In	  his	  hotel	  room	  one	  night,	  he	  noticed	  sores	  across	  his	  body.	  Alarmed	  and	  fearing	  the	  worst,	  he	  sought	  the	  counsel	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  AMA,	  Code	  of	  Ethics	  (1847).	  	  30	  “Liability	  of	  a	  Physician	  for	  Revealing	  out	  of	  Court	  His	  Patient’s	  Confidences,”	  
Harvard	  Law	  Review	  34:3	  (January	  1,	  1921):	  312–14.	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Swenson,	  a	  local	  physician,	  but	  the	  doctor’s	  visit	  did	  little	  to	  allay	  Simonsen’s	  fears.	  After	  a	  brief	  examination,	  Swenson	  informed	  the	  travelling	  telephone	  employee	  that	  his	  sores	  were	  most	  likely	  indications	  of	  syphilis.	  There	  was	  still	  some	  cause	  for	  optimism,	  however,	  as	  the	  doctor’s	  hasty	  examination	  called	  for	  more	  tests	  before	  the	  diagnosis	  could	  be	  confirmed.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  doctor	  worried	  that	  Simonsen’s	  condition	  might	  be	  contagious	  and	  strongly	  urged	  the	  traveller	  to	  vacate	  his	  hotel	  room.31	  	  Though	  the	  diagnosis	  was	  distressing,	  Simonsen	  elected	  to	  ignore	  the	  doctor’s	  advice.	  Instead,	  he	  opted	  to	  finish	  his	  business	  in	  town	  before	  seeking	  a	  second	  opinion	  at	  home.	  Returning	  from	  work	  the	  following	  day,	  however,	  Simonsen	  was	  alarmed	  to	  find	  his	  bags	  packed	  and	  waiting	  in	  the	  hall.	  His	  room	  was	  under	  quarantine	  and	  in	  the	  process	  of	  being	  fumigated.	  When	  Simonsen	  sought	  out	  the	  hotel’s	  proprietor	  to	  ask	  what	  was	  going	  on,	  he	  was	  instructed	  to	  leave	  immediately.	  The	  telephone	  employee	  was	  distraught.	  On	  its	  own,	  the	  diagnosis	  was	  enough	  to	  cause	  concern,	  but	  his	  expulsion	  from	  the	  hotel	  brought	  even	  more	  problems:	  where	  would	  he	  stay	  as	  he	  finished	  his	  work?	  How	  would	  he	  explain	  these	  events	  to	  his	  colleagues?	  The	  court	  records	  fail	  to	  indicate	  how	  Simonsen	  managed	  to	  negotiate	  these	  dilemmas.	  He	  did,	  however,	  seek	  a	  second	  opinion,	  learning	  later	  his	  sores	  were	  been	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  false	  alarm.32	  	  In	  the	  resulting	  lawsuit,	  Simonsen	  called	  the	  physician	  into	  court,	  asking	  Dr.	  Swenson	  to	  answer	  for	  the	  embarrassment	  and	  hardship	  caused	  by	  his	  mistaken	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Simonsen	  v.	  Swenson,	  1920	  NE	  104	  Neb	  224.	  	  32	  Ibid.	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diagnosis.	  The	  physician’s	  story	  did	  not	  contradict	  that	  of	  his	  patients.	  Both	  agreed	  on	  the	  same	  sequence	  of	  events,	  yet	  the	  doctor	  vehemently	  attested	  that	  his	  actions	  were	  justified.	  Dr.	  Swenson	  had	  long	  served	  Mrs.	  Bristol,	  the	  hotel’s	  proprietor,	  developing	  a	  friendship,	  and	  Mrs.	  Bristol	  would	  frequently	  refer	  ailing	  guests	  to	  Swenson.	  Accordingly,	  when	  Simonsen	  first	  noticed	  the	  symptoms	  of	  a	  mysterious	  ailment,	  he	  was	  referred	  to	  the	  “hotel	  doctor.”33	  Upon	  examining	  Simonsen,	  Swenson	  immediately	  feared	  the	  worst:	  the	  patient	  was	  suffering	  from	  syphilis.	  To	  make	  matters	  worse,	  contemporary	  physicians	  believed	  that	  the	  disease	  was	  “very	  readily	  transmitted	  in	  its	  early	  stages,	  and	  could	  be	  carried	  through	  drinking	  cups,	  eating	  utensils,	  and	  other	  articles	  handled	  or	  used	  by	  the	  diseased	  person.”	  To	  the	  doctor,	  Simonsen’s	  condition	  was	  not	  just	  a	  personal	  matter	  for	  his	  presence	  at	  the	  hotel	  risked	  exposing	  other	  guests	  to	  this	  loathsome	  disease.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  protect	  the	  health	  and	  safety	  of	  the	  hotel’s	  guests,	  the	  doctor	  pleaded	  with	  his	  patient	  to	  leave	  the	  hotel	  and	  return	  home.	  34	  	   When	  Dr.	  Swenson	  returned	  to	  the	  hotel	  the	  next	  day,	  he	  was	  dismayed	  to	  hear	  that	  Simonsen	  had	  not	  left.	  Concerned,	  the	  doctor	  informed	  his	  friend,	  Mrs.	  Bristol,	  that	  Simonsen	  was	  “afflicted	  with	  a	  ‘contagious	  disease.’”	  The	  doctor	  instructed	  Mrs.	  Bristol	  “to	  be	  careful,	  to	  disinfect	  [Simonsen’s]	  bedclothing,	  and	  to	  wash	  her	  hands	  in	  alcohol	  afterwards.”	  Acting	  on	  this	  information,	  Mrs.	  Bristol	  immediately	  gathered	  Simonsen’s	  belongings	  and	  expelled	  him	  from	  the	  hotel.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Ibid.	  	  34	  Ibid.	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Though	  Simonsen’s	  embarrassment	  was	  regrettable,	  the	  doctor	  argued,	  the	  doctor	  needed	  to	  act	  swiftly	  to	  prevent	  further	  spread	  of	  disease.35	  	  When	  the	  justices	  of	  the	  Nebraska	  Supreme	  court	  assembled	  to	  adjudicate	  the	  dispute,	  they	  heard	  each	  of	  these	  narratives.	  First	  Simonsen	  presented	  his	  case,	  arguing	  that	  the	  doctor	  acted	  unethically	  and	  that	  the	  patient	  was	  entitled	  to	  damages.	  Simonsen’s	  attorney’s	  directed	  the	  justices	  toward	  a	  Nebraska	  statute	  that	  mandated	  the	  revocation	  of	  a	  physician’s	  license	  upon	  the	  “betrayal	  of	  a	  professional	  secret	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  a	  patient.”	  The	  court	  was	  unmoved,	  however.	  After	  hearing	  Swenson’s	  account	  the	  justices	  ruled	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  doctor.	  In	  their	  decision,	  the	  justices	  stated,	  “no	  patient	  can	  expect	  that	  if	  his	  malady	  is	  found	  to	  be	  of	  a	  dangerously	  contagious	  nature	  he	  can	  still	  require	  it	  to	  be	  kept	  secret	  from	  those	  to	  whom,	  if	  there	  was	  no	  disclosure,	  such	  disease	  would	  be	  transmitted.”36	  To	  doctors	  and	  lawyers	  Simonsen	  was	  a	  landmark	  case.	  By	  establishing	  a	  precedent	  through	  which	  physicians’	  legal	  obligations	  could	  be	  overruled	  in	  the	  name	  of	  public	  health,	  as	  one	  legal	  scholar	  remarked,	  “the	  case	  [stood]	  for	  the	  triumph	  of	  medical	  altruism	  over	  legal	  duty.”37	  	   As	  legal	  scholars	  railed	  against	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  and	  the	  medical	  profession	  increasingly	  embraced	  laissez-­‐faire	  medical	  ethics,	  the	  spread	  of	  the	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  that	  had	  continued	  throughout	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  slowly	  came	  to	  a	  halt.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  U.S.	  territories	  of	  Puerto	  Rico	  (1911)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Ibid.	  	  36	  Ibid.	  	  37	  Ibid.	  
	  	  116	  
and	  the	  Virgin	  Islands	  (1920),	  no	  new	  jurisdictions	  adopted	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  between	  1906	  and	  1925.38	  While	  the	  law	  has	  continued	  to	  evolve	  though	  judicial	  interpretation	  and	  occasional	  amendments	  to	  these	  codes,	  the	  wave	  of	  legislation	  that	  produced	  many	  of	  the	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  statutes	  still	  in	  effect	  today	  had	  come	  to	  a	  close.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Wigmore,	  On	  Evidence	  4th	  ed.,	  803-­‐805.	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CHAPTER	  VII	  
	  EPILOGUE:	  MEDICAL	  CONFIDENTIALITY	  TODAY	  
	  In	  February	  2004,	  conflict	  arose	  as	  Planned	  Parenthood	  challenged	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  legality	  of	  the	  Partial-­‐Birth	  Abortion	  Ban	  Act.	  The	  2003	  law,	  Planned	  Parenthood	  argued,	  was	  unconstitutional,	  as	  the	  procedure	  was	  often	  medically	  necessary	  and,	  therefore,	  the	  ban	  violated	  women’s	  constitutional	  right	  to	  have	  an	  abortion.	  The	  Bush	  administration,	  searching	  for	  evidence	  to	  support	  the	  anti-­‐abortion	  claim	  that	  most	  of	  these	  procedures	  occurred	  on	  healthy	  women,	  subpoenaed	  the	  medical	  records	  of	  2,700	  women	  who	  had	  received	  abortions	  through	  Planned	  Parenthood.	  Clinics	  and	  hospitals	  in	  six	  states—California,	  New	  York,	  Kansas,	  Missouri,	  Washington,	  and	  Pennsylvania—were	  to	  send	  their	  patient	  records	  to	  the	  federal	  government.1	  	  According	  to	  the	  Justice	  Department,	  the	  acquisition	  of	  patient	  records	  was	  legal	  because	  federal	  law	  "does	  not	  recognize	  a	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege."	  In	  spite	  of	  objections	  from	  reproductive	  rights	  advocates,	  U.S.	  District	  Judge	  Richard	  Conway	  Casey	  found	  the	  Justice	  Department’s	  arguments	  convincing,	  mandating	  that	  Planned	  Parenthood	  turn	  over	  its	  patient	  records.2	  	  In	  the	  weeks	  that	  followed,	  however,	  several	  federal	  courts	  ruled	  in	  favor	  of	  Planned	  Parenthood.	  “There	  is	  no	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Hoawrd	  Markel,	  “When	  Big	  Brother	  Invades	  the	  Examining	  Room,”	  New	  York	  Times	  (March	  16,	  2004),	  Terry	  Freiden,	  “US	  Drops	  fight	  to	  Get	  Abortion	  Records,”	  CNN	  Law	  
Center	  (June	  1,	  2004);	  Robert	  Pear	  and	  Eric	  Lichtblau,	  “Administration	  Sets	  Forth	  a	  Limited	  View	  on	  Privacy,”	  New	  York	  Times	  (March	  6,	  2004),	  and	  Steve	  Hymon,	  “U.S.	  Subpoenas	  Records	  of	  Abortion	  Repipients,”	  Los	  Angeles	  Times	  (February	  27,	  2004).	  	  2	  Pear	  and	  Lichtblau,	  “Administration	  Sets	  Forth	  a	  Limited	  View	  on	  Privacy.”	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question	  that	  the	  patient	  is	  entitled	  to	  privacy	  and	  protection,"	  Judge	  Phyllis	  J	  Hamilton	  stated,	  "Women	  are	  entitled	  to	  not	  have	  the	  government	  looking	  at	  their	  records."	  3	  Likewise,	  U.S.	  chief	  District	  Judge	  Charles	  Kocoras	  “halted	  an	  attempt	  to	  subpoena	  records	  of	  about	  forty	  patients	  who	  had	  received	  abortions	  at	  Northwestern	  Memorial	  Hospital	  in	  Chicago,”	  stating	  that	  these	  requests	  violated	  Illinois’	  medical	  confidentiality	  laws.4	  In	  response	  to	  mounting	  criticism	  from	  professionals	  and	  public	  alike,	  the	  Bush	  administration	  eventually	  relented.	  	  This	  brief	  episode	  illustrates	  several	  major	  changes	  that	  have	  transformed	  debates	  over	  medical	  confidentiality	  during	  the	  past	  century.	  No	  longer	  debated	  solely	  by	  doctors	  and	  lawyers,	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  has	  now	  entered	  public	  discourse.	  The	  medical	  confidentiality,	  however,	  laws	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  were	  enacted	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  professionals—doctors	  and	  legal	  scholars—not	  the	  public.	  While	  sporadic	  newspaper	  articles	  referenced	  medical	  confidentiality,5	  indicating	  that	  patients	  likely	  expected	  their	  doctors	  to	  preserve	  their	  secrets,	  there	  is	  little	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  the	  public	  actively	  pushed	  for	  legislation	  on	  the	  issue.	  When	  physicians—even	  the	  eminent	  gynecologist	  James	  Marion	  Sims—violated	  patient	  confidentiality,	  there	  was	  seldom	  any	  public	  outcry.	  By	  contrast,	  nearly	  every	  major	  American	  newspaper	  covered	  the	  protracted	  court	  battle	  between	  the	  Justice	  Department	  and	  Planned	  Parenthood.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Pear	  and	  Lichtblau,	  “Administration	  Sets	  Forth	  a	  Limited	  View	  on	  Privacy.”	  	  4	  Hymon,	  “U.S.	  Subpoenas	  Records	  of	  Abortion	  Recipients.”	  	  5	  See,	  for	  example,	  coverage	  of	  a	  proposed	  Illinois	  statute	  in	  “Abbreviated	  Telegrams,”	  The	  Rock	  Island	  Argus	  (December	  8,	  1896).	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Nevertheless,	  this	  2004	  case	  demonstrates	  several	  continuities	  in	  the	  debate	  surrounding	  physician-­‐patient-­‐privilege.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  past	  two	  centuries—contradictory	  impulses,	  including	  the	  advocacy	  of	  numerous	  physicians	  and	  medical	  societies	  on	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  criticism	  of	  prominent	  doctors	  and	  legal	  scholars	  on	  the	  other—have	  prevented	  any	  formation	  of	  consensus	  on	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege.	  	  While	  the	  Bush	  administration	  could	  point	  to	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  federally	  recognized	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege,	  owing	  to	  a	  legal	  precedent	  established	  in	  1776,	  proponents	  of	  the	  privilege	  could	  point	  to	  myriad	  state	  laws	  mandating	  that	  doctors	  observe	  their	  patients’	  confidences	  at	  all	  times.	  Uncertainty	  surrounding	  medical	  confidentiality	  laws—a	  byproduct	  of	  the	  long	  and	  fractured	  history	  of	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  in	  America—enables	  both	  proponents	  and	  critics	  of	  medical	  confidentiality	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  law	  is	  on	  their	  side.	  	  Though	  notions	  of	  medical	  confidentiality	  have	  increasingly	  become	  linked	  to	  contemporary	  issues	  such	  as	  reproductive	  rights—a	  topic	  worthy	  of	  further	  study—much	  of	  the	  rhetoric	  surrounding	  physician-­‐patient-­‐privilege	  echoes	  the	  arguments	  of	  earlier	  debates.	  Those	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  privilege	  continue	  to	  argue	  that	  it	  serves	  as	  a	  necessary	  guarantee	  of	  patients’	  privacy	  and	  that	  it	  facilitates	  a	  healthy	  doctor-­‐patient	  relationship.	  Critics	  of	  the	  privilege,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  maintain	  that	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  constitutes	  an	  unnecessary	  impediment	  to	  the	  judicial	  process.	  And	  yet,	  neither	  side	  can	  be	  content	  with	  the	  current	  state	  of	  the	  law.	  As	  such,	  the	  numerous	  statutes	  guaranteeing	  physician-­‐patient	  privilege	  constitute	  a	  considerable	  obstacle	  to	  an	  efficient	  judicial	  process.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  however,	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these	  laws—unenforceable	  in	  federal	  courts—do	  not	  do	  enough	  to	  ensure	  patients	  feel	  secure	  that	  their	  medical	  secrets	  will	  remain	  confidential.	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